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DISAGGREGATING “IMMIGRATION LAW” 
Matthew J. Lindsay* 
Abstract 
Courts and scholars have long noted the constitutional exceptionalism 
of the federal immigration power, decried the injustice it produces, and 
appealed for greater constitutional protection for noncitizens. This Article 
builds on this robust literature while focusing on a particularly critical 
conceptual and doctrinal obstacle to legal reform—the notion that laws 
governing the rights of noncitizens to enter and remain within the United 
States comprise a distinct body of “immigration laws” presumed to be part 
and parcel of foreign affairs and national security.  
This Article argues that the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent immigration 
jurisprudence suggests a willingness to temper, and perhaps even retire, 
that presumption. In particular, the majority opinions in Zadvydas v. 
Davis and Padilla v. Kentucky evidence a growing skepticism among the 
Justices that the regulation of noncitizens comprises a discrete, 
constitutionally privileged domain of distinctly “political” subject matter 
that is properly buffered against judicial scrutiny.  
To rescind that presumption would, in effect, disaggregate the 
category of “immigration law” for the purpose of constitutional review 
and subject federal authority over noncitizens to the same judicially 
enforceable constitutional constraints that apply to most other federal 
lawmaking. The disaggregation of immigration law would thus give full 
expression to noncitizens’ constitutional personhood. Foreign policy and 
national security considerations would continue to serve as 
constitutionally viable warrants for laws burdening noncitizens, but 
Congress and the President would no longer enjoy the extraordinary 
judicial deference that they currently receive as a matter of course. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Immigration occupies a paradoxical position in American law and 
political culture. On the one hand, the United States enthusiastically 
celebrates its heritage as a “nation of immigrants” and has long embraced 
the “melting pot” as a central metaphor of civic identity. For the past half-
century, in particular, federal law governing eligibility for admission to 
the United States has generally reflected this inclusive, pluralistic 
heritage.1 On the other hand, for more than a century, the U.S. Supreme 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Congress repealed the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1943, though immigration from China 
remained extremely limited for another two decades as the result of the miniscule immigration 
quotas allocated to nations in the “Asia-Pacific triangle.” Act of June 23, 1913, ch. 3, § 1, 38 Stat. 
65, repealed by Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, § 1, 57 Stat. 600. Congress abandoned the limitation 
of eligibility for naturalization to “free white persons”—a limitation first adopted in the 
Naturalization Act of 1790—in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), also known 
as the McCarran–Walter Act. Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, repealed by Immigration 
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Court has maintained that noncitizens and the laws that govern them are 
constitutionally exceptional, outside of and largely insulated from 
mainstream constitutional norms.2 When the federal government 
banishes a noncitizen from the country or detains her for months or years 
at a time, for example, she does not enjoy many of the constitutional 
protections to which she, as a constitutional “person,” would otherwise 
be entitled.3 As a result, noncitizens in the United States operate under a 
deep and enduring estrangement from the American constitutional 
community. This estrangement stands in sharp contrast not only to the 
nation’s prevailing, if still contested, cultural and political ethic of 
inclusiveness, but also the Constitution’s denomination of “persons,” 
rather than “citizens,” as the beneficiaries of key constitutional 
                                                                                                                     
and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 84-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952). Yet it was not until the 
Immigration Act of 1965 that the civil rights revolution finally came to immigration law. See 
Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look at the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REV. 273, 300–02 (1996) (documenting that 
racial egalitarianism motivated many of the Immigration Act’s leading sponsors). The 1965 Act 
eliminated the near-total exclusion for seven decades of immigrants from nations in the Asia-
Pacific triangle, and abandoned the National Origins Quota system, which had severely restricted 
immigration from countries outside of western and northern Europe since the 1920s. Id. at 303, 
316 & n.193; Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965). Notwithstanding the 
racially egalitarian intent and effect of the Act, however, its liberalizing impulse was not without 
substantial limits. See Kevin R. Johnson, The Beginning of the End: The Immigration Act of 1965 
and the Emergence of Modern U.S./Mexico Border Enforcement 35, 38 (U.C. Davis Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 360, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2362478 (arguing that the 1965 Act’s “artificial” numerical cap on migration from the Western 
Hemisphere represents a quite deliberate, though more sophisticated and less visible, intention to 
restrict Latino immigration to the United States); see also Kevin R. Johnson, A Case Study of 
Color-Blindness: The Racially Disparate Impacts of Arizona’s SB 1070 and the Failure of 
Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 313, 315 (2012) (documenting 
various ways in which federal immigration law, as well as state laws such as Arizona S.B. 1070, 
“readily provide color-blind, facially neutral proxies” for race and, “in the aggregate, [allow for 
racial discrimination] without the need for the express (and delegitimizing) reliance on race, on a 
massive scale”); Elizabeth Keyes, Race and Immigration, Then and Now: How the Shift to 
“Worthiness” Undermines the 1965 Immigration Law’s Civil Rights Goals, 57 HOWARD L.J. 899, 
902, 910–15 (2014) (discussing the “erosion of the 1965 Act’s egalitarian goals” by the racially 
disparate impacts of workplace, national security, and criminal law enforcement). 
 2. See infra Section I.A. 
 3. See infra notes 50–61 and accompanying text. This constitutional estrangement was the 
product of a deep undercurrent—at once cultural, economic, and racial—of apprehension about 
the meaning of mass immigration for the quality of the nation’s economic and political life. That 
apprehension found expression historically in a host of remarkably illiberal movements and 
policies that have colored American immigration policy, particularly before the mid-twentieth 
century. See generally Matthew J. Lindsay, Immigration as Invasion: Sovereignty, Security, and 
the Origins of the Federal Immigration Power, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 40–51 (2010) 
[hereinafter Lindsay, Immigration as Invasion]; Matthew J. Lindsay, Immigration, Sovereignty, 
and the Constitution of Foreignness, 45 CONN. L. REV. 743, 746–49 (2013) [hereinafter Lindsay, 
Constitution of Foreignness].  
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protections.4 
This Article argues that the Supreme Court’s recent immigration 
jurisprudence suggests a growing skepticism among the Justices that the 
regulation of noncitizens comprises a discrete, constitutionally privileged 
domain of distinctly “political” subject matter that is properly buffered 
against judicial scrutiny. To rescind that presumption would effectively 
disaggregate the category of “immigration law” for the purpose of 
constitutional review, and subject federal authority over immigrants and 
immigration to the same judicially enforceable constitutional constraints 
that apply to most other federal lawmaking. The disaggregation of 
immigration law would thus give full expression to noncitizens’ 
constitutional personhood. 
To better understand the terms and stakes of immigrants’ 
constitutional estrangement, consider Mathews v. Diaz,5 a staple of 
modern constitutional immigration law. In 1972, the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services denied the Medicaid applications of three 
elderly noncitizens—Cuban refugees Santiago Diaz and José Clara, and 
permanent resident Victor Espinosa—because they could not satisfy a 
statutory five-year residency requirement.6 When Diaz, Clara, and 
Espinosa challenged the residency requirement as an unconstitutional 
denial of equal protection,7 they had reason to be hopeful. The Supreme 
Court in Graham v. Richardson had recently applied strict scrutiny to a 
state law conditioning eligibility for welfare benefits on a period of 
residency and struck down the residency provision as an unconstitutional 
denial of equal protection.8 Because “[a]liens as a class are a prime 
example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority,” the Graham Court 
declared, “classifications based on alienage, like those based on 
                                                                                                                     
 4. The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses protect “persons” without regard to 
citizenship. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. The Supreme Court has long acknowledged as much 
when reviewing state laws discriminating on the basis of alienage. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 
U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (observing that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment were “universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial 
jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality”). The First 
Amendment is framed as a general restraint on Congress. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The only 
potentially meaningful exception is the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which prohibits the states from “abridg[ing] the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States.” Id. amend. XIV. 
 5. 426 U.S. 67 (1976). 
 6. Id. at 69–70. 
 7. Id. at 70–71. Specifically, the petitioners argued that the residency requirement violated 
the equal protection guarantee incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
by the Supreme Court in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) (declaring that equal protection under the Fifth Amendment “is the same as 
that under the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
 8. 403 U.S. 365, 372, 382–83 (1971). 
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nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial 
scrutiny.”9 Yet the Diaz Court had little difficulty upholding the 
analogous federal statute. Because “the relationship between the United 
States and our alien visitors . . . may implicate our relations with foreign 
powers,” the Court explained, the responsibility of regulating noncitizens 
had been “committed to the political branches of the Federal 
Government.”10 The same “reasons that preclude judicial review of 
political questions” therefore “dictate[d] a narrow standard of review of 
decisions made by the Congress or the President in the area of 
immigration and naturalization.”11 
This constitutional diffidence has two curious features. First, there is 
a striking mismatch between the quintessentially domestic subject matter 
of the challenged statute—eligibility for federal Medicare benefits—and 
the Court’s rationale for deferring to the political judgment of Congress—
the asserted connection between the regulation of noncitizens and the 
conduct of foreign affairs.12 Second, the Court simply assumes without 
discussion that the challenged provision constituted a regulation of 
“immigration,” even though Medicare eligibility has no obvious bearing 
on any immigrant’s right to enter into or remain within the United 
States—the conventional indices of an immigration law.13 These 
curiosities in the Diaz Court’s reasoning are symptoms of the Court’s 
very peculiar legal construction of the federal immigration power, known 
as the “plenary power doctrine.” Under the plenary power doctrine, 
federal authority to regulate immigration does not derive from any 
constitutionally enumerated power but is rather “an incident of 
sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States.”14 The 
authority is thus extra-constitutional and exclusive to the federal 
government; moreover, its exercise by Congress or the President is 
buffered against judicially enforceable constitutional constraints.15 As the 
                                                                                                                     
 9. Id. at 372 (footnotes omitted) (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 
144, 153 n.4 (1938)). 
 10. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 81. 
 11. Id. at 81–82. 
 12. See id. Federal courts of appeal rejected similar constitutional challenges to the 1996 
Welfare Reform Act on the same grounds. See infra note 357. 
 13. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 79–80; see also De Canas v. BICA, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976) (defining 
the “regulation of immigration” as “essentially a determination of who should or should not be 
admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain”). 
 14. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889). 
The Court first grounded the federal immigration power in national sovereignty in the 1889 
Chinese Exclusion Case, and it remains there to this day. For the classic formulation of the plenary 
power doctrine, see id. at 606–09; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893); 
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892). 
 15. This is not to suggest that the plenary power doctrine always wholly immunizes 
immigration-related federal lawmaking from meaningful constitutional review. As the Article 
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quoted language from Diaz suggests, the Court justifies the constitutional 
exceptionalism of the immigration power with reference to the 
purportedly intricate connection between immigration regulation and 
“basic aspects of national sovereignty, more particularly our foreign 
relations and the national security.”16  
When a noncitizen encounters governmental authority outside of the 
immigration context—for example, as an employee, criminal defendant, 
or business licensee—he enjoys the same slate of constitutional 
protections afforded to citizens.17 The moment a court determines that a 
federal law or enforcement action qualifies as a regulation of immigration 
per se, however, it triggers a constitutionally exceptional authority, the 
exercise of which lies largely beyond the scope of constitutional review.18 
This is true even when the constitutional protection being asserted—for 
example, the First Amendment or the Due Process or Equal Protection 
Clause—makes no distinction between “persons” and “citizens.”19 Nor 
does it matter whether the underlying basis for removal bears even a 
colorable connection to foreign affairs or national security—for example, 
whether the noncitizen in question is a suspected terrorist mastermind or 
a teenage petty criminal. The consequences for noncitizens are often 
profound. Even long-term legal residents lack robust constitutional 
protections against improper detention during lengthy removal 
proceedings20 or selection for removal based on otherwise 
constitutionally protected speech or associations.21 
Scholars and courts alike have long noted the constitutional 
exceptionalism of federal immigration regulation, decried the injustice 
                                                                                                                     
discusses below (see infra note 358), Justice Stevens’s unanimous opinion in Diaz does undertake 
a conscientious, if still highly deferential, form of rational basis review before concluding that the 
challenged alienage classification was “unquestionably reasonable” and not “wholly irrational.” 
Id. at 83. See also infra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 16. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954); see also, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 
522 (2003) (“[A]ny policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with 
contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the 
maintenance of a republican form of government.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). For 
background on the heightened national security cast of both political debate over immigration 
policy and constitutional immigration law in the years following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, see 
Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National 
Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1830 (2007) and Kevin R. Johnson & Bernard Trujillo, 
Immigration Reform, National Security After September 11, and the Future of North American 
Integration, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1369, 1370–71 (2007). 
 17. See infra notes 205–07 and accompanying text; see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 
356, 369 (1886).  
 18. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976). 
 19. U.S. CONST. amends. I, V, XIV. 
 20. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 513. 
 21. See Reno v. Am. Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491–92 (1999). 
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that it produces, and called for greater constitutional protection for 
noncitizens.22 This Article builds on this literature but refocuses critical 
attention on a key but under-analyzed conceptual and doctrinal obstacle 
to legal reform: the notion that laws and regulations governing the rights 
of noncitizens to enter and remain within the United States comprise a 
discrete body of immigration laws that are presumed to be part and parcel 
of foreign affairs and national security.23 It argues that this presumption 
is descriptively and analytically incoherent, and that its incoherence has 
produced a cascade of doctrinal confusion and substantive injustice. The 
Supreme Court should instead disaggregate immigration law for the 
                                                                                                                     
 22. See, e.g., T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, 
THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 196 (2002); DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: 
OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 15–20 (2007); GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE 
CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 13–14 (1996) (describing the 
“immigration anomaly”); PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS: ESSAYS ON 
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP 19 (1998) (characterizing immigration as a legal “maverick” and “wild 
card”); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership, and the Constitution, 7 CONST. 
COMMENT. 9–10 (1990); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary 
Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 255 (1984); Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious 
Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 
COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1704 (1992) (noting the “singularity” of immigration) [hereinafter 
Motomura, Curious Evolution]; Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and 
Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1363 (1999) [hereinafter Motomura, 
Federalism] (defining “‘immigration exceptionalism’ . . . as the view that immigration and 
alienage law should be exempt from the usual limits on government decisionmaking”). But see 
Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative Apology and Prediction for Our 
Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 257–58 
(2000) (arguing that the Court’s review of various discriminatory grounds for exclusion and 
deportation “may not be that different from how it has treated those groups domestically” and that 
“many of the terrible immigration cases could have come out the same way even if they involved 
the rights of citizens under domestic constitutional law”). 
 23. One might plausibly object that, although the foundational nineteenth-century plenary 
power cases did ground immigration exceptionalism squarely in foreign affairs and national 
security, the modern justification for the doctrine is considerably broader and more varied, and 
includes rationales that cannot easily be dismissed as inaccurate or anachronistic. Professor 
Hiroshi Motomura, for one, defends a discrete form of “immigration exceptionalism” with respect 
to federal exclusivity on the ground that immigration law and policy is “part of a project of 
national self-definition.” Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and 
Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1374 (1999). Although it is true that 
immigration implicates distinctly national interests in ways that are highly relevant to 
constitutional immigration law (particularly with respect to federalism), my focus on the foreign 
affairs/national security rationale is nevertheless warranted because that rationale continues to do 
the lion’s share of rhetorical work in justifying the insulation of immigration-related lawmaking 
from constitutional review. See infra notes 406–17 and accompanying text (discussing Demore v. 
Kim); see also David A. Martin, Why Immigration’s Plenary Power Doctrine Endures, 68 OKLA. 
L. REV. 29 (2015) (arguing that the strong and continuing linkage between immigration and 
foreign affairs explains the durability of the plenary power doctrine in the face of decades of 
criticism by scholars and advocates). 
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purpose of constitutional review and recognize both federal and state 
regulation of noncitizens for what it is: a variegated conglomeration of 
laws and enforcement actions that concern labor, crime, public health and 
welfare, and, sometimes, foreign affairs and national security.  
Under a disaggregated immigration law, courts would no longer 
approach the regulation of noncitizens as a distinct, constitutionally 
privileged domain of “political” subject matter. Rather, immigration-
related lawmaking would be recast as a constitutionally ordinary instance 
of federal authority, akin to Congress’s “plenary” power to regulate 
commerce or to tax and spend for the general welfare. Federal action 
toward noncitizens would therefore be constrained by the same 
substantive, judicially enforceable constitutional norms that apply to 
most other federal lawmaking and enforcement. The disaggregation of 
immigration law would thus give full expression to noncitizens’ 
constitutional personhood; accordingly, regulations that employ a suspect 
classification, infringe a fundamental liberty interest, or chill free 
expression would be subject to strict constitutional scrutiny. Foreign 
policy and national security considerations would continue to serve as 
constitutionally viable warrants for laws burdening noncitizens, but 
Congress and the President would no longer enjoy the extraordinary 
judicial deference that they currently receive as a matter of course.24  
Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of the federal 
immigration power, including its history, doctrine, and underlying 
rationale. It then argues that the varied legal techniques through which 
national and subnational governments attempt to govern noncitizens defy 
the basic notion of a legally discrete category of immigration laws that 
are functionally distinct from a host of other, non-immigration laws that 
shape the lives and migration-related choices of noncitizens.  
Part II seeks to dispel the aura of naturalness that surrounds the 
plenary power doctrine. It first considers the history of immigration-
related lawmaking in the century before immigration law emerged as a 
discrete legal category. It demonstrates that until the final decades of the 
nineteenth century, immigration regulation was an unexceptional aspect 
of both the state police power and the federal commerce power. It then 
describes a counter-history of plenary federal power—a history of 
dissent, criticism, and doubt on the part of not only scholars and activists, 
                                                                                                                     
 24. See infra notes 346–55 and accompanying text. The disaggregation of immigration law 
likewise would have important consequences for developing “immigration federalism” 
jurisprudence. Specifically, and in contrast to the current framework, courts would be able to 
acknowledge that the purpose and effect of many recent state and local initiatives is to deter certain 
noncitizens from living and working within a given jurisdiction, without rendering such laws 
automatically preempted under the plenary power doctrine. See infra notes 102–110, 350 and 
accompanying text. 
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but also many Supreme Court Justices—that refutes the claims of 
inevitability that typically characterize defenses of immigration 
exceptionalism.  
Part III argues that the Supreme Court should disaggregate 
immigration law for the purpose of constitutional review. Section III.A 
contends that certain recent legal and rhetorical gestures on the part of the 
Supreme Court in Zadvydas v. Davis25 and Padilla v. Kentucky26 evidence 
a growing discomfort among the Justices toward the notion of a discrete, 
constitutionally privileged domain of immigration law. Section III.B 
considers the constitutional implications of a disaggregated, 
unexceptional immigration law in three select doctrinal contexts: the 
administration of public benefits, removal, and detention. Section III.C 
concludes by briefly sketching a course of doctrinal development that 
could plausibly culminate in the disaggregation of immigration law. 
I.  THE FEDERAL IMMIGRATION POWER 
This Part provides a brief overview of the modern federal immigration 
power, commonly known as the plenary power doctrine. As Section I.A 
explains, the plenary power doctrine defines as its object a legally discrete 
category of immigration laws that are presumed to be inextricably linked 
to the political branches’ regulation of foreign affairs and national 
security. Section I.B argues that the notion of a distinct category of 
immigration law seriously mischaracterizes the relationship between 
immigration-related lawmaking and the actual governance of foreign 
migration to and from the United States; and further, that courts deploy 
the category instrumentally, as a means of calibrating constitutional 
skepticism toward a challenged law. 
A.  Plenary Federal Power, in Theory 
The modern federal immigration power is constitutionally exceptional 
in two distinct but interrelated aspects. First, the authority to regulate 
immigration does not derive from any enumerated power, but is rather 
“an incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of the United 
States.”27 Second, the federal government’s enactment and enforcement 
of immigration laws is buffered against judicially enforceable 
constitutional constraints.28  
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 25. 533 U.S. 678, 695–96 (2001). 
 26. 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 27. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889). 
 28. See, e.g., id. at 606–09. 
9
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Ever since the Supreme Court first adopted the plenary power doctrine 
in the 1889 Chinese Exclusion Case,29 it has justified this constitutional 
exceptionalism with reference to the purportedly intricate connection 
between the admission and removal of foreigners and “basic aspects of 
national sovereignty, more particularly our foreign relations and the 
national security.”30 Because the authority emanates from the nation’s 
sovereignty, it is exclusively federal.31 Although state and local 
governments can and do govern noncitizens in various ways outside of 
the immigration context, once a subnational law or enforcement practice 
is understood to implicate “core” immigration functions, it is structurally 
preempted under the Supremacy Clause.32  This was not always the case. 
The late nineteenth-century Supreme Court refashioned the federal 
immigration power from a branch of Congress’s commerce power 
adapted to the regulation of labor, economic dependency, and crime—
issues that have always characterized most immigration lawmaking—to 
the defense of the nation against foreign invasion.33 Even today, when the 
Chinese Exclusion Case has long since assumed a prominent place in the 
Supreme Court hall of infamy, the Court continues to reason from the 
premise that certain laws and enforcement actions bearing on noncitizens 
occupy a logically self-evident, legally discrete category of immigration 
laws that are part and parcel of foreign affairs and national security.34 
Moreover, the Court perpetuates that premise even though the social and 
political judgments that historically appeared to justify it would strike 
most contemporary policy makers and judges as both anachronistic and 
patently racist.35  
 
                                                                                                                     
 29. Id. at 604. 
 30. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954). On the origin of the “national security 
rationale” for immigration exceptionalism, see Lindsay, Immigration as Invasion, supra note 3, 
at 40. 
 31. See Lindsay, Immigration as Invasion, supra note 3, at 26. 
 32. Seth P. Waxman & Trevor W. Morrison, What Kind of Immunity? Federal Officers, 
State Criminal Law, and the Supremacy Clause, 112 YALE L.J. 2195, 2217–18 (2003).  
 33. Lindsay, Immigration as Invasion, supra note 3, at 6; Lindsay, Constitution of 
Foreignness, supra note 3, at 747–48 (“Throughout the nation’s first century, immigrants’ non-
citizenship was incidental, or at least secondary, to the nature of the regulatory authority to which 
they, as immigrants, were subject. . . . Immigrants were legally reconstructed as foreigners only 
in the final decades of the nineteenth century, as Europeans and Chinese migrants alike 
increasingly became understood as fundamentally and permanently alien to the American 
character. . . . The Supreme Court then translated the discourse of indelible foreignness into a 
potent and durable rationale for immigration exceptionalism, forging the immigration power into 
an instrument of national ‘self-preservation’ to be deployed against invading armies of 
economically degraded, politically unassimilable, racially suspect foreigners.”). 
 34. Lindsay, Constitution of Foreignness, supra note 3, at 746–47. 
 35. See id. at 748 & n.20, 794–95. 
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Archetypal “immigration regulations” are rules that bear on the right 
of noncitizens to enter and remain within a jurisdiction, particularly 
federal statutes and regulations that define eligibility for admission to and 
grounds for removal from the United States.36 Under this rubric, 
immigration laws are conceptually distinct from so-called “alienage 
laws,” which target noncitizens for differential treatment but are not 
understood to implicate “core” immigration functions.37 Examples 
include federal or state provisions excluding noncitizens or a class of 
noncitizens from receiving public assistance,38 working without state 
authorization,39 or entering particular occupations.40 The Court’s 
approach to alienage laws is notoriously opaque. It is reasonably clear 
that state alienage laws are generally subject to both conflict preemption 
analysis under the Supremacy Clause41 and heightened scrutiny under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.42 As a result, they are constitutionally suspect, 
but sometimes permissible.43 Yet when reviewing federal alienage laws, 
though in theory distinct from immigration regulations per se, the Court 
has tended to blur the immigration/alienage boundary and to show 
considerable deference.44 Although, as the following Section will discuss, 
the immigration/alienage distinction does not hold up under closer 
scrutiny, it nevertheless operates as a central premise of a relatively 
unfettered federal immigration power and shapes the Court’s recent 
immigration federalism jurisprudence. 
The precise nature of noncitizens’ constitutional estrangement under 
the plenary power doctrine is likewise somewhat murky. On some 
occasions, the Supreme Court has implied that the substantive 
constitutional norms that otherwise constrain congressional power simply 
do not apply in the immigration context.45 Yet at other times, the Court 
                                                                                                                     
 36. See Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 341, 
360–61 (2008). 
 37. Id. at 351. 
 38. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78–79 (1976); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 
365, 371–72 (1971). 
 39. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2503–05 (2012). 
 40. See, e.g., Hampton v. Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 116–17 (1976). 
 41. See, e.g., Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2500–01.  
 42. See, e.g., Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220 (1984); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 
634, 642 (1973); Graham, 403 U.S. at 371–72.  
 43. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1973 (2011) (upholding 
an Arizona law penalizing businesses that hired undocumented workers); Cabell v. Chavez-
Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 447 (1982) (upholding a state requirement of U.S. citizenship for “peace 
officers”); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 80–81 (1979) (upholding a state requirement of U.S. 
citizenship for public school teachers). 
 44. See, e.g., Vergara v. Hampton, 581 F.2d 1281, 1286 (1978); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 
67, 69–71 (1976). 
 45. See Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 373, 
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has suggested that constitutional guarantees of due process and equal 
protection do, at least in theory, limit federal authority in immigration 
matters, but that the enforcement of those guarantees against Congress 
and the Executive Branch is beyond the proper institutional role of the 
federal courts.46 Although both readings find plausible support in the case 
law, the Court’s highly deferential posture is best understood as a 
limitation of the judicial role rather than the absence of applicable 
constitutional norms.47 
Regardless of the legal-theoretical basis for buffering immigration 
regulation against constitutional review, the consequences for 
immigration lawmaking and enforcement, and, not least, for noncitizens 
themselves, are profound and far-reaching. Congress enjoys virtually 
unlimited authority to establish criteria for admission of noncitizens.48 As 
Justice Felix Frankfurter explained six decades ago, policies governing 
the rights of noncitizens to enter or remain within the U.S. “are for 
Congress exclusively to determine even though such determination may 
be deemed to offend American traditions.”49 
                                                                                                                     
384–86 (discussing the “unlimited congressional power” conception of the plenary power doctrine 
and citing various judicial opinions employing that conception). 
46. Professor Adam Cox proposes a third plausible reading of the insulation of immigration 
law against constitutional review: that “the plenary power doctrine is principally a doctrine of 
standing,” under which “aliens lack the right to seek meaningful judicial review of the 
constitutionality of immigration policy.” Id. at 278, 389. 
 47. As this Article discusses, the Court’s self-conscious construction of federal statutes to 
avoid constitutional difficulties only makes sense if the Justices believe that substantive 
constitutional norms do, or at least should, apply to immigration regulation. See infra notes 295–
23 and accompanying text. Consider, too, the Diaz Court’s reference to the political question 
doctrine. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 81–82 (“The reasons that preclude judicial review of political questions 
also dictate[d] a narrow standard of review of decisions made by the Congress or the President in 
the area of immigration and naturalization.” (footnote omitted)). The Court is not literally 
invoking the political question doctrine in the sense of declaring that immigration regulation is 
nonjusticiable. Rather, it is suggesting that, similar to the way that certain issues raise 
nonjusticiable political questions, the subject matter involved in immigration regulation—
specifically, “our relations with foreign powers”—warrants judicial restraint (i.e. “a narrow 
standard of review”), though not abstention. See id. (emphasis added). For a persuasive analysis 
of this issue, see ALEINIKOFF, supra note 22, at 153–59. 
 48. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 
(1972). 
 49. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 597 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
When a noncitizen is denied entry at the border, and even detained for an extended period, 
“[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process.” Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 
338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950); see also Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (quoting 
Knauff and agreeing that Congress has the ultimate authority to deny entry to an alien). On the 
difficulties involved in allocating rights based on this territorial distinction, see Charles D. 
Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: Lessons from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and 
Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1995). But see Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32–33 
(1982) (noting that although “an alien seeking initial admission to the United States requests a 
12
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It is perhaps in the context of removal (formerly called “deportation”) 
that the relative absence of judicially enforceable constitutional 
constraints is most conspicuous.50 Indeed, the Court has repeatedly 
recognized that deportation often “visits a great hardship on the 
individual and deprives him of the right to stay and live and work in this 
land of freedom.”51 Although the INA affords noncitizens certain due 
process rights during removal proceedings,52 even those who have lived 
in the United States legally for decades lack robust constitutional 
protections against selection for removal based on otherwise 
constitutionally protected speech or associations,53 or against 
unwarranted detention during lengthy removal proceedings.54 Further, 
while it “cannot be doubted” that “deportation is a penalty,”55 it is 
technically a civil proceeding rather than criminal punishment; therefore, 
noncitizens subject to removal are denied the suite of rights that protect 
criminal defendants against governmental abuses.56 As a result, a 
noncitizen facing removal does not receive a Miranda warning,57 does 
not have a Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel,58 cannot 
suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment,59 
cannot challenge the retroactive application of new grounds for removal 
                                                                                                                     
privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his application, . . . . a continuously present 
permanent resident alien [seeking reentry to the United States] has a right to due process”). 
 50. The term “removal” now encompasses both deportation and inadmissibility. See 
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a) (2012). For an enlightening history of 
deportation policy and process, see generally KANSTROOM, supra note 22 (analyzing “the nature 
and history of a particular exertion of U.S. government power over noncitizens: its power to detain 
and to deport”); Jennifer Lee Koh, Rethinking Removability, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1803 (2013).  
 51. E.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945). As Justice Hugo Black explained 
sixty years ago, a noncitizen facing deportation stands to lose “his job, his friends, his home, and 
maybe even his children, who must choose between their father and their native country.” Galvan 
v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 533 (1954) (Black, J., dissenting).  
 52. The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that a noncitizen receive written notice 
to appear, which informs him of the nature of the proceeding, the charges against him, and the 
legal authority under which the proceedings are conducted. 8 U.S.C. § 1229–29a. A noncitizen is 
afforded “a reasonable opportunity to examine evidence against [him], to present evidence on 
[his] own behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the Government” and the right to 
be represented by counsel “at no expense to the Government.” Id. §§ 1229a(4)(A)–(B). 
 53. See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491–92 (1999); 
Galvan, 347 U.S. at 523. 
 54. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513 (2003). 
 55. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 154.  
 56. But see Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360 (2010) (holding that a defense attorney’s 
failure to inform a noncitizen criminal defendant of the likely immigration consequences of a 
guilty plea constituted ineffective assistance of counsel within the meaning of the Sixth 
Amendment).  
 57. United States v. Silva, 715 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 58. Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565, 568–69 (6th Cir. 1975). 
 59. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1034 (1984). 
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as a violation of the ex post facto clause of Article I,60 and is not entitled 
to a conscientious review of his removal order.61  
The stakes of this legal state of affairs for millions of noncitizens 
could hardly be higher. Over the past two decades, both the number of 
removable noncitizens and the number of actual removals have exploded. 
After fluctuating between 3900 and 38,500 deportations annually for 
most of the twentieth century, the number surged in the 1990s,62 
especially following the adoption of two federal statutes in 199663: the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)64 and the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).65 The 
laws radically expanded the statutory grounds for exclusion and 
deportation, applied new grounds for deportation retroactively, and 
eliminated certain discretionary waivers of deportability.66 As a result, 
deportations more than doubled, from fewer than 51,000 in 1995 to more 
than 114,000 in 1997.67 The number of noncitizens confined in federal 
detention facilities during the pendency of removal proceedings has 
swelled accordingly, to more than 440,000.68 In 2013, the most recent 
                                                                                                                     
 60. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593–95 (1952). 
 61. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2012) (severely limiting judicial review of removal orders). As 
Professor Daniel Kanstroom explains, a noncitizen who appeals a removal order may “receive a 
summary decision made by a single member of the understaffed and overwhelmed Board of 
Immigration Appeals produced after a ten-minute review of his case.” If the noncitizen appeals to 
a federal court, “he may well find that the court declines review of ‘discretionary’ questions, such 
as his potential eligibility for ‘relief’ from removal.” KANSTROOM, supra note 22, at 4; see also 
Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. 
L. REV. 367, 392–95 (2006) (describing the paucity of constitutional protection in immigration 
proceedings relative to the criminal context). It is stark testimony to the inadequacies of the current 
immigration adjudication system that there are several documented cases of U.S. citizens being 
denied entry or erroneously deported, based on the mistaken conclusion that they were 
noncitizens. Rachel E. Rosenbloom, The Citizenship Line: Rethinking Immigration 
Exceptionalism, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1965, 1971–80 (2013). For an overview of the daunting 
inadequacies of the underfunded, understaffed, and politicized immigration adjudication system, 
see generally Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 
1645–76 (2010). 
 62. Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: Immigration Enforcement Actions: 2012, U.S. 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/publication/yearbook-immigration-statistics-
2012-enforcement-actions (last visited Jan. 16, 2016) [hereinafter Yearbook of Immigration 
Statistics]. 
 63. Walter A. Ewing, The Growth of the U.S. Deportation Machine, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL 
(Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/growth-us-deportation-machine. 
 64. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 8 U.S.C. § 1182. 
 65. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRAIRA), 8 
U.S.C. § 1227. 
 66. See KANSTROOM, supra note 22, at 10, 228–31.  
 67. Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, supra note 62. 
 68. JOHN F. SIMANSKI, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
ACTIONS: 2013, ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
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year for which the U.S. Department of Homeland Security has reported 
removal statistics, the number stood at 438,000.69 Notwithstanding 
President Barack Obama’s declared policy of exercising prosecutorial 
discretion to focus removal efforts on noncitizens who “pose a danger to 
national security or a risk to public safety,”70 as well as the 2012 initiative 
to provide legal status to certain undocumented noncitizens brought to 
the United States as children,71 the Obama Administration has overseen 
more removals annually than any of his predecessors. During President 
George W. Bush’s eight years in office, the United States removed just 
over 2,000,000 noncitizens;72 President Obama’s administration 
surpassed that number in April 2014—only sixteen months into the 
President’s second term. 
B.  Classification Trouble: What Is an “Immigration Law”? 
Modern constitutional immigration law is premised on a distinction 
between a discrete class of immigration laws that govern the rights of 
noncitizens to enter and remain within the United States, and the host of 
other state and federal laws that subject noncitizens to various burdens 
and disabilities but do not purport to regulate immigration per se. This 
Section argues that the immigration/alienage distinction is analytically 
incoherent; and further, that courts often approach those categories 
instrumentally, by classifying state and federal rules alternatively as 
either “immigration” or “alienage” laws as a means of calibrating 
constitutional skepticism. 
Immigration laws are generally classified as such because they define 
the rights of noncitizens to enter and remain within the United States, and 
thus operate as what Professor Adam B. Cox helpfully labels “selection 
                                                                                                                     
ois_enforcement_ar_2013.pdf. For a helpful overview of the 1996 reforms, see generally David 
A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for Aliens: The Real Meaning of 
Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 62–68 (2001) and Nancy Morawetz, Understanding 
the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. 
L. REV. 1936 (2000). 
 69. SIMANSKI, supra note 68, at 1. Congress’s “radical expansion of the grounds of 
deportation,” in combination with “stringent admissions restrictions . . . and lax border 
enforcement policy by the Executive,” has had the “counterintuitive consequence of delegating 
tremendous authority to the President to set immigration screening policy by making a huge 
fraction of noncitizens deportable at the option of the Executive.” Adam B. Cox & Christina M. 
Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 463 (2009). 
 70. Memorandum from John Morton, Director of U.S. Immigration & Customs 
Enforcement, to All ICE Employees (Mar. 2, 2011),  http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/
2011/110302washingtondc.pdf. 
 71. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (July 17, 2015), 
http://www.dhs.gov/deferred-action-childhood-arrivals. 
 72. See Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, supra note 62. 
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rules.”73 Immigrant selection encompasses, most obviously, rules 
defining which noncitizens are eligible for admission to the United States, 
as well as rules governing the removal (or de-selection) of noncitizens 
already present in U.S. territory.74 Selection rules are understood to be 
analytically and legally distinct from the vast array of state and federal 
laws that directly and indirectly regulate the status and conduct of 
noncitizens, but which do not purport to govern immigration per se.75 The 
concepts rest on “a rough sense that selection has to do with the process 
of sorting, while regulation has to do with the process of determining how 
immigrants residing in the United States live their lives.”76 Because the 
selection of noncitizens is understood to implicate national sovereignty 
and foreign affairs in ways that the regulation of resident noncitizens does 
not, the Court affords the federal government very broad authority to 
adopt and enforce selection rules, while restraining local, state and (to a 
lesser extent) federal regulation of resident noncitizens.77 
Although the notion of a logically and legally discrete category of 
immigration laws is attractive in its apparent analytical clarity, it 
seriously mischaracterizes the manner in which immigration-related 
lawmaking and enforcement actually governs the migration of 
noncitizens to and from the United States. As Professor Cox explains, 
“Every rule that imposes duties on noncitizens imposes both selection 
pressure, potentially influencing noncitizens’ decisions about whether to 
enter or depart the United States, and regulatory pressure, potentially 
influencing the way in which resident noncitizens live.”78 Consider the 
various statutory provisions that govern noncitizens’ eligibility to 
immigrate to the United States, such as rules concerning family 
connections,79 employment qualifications,80 and numerical quotas;81 as 
well as conditions on noncitizens’ continued residence in the United 
States, such as refraining from certain criminal conduct.82 As selection 
                                                                                                                     
 73. Cox, supra note 36, at 344–45. 
 74. Id. at 342–43. 
 75. See id. at 343–45. 
 76. Id. at 345. 
 77. See Hampton v. Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 116 (1976) (striking down a federal Civil Service 
Commission regulation barring noncitizens from employment in the competitive civil service). 
 78. Cox, supra note 36, at 343. Professor Cox is not the first to point to the difficulty in 
drawing a clean distinction between immigration and alienage laws. See, e.g., Linda Bosniak, 
Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1063–
68 (1994); Linda Bosniak, Varieties of Citizenship, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2449, 2451–52 (2007); 
Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and Alienage, Federalism and Proposition 187, 35 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 201, 203 (1994) [hereinafter Motomura, Immigration and Alienage].  
 79. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1151(c) (2012). 
 80. See id. § 1153(b). 
 81. See id. § 1152. 
 82. See id. § 1227(a)(2). 
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rules, these are archetypal immigration laws insofar as they define who 
is eligible to enter and remain within the United States. But as Professor 
Cox observes, such rules also necessarily “operate as immigrant-
regulating rules by generating powerful incentives for immigrants to live 
their lives in particular ways.”83 Most obviously, the prospect of removal 
from the United States “creates pressure for a resident noncitizen to avoid 
committing crimes classified as aggravated felonies.”84 Similarly, federal 
statutory provisions making unauthorized entry grounds for removal will 
inform the choices of unauthorized entrants about where to live and work, 
as well as whether to engage in conduct that risks an encounter with 
government officials, such as driving or registering one’s children for 
school.85 
Just as selection rules create substantial regulatory pressure, “putative 
immigrant-regulating rules create substantial selection pressure.”86 
Consider the recent spate of state and local laws restricting housing and 
employment opportunities for some noncitizens; requiring that 
noncitizens carry special registration documents; restricting eligibility for 
certain public benefits; and prohibiting noncitizen voting and office-
holding.87 These are classic alienage regulations in the sense that they 
burden noncitizens by virtue of their lack of citizenship but do not 
formally govern anyone’s right to enter or remain within a jurisdiction. 
Yet such regulations will powerfully shape noncitizens’ migration 
decisions—whether to migrate to the United States in the first place, 
where to settle if one does decide to migrate, and whether to remain in 
the United States or in a particular state if one has migrated already.88  
The creation of selection pressure is the natural, and often intended, 
effect of such regulations. Indeed, the Supreme Court has acknowledged 
that state discrimination against noncitizens “necessarily operate[s] . . . to 
discourage entry into or continued residency in the State.”89 To deny an 
alien “the necessities of life, including food, clothing and shelter . . . 
equate[s] [to] the assertion of a right, inconsistent with federal policy, to 
                                                                                                                     
 83. Cox, supra note 36, at 361. 
 84. Id. 
 85. As Professor Cox observes, the “regulation effects of immigration rules” are not limited 
to noncitizens already present in the United States, as conditions for admission may shape 
“potential migrants’ decisions about education, marriage, and [employment].” Id. at 363. 
 86. Id. at 364. 
 87. For a fuller discussion of such laws, see infra notes 102–05 and accompanying text. 
 88. See generally Martin, supra note 68, at 18 (“Changes to the treatment or opportunity of 
noncitizens in the United States, whether in the direction of restriction or liberalization, almost 
inevitably affect the decisions of people and organizations abroad who are thinking about 
organizing or participating in migration to the United States.”). 
 89. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 379 (1971). 
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deny entrance and abode.”90 Viewed in this light, “such laws encroach 
upon exclusive federal power, [and] are constitutionally 
impermissible.”91 The categorical distinction between immigration and 
alienage laws—or, in Professor Cox’s terminology, between immigrant-
selecting rules and immigrant-regulating rules—is further complicated by 
the federal government’s long-standing and very deliberate practice of 
selectively under-enforcing federal immigration law—a practice that has 
prompted many states and localities to enter into the immigration arena.92 
In short, that neat division between a select class of immigration laws 
and the various non-immigration laws that nevertheless directly and 
palpably shape the migration decisions of noncitizens, does not reflect 
how law actually functions to govern immigrants and immigration. 
Moreover, even if it were possible to draw an analytically defensible 
dividing line, it is unclear why that line would carry any legal 
significance.  
If the distinction between immigration and alienage regulation is so 
illusory, however, why does it continue to operate as a central premise of 
the federal immigration power? Most obviously, the notion of a discrete 
body of laws defining who will be included with the American polity 
helps to underwrite the inherent sovereignty rationale for immigration 
exceptionalism. Insofar as formal legal conditions for admission and 
removal govern access to U.S. territory, the U.S. labor market, and 
potentially U.S. citizenship, they appear to implicate national sovereignty 
with an immediacy that mere alienage regulations do not.  
More subtly, however, the distinction between immigration and 
alienage regulations also endows courts with remarkable flexibility in 
how they adjudicate challenges to laws that impose distinctive burdens 
or disabilities on noncitizens. Because the fiction of a discrete category 
of immigration laws radically understates the range of legal techniques 
through which lawmakers and other officials govern immigration—and 
which could therefore plausibly be characterized as immigration laws—
it falls upon courts to classify a challenged law as either a regulation of 
immigration per se or something else. This classification function, in turn, 
                                                                                                                     
 90. Id. at 380 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 91. Id. 
92. As Hiroshi Motomura explains, by making “both lawful admissions and 
enforcement . . . highly selective,” the federal government has, in effect, invited mass 
“immigration outside the law,” primarily in order to satisfy domestic labor demands. HIROSHI 
MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE Law 22 (2014). Under this self-conscious “scheme of 
tolerance,” Motomura argues, “the actual operation of law in action . . . amount[s] to government 
policy,” even if that policy “seems inconsistent with what is explicitly written in statutes and 
regulations.” Id. at 107, 109. Many states and localities, in turn, have interpreted that unspoken 
federal “policy” as a vacuum of federal enforcement, and sought to fill that vacuum with their 
own immigration measures. See id. at ch. 2. 
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affords courts significant discretion in how they position various state and 
federal laws in relation to a given constitutional challenge. Consider 
Mathews v. Diaz, discussed in the opening paragraphs of this Article.93 
The Court simply assumed without discussion that the challenged 
provision—a federal statute establishing a five-year residency 
requirement for receiving Medicaid—constituted an immigration law.94 
That assumption consigned the matter to the “political branches,”95 and 
thus limited the Court’s role in reviewing the constitutionality of a federal 
rule that had no obvious bearing on any immigrant’s right to enter or 
remain within the United States and that lacked a substantial connection 
to foreign affairs, national security, or any other typical concomitant of 
U.S. sovereignty. In short, the Court’s unstated classification foreclosed 
meaningful scrutiny of the noncitizen plaintiffs’ equal protection claims.  
Five years earlier, when the Court struck down a similar state 
residency requirement in Graham v. Richardson,96 one might have 
expected it to be on federal preemption grounds. After all, if the Court 
had classified the statute as an immigration law, as it did the analogous 
federal provision in Diaz, it would have been structurally preempted 
under the Supremacy Clause for having treaded into an exclusively 
federal regulatory domain.97 Yet the Court did not stake its holding to the 
classification of the residency requirement as an immigration law. 
Instead, it invalidated the provision as an unconstitutional denial of equal 
protection.98 Because “[a]liens as a class are a prime example of a 
‘discrete and insular’ minority,” the Graham Court reasoned, 
“classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, 
are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.”99  
The slippage between the ostensibly discrete categories of 
immigration and alienage law afforded the Court considerable flexibility. 
Specifically, by approaching the provision in Graham primarily as an 
ordinary state welfare law, and only “additional[ly]” as a regulation of 
immigration, the majority elected to adjudicate the equal protection 
                                                                                                                     
 93. See supra notes 5–11 and accompanying text. 
 94. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976). 
 95. Id. 
 96. 403 U.S. at 382–83. 
 97. See Waxman & Morrison, supra note 32, at 2217–18. 
 98. Graham, 403 U.S. at 372. 
 99. Id. (footnotes omitted). Even before the Supreme Court adopted the now-familiar 
framework of applying heightened scrutiny to so-called “suspect classifications,” it struck down 
various state laws as a denial of equal protection. See, e.g., Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 
334 U.S. 410, 419–20 (1948) (striking down on equal protection grounds a state law restricting 
issuance of fishing licenses to noncitizens); Traux v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 43 (1915) (striking down 
on equal protection grounds a state law requiring a minimum percentage of employees to be U.S. 
citizens).  
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claim, and thus to pass constitutional judgment on what the justices 
viewed as an invidious classification.100 But in Diaz, approaching the 
analogous federal statute as an immigration law enabled the Court to 
defer to the political judgment of Congress without having to explain why 
the challenged alienage classification did not offend a core constitutional 
commitment to equal treatment.  
Nowhere is the judicial utility of this classification function more 
evident than in federal preemption challenges to the recent flood of state 
and local laws regulating noncitizens.101 Most prominently, in United 
                                                                                                                     
 100. See 403 U.S. at 376–77. 
 101. The new “immigration federalism” has given rise to a large scholarly literature 
representing a broad spectrum of assessments. See, e.g., MOTOMURA, supra note 92, at ch. 2 
(analyzing the broad array of state and local laws adopted in the 1990s and 2000s, as well as their 
influence on federal policy); Erin F. Delaney, In the Shadow of Article I: Applying a Dormant 
Commerce Clause Analysis to State Laws Regulating Aliens, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1821, 1855–56 
(2007) (proposing the application of dormant Commerce Clause analysis to state laws regulating 
aliens as a way to overcome the limitations of conventional federal preemption doctrine and 
relative immunity to constitutional review of state laws enacted under an authority devolved from 
Congress); Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 
VAND. L. REV. 787, 792 (2008) (arguing that immigration is akin to “areas of constitutional law 
that involve a mix of federal and state authority” and rejecting the view that any state immigration 
regulation is structurally preempted); Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights: State and 
Local Efforts to Regulate Immigration, 46 GA. L. REV. 609 (2012) (observing that the federal 
courts’ application of conventional preemption analysis to state and local efforts to regulate 
immigration often obscures important civil rights implications, including possible racial 
profiling); Motomura, Federalism, supra note 22, at 1392–94 (arguing in favor of retaining a 
discrete form of “immigration exceptionalism” with respect to federal exclusivity); Cristina M. 
Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 571 
(2008) (arguing that “immigration regulation should be included in the list of quintessentially 
state interests, such as education, crime control, and the regulation of health, safety, and welfare, 
not just because immigration affects each of those interests, but also because managing immigrant 
movement is itself a state interest”); Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 
2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57, 59 (2007) (arguing for “a more robust role for the states in certain areas 
of immigration policy,” as long as “they reflect a legitimate state interest and do not interfere with 
the goals of federal immigration policy”); Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration 
Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627, 1628–39 (1997) (proposing that immigration federalism may 
serve a “steam-valve” function in which the opportunity for anti-alien states to effectuate their 
political preferences, albeit in a limited way, could dampen the political impetus for federal anti-
alien measures); Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power over 
Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1565 (2008) (predicting that the “domestication of 
immigration law” by states and localities concerned with economic and criminal issues is “bound 
to expand judicial acceptance of state and local participation in immigration control”); Rick Su, 
A Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1619, 1624 (2008) 
(arguing that the immigration federalism “crisis” identified by critics of subnational regulation is 
less “a response to immigration or a consequence of existing federal immigration policy” than a 
“more familiar byproduct of . . . how we structure and organize local communities . . . , provide 
and allocate local services, and define the legal relationship of local, state and federal 
governments”); Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration 
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States v. Arizona, the Supreme Court struck down provisions of Arizona 
Senate Bill 1070 (SB 1070), which required aliens to carry registration 
documents, authorized the arrest of any person suspected of being an 
undocumented alien, and made it illegal for an undocumented alien to 
hold or seek employment.102 Laws such as Arizona’s bear many of the 
indices of immigration laws. Their often-express purpose is to deter 
undocumented migrants from entering the state and to induce those 
already present to leave. Indeed, the Arizona legislature’s 
“declare[d] . . . intent” in adopting SB 1070 was “to make attrition 
through enforcement the public policy of all state and local government 
agencies in Arizona.”103 As the sponsor of a similar 2011 Alabama law 
explained, the theory of “attrition through enforcement,” or “self-
deportation,” is that by “‘attack[ing] every aspect of an illegal 
immigrant’s life,’” states and localities can “‘make it difficult for them to 
live here so they will deport themselves.’”104 In fact, attrition through 
enforcement is a well-theorized strategy promoted aggressively over the 
previous decade by immigration restriction organizations and legal 
activists.105  
                                                                                                                     
Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 497 (2001) (arguing that the 
1996 Welfare Act’s devolution to the states of the authority to deny benefits on the basis of 
alienage amounted to an “invitation to discriminate”). 
 102. 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2503–05 (2012). Five more states—Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, South 
Carolina, and Utah—soon followed Arizona’s lead, adopting bills modeled after S.B. 1070. Like 
the Arizona statutes, these laws “require law enforcement to attempt to determine the immigration 
status of a person involved in a lawful stop; allow state residents to sue . . . for noncompliance 
with immigration enforcement; require E-Verify . . . ; prohibit the harboring . . . of unauthorized 
aliens; and make it a violation for failure to carry an alien registration document.” Brooke Meyer 
et al., Immigration Policy Report: 2011 Immigration-Related Laws and Resolutions in the States 
(Jan.1–Dec. 7, 2011), NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/ 
immigration/state-immigration-legislation-report-dec-2011.aspx (last visited Jan. 16, 2016). 
 103. See Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 
450 (codified as amended in scattered sections of ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. tits. 11, 13, 23, 28, and 
41). Id. § 1 (emphasis added). 
 104. Caught in the Net: Alabama’s Immigration Law Is Proving Too Strict and Too Costly, 
ECONOMIST (Jan. 28, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21543541 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). The Alabama law additionally required public schools to verify students’ 
immigration status. Id. 
 105. On the career of “attrition through enforcement,” see MICHELE WASLIN, IMMIGRATION 
POL’Y CTR., DISCREDITING “SELF-DEPORTATION” AS IMMIGRATION POLICY 2–4 (2012), http://www. 
immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/Waslin_-_Attrition_Through_Enforcement_
020612.pdf. In particular, Kansas Secretary of State Kris Kobach has been a legal and intellectual 
leader of the movement for attrition through enforcement. Id. at 4–5. Secretary Kobach, a former 
immigration official in the George W. Bush administration, coauthored the Arizona and Alabama 
immigration statutes, has published academic articles advocating for an expanded role for states 
and localities in combating unauthorized immigration, and as an attorney defended various state 
and local provisions against constitutional attack. Id.; see also e.g., Kris W. Kobach, The 
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If laws such as Arizona’s were classified as immigration laws, they 
would be structurally preempted for having interfered in an exclusively 
federal regulatory arena.106 Indeed, the logical argument for treating them 
as immigration laws seems quite compelling. In light of the Arizona 
legislature’s declared purpose of “attrition through enforcement,” Judge 
John Noonan of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit observed, 
“Without qualification, Arizona establishes its policy on immigration.”107 
But Judge Noonan stands alone in that conclusion among federal judges. 
Courts have uniformly declined to review laws such as Arizona’s as 
immigration laws, even while recognizing that they are motivated, at least 
in part, by legislatures’ desire to effect noncitizens’ migration and 
settlement decisions. In Arizona v. United States, for example, the Court 
cited the state’s declared policy of “attrition through enforcement” and 
readily acknowledged that the express purpose of SB 1070 was to exert 
selection pressure on undocumented noncitizens who were either already 
present in or considering migrating to the state.108 To uphold the 
provision authorizing state officers to make a warrantless arrest of any 
person the officer has “probable cause” to believe has committed a 
                                                                                                                     
Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local Police to Make Immigration 
Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 181–82 (2006). 
 106. In federal preemption challenges, the U.S. government routinely characterizes state 
laws regulating noncitizens as “immigration laws,” even if its substantive arguments center on 
field or conflict preemption. See, e.g., Complaint at 2, United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 
980 (D. Ariz. 2010) (2:10-cv-01413-NVM) (characterizing the challenged Arizona laws as “a 
sweeping set of provisions that are designed to ‘work together to discourage and deter the 
unlawful entry and presence of aliens’ by making ‘attrition through enforcement the public policy 
of all state and local government agencies in Arizona,’” and arguing that a state “may not establish 
its own immigration policy”); Complaint at 2, United States v. Alabama, 2:11-cv-02746-WMA 
(N.D. Ala. filed Aug. 1, 2011) (characterizing the challenged Alabama law as “a sweeping set of 
provisions that are designed to address numerous aspects of immigration regulation and 
enforcement,” and arguing that a state “may not establish its own immigration policy”).  
 107. Judge Noonan wrote:  
That immigration policy is a subset of foreign policy follows from its subject: 
the admission, regulation and control of foreigners within the United States. By 
its subject, immigration policy determines the domestication of aliens as 
American citizens. It affects the nation’s interactions with foreign populations 
and foreign nations[,] . . . the travel of foreigners here and the trade conducted 
by foreigners here.  
Id. While this Article disagrees with Judge Noonan’s position that any regulation that bears in a 
substantial way on the inclusion of foreigners within the American polity should ineluctably be 
declared a matter of foreign affairs or national security, his concurring opinion helpfully illustrates 
how characterizing immigration regulation as a subset of foreign affairs and national security 
leads logically to the structural preemption of any subnational law that exerts substantial pressure 
on foreign migration to or from the United States. 
 108. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2497 (2012). 
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removable offense, the Court declared, “would allow the State to achieve 
its own immigration policy.”109 The Court nevertheless declined to 
analyze SB 1070 as an immigration law per se, opting instead to strike 
down three different sections of SB 1070 on field and conflict preemption 
grounds.110  
The intention here is not to criticize the Court for analyzing the 
challenged Arizona provisions as something other than immigration laws. 
The broader contention of this Article, after all, is that the very notion of 
a singular category of immigration law is analytically incoherent and 
should be retired. Rather, this analysis highlights that when courts decline 
to approach state laws restricting certain noncitizens’ access to 
employment or requiring noncitizens to carry registration documents as 
something other than immigration regulations, they are making an 
interpretive choice. Consider the contrast between Arizona and Diaz. In 
Diaz, the Court assumed without discussion that a federal law defining 
Medicare eligibility was an immigration law,111 a classification decision 
that enabled the Court to uphold the statute out of deference to Congress 
without having to explain why the challenged alienage classification was 
consistent with equal protection. The Court’s decision in Arizona to 
approach SB 1070 as something other than an immigration regulation 
likewise held considerable instrumental value. Most obviously, by 
withholding the immigration law label the Court preserved for individual 
states a potentially meaningful role in regulating a class of persons—in 
                                                                                                                     
 109. Id. at 2506. 
 110. Id. at 2501–03. The Court held that Section 3, which created a new state misdemeanor 
punishing “the ‘willful failure to complete or carry an alien registration document,’” was 
preempted because Congress had occupied the field of alien registration. Id. at 2501 (quoting 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1509(A) (2011)). The Court held that Section 5(C), “maki[ng] it a 
state misdemeanor for ‘an unauthorized alien to knowingly apply for work, solicit work in a public 
place or perform work as an employee or independent contractor,’” and Section 6, “provid[ing] 
that a state officer, ‘without a warrant, may arrest a person if the officer has probable cause to 
believe . . . [the person] has committed any public offense that makes [him] removable from the 
United States,’” were preempted on the ground that they posed an “obstacle to the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress.” Id. at 2503–05 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2928(C), 13-
3883(A)(5)). 
To observe that the Court characterized Arizona as an ordinary Supremacy Clause case rather 
than a plenary power case, however, does not mean that the values and concerns that underlie the 
plenary power doctrine—namely foreign affairs and national sovereignty—had no bearing on the 
Court’s analysis. As Professor Kerry Abrams explains, the Arizona Court offers a lengthy “paean 
to federal power . . . [that] serves as a kind of rhetorical ‘penumbra,’ radiating out over the 
preemption analysis.” Kerry Abrams, Plenary Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 601, 603 
(2013). By unfolding its preemption analysis in the shadow of plenary federal power, Professor 
Abrams suggests, Justice Anthony Kennedy’s majority opinion could deploy national sovereignty 
rhetoric selectively, bolstering its preemption analysis with respect to some of the challenged 
provisions while withholding it in others. See id. at 627–33. 
 111. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976). 
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particular, undocumented migrants, as well as noncitizens more 
generally—the presence of which directly implicates local and national 
concerns.112 Not least, it also reserved for reviewing courts the flexibility 
inherent in field and conflict preemption analysis. Rather than 
invalidating Arizona’s attrition through enforcement policy in toto, the 
Arizona Court could engage in a more granular analysis of the challenged 
statute—striking down some provisions as obstacles to a congressional 
purpose; upholding another as complementary to, rather than in conflict 
with, federal law; and reserving judgment on others until the state had 
enforced them.113  
II.  A BRIEF (COUNTER-)HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION EXCEPTIONALISM 
An aura of naturalness surrounds the plenary power doctrine today, as 
though withholding constitutional rights from persons subject to federal 
authority is a self-evident concomitant of exclusive citizenship and 
sovereign nationhood. When a noncitizen challenges a federal law or 
enforcement action on constitutional grounds, the reviewing court will 
take it as given that Congress and the President are owed extraordinary 
deference. Each time that the Supreme Court reaffirms the constitutional 
exceptionalism of the federal immigration power, it dutifully recites the 
presumptive connection between immigration regulation and the conduct 
of foreign affairs and national security.114 Even dissenting or concurring 
Justices who appear to harbor serious misgivings about such deference 
often avoid attacking the plenary power doctrine directly, urging instead 
that it be applied more flexibly and humanely.115  
This was not always the case. This Part seeks to recover the largely 
repressed history of judicial resistance to the plenary power doctrine. 
Section II.A considers the history of immigration-related lawmaking and 
enforcement in the century before immigration law emerged as a legal 
category. It demonstrates that until the final decades of the nineteenth 
century, immigration regulation was an unexceptional aspect of both the 
state police power and the federal commerce power. Section II.B 
describes a counter-history of the inherent sovereignty rationale—a 
                                                                                                                     
 112. See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 101, at 791; Rodriguez, supra note 101. 
 113. For conservative adherents of “new federalism” such as Chief Justice John Roberts, the 
author of the majority opinion in Arizona, conflict preemption may be preferable to the blunt 
instrument of plenary federal power because it permits the conclusion that Arizona did overstep 
its authority without foreclosing a more limited role for the states in regulating noncitizens within 
their border.  
 114. See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 520 (2003); Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 490–91 (1999).  
 115. See, e.g., Demore, 538 U.S. at 578–79 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
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history of dissent, criticism, and regret on the part of not only scholars 
and activists but also many Supreme Court Justices—that defies the 
presumption of inevitability that typically characterizes modern defenses 
of immigration exceptionalism. 
A.  Before Constitutional Exceptionalism: Pre-aggregated 
Immigration Law 
Beyond empowering Congress to “establish a[] uniform Rule of 
Naturalization,”116 the U.S. Constitution omits any mention of the 
authority to regulate immigration. This virtual silence begs the question: 
why would a document that is otherwise so attentive to the allocation of 
power, both within the departments of the federal government and 
between the federal government and the separate states, neglect to define 
this “basic aspect[] of national sovereignty?”117 
The answer lies in the fact that at the time of the founding of the 
United States and for nearly a century thereafter, American policy makers 
and judges did not conceive of immigration per se as a substantively or 
constitutionally discrete subject of lawmaking, federal or otherwise. This 
Section briefly reviews the pre-history of the modern federal immigration 
power, in order both to denaturalize the modern category of “immigration 
law” and to underscore that the inherent sovereignty model is not inherent 
to the regulation of immigration. 
Until the 1870s, individual states exercised substantial authority 
over immigrants and immigration under their traditional police 
powers.118 As the objects of state police regulation—as potential 
paupers or carriers of disease, for example—immigrants were simply 
persons, whose effect on the health, morals, and welfare of the 
community was, like that of all persons, subject to regulation.119 Even 
when the Supreme Court transferred authority to govern the admission 
of foreign migrants from the states to Congress in the 1870s and 1880s, 
it characterized federal authority not as an attribute of national 
sovereignty but as a variety of international commercial regulation.120 
For the first century of the nation’s history, governing foreign migrants 
at the U.S. border and within U.S. territory was thus constitutionally 
indistinct from the larger bodies of state and federal economic 
regulation in which that governance was embedded. The decidedly 
unexceptional manner in which both state and federal law conceived 
of noncitizens defies the constitutional singularity of a distinct class 
                                                                                                                     
 116. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 117. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954).  
 118. Lindsay, Constitution of Foreignness, supra note 3, at 774. 
 119. See id. at 774–86.  
 120. Id. at 793. 
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of exclusively federal immigration laws that govern the admission and 
removal of foreigners.  
It was a full century after the founding generation ordained the young 
republic the “asylum of mankind”121 before the federal government 
claimed significant authority to govern foreign immigration.122 Until the 
1870s, Congress neither defined the terms of eligibility for foreigners’ 
admission into the country nor governed their manner of entry. Instead, 
the seaboard states—primarily New York, but also California, Louisiana, 
and Massachusetts, among others—administered the landing of 
immigrants, and each individual state determined the rights and privileges 
of foreigners residing in its territory.123 It was not that the ebb and flow 
of foreign immigration was unproblematic. Indeed, notwithstanding the 
nation’s long-prevailing policy of encouraging—or at least not 
restraining—immigration, policy makers, reformers, judges, and other 
opinion leaders periodically worried throughout this period about the 
influence of foreign arrivals on the character and well-being of the 
communities in which they settled.124 Yet well into the post-Civil War 
era, there was a broad consensus that the regulatory challenges and 
political interests implicated by the presence of foreigners—the problem 
of economic dependency and crime, for example, or the desire to attract 
laborers or settlers—were fundamentally local in nature.125 As such, 
those problems fit comfortably within the states’ traditional police 
authority, through which states and municipalities regulated all aspects 
of public safety, health, morals, and welfare throughout the nineteenth 
century.126 Sectional conflict over slavery likewise weighed heavily in 
favor of sub-national immigration law. Pro-slavery states’ rights 
advocates, in particular, denied that immigrants were properly 
understood as “articles of commerce” precisely because that view implied 
that Congress might have the authority to regulate other human articles 
                                                                                                                     
 121. MARILYN C. BASELER, “ASYLUM FOR MANKIND”: AMERICA 1607–1800, at 7 (1998). 
 122. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of Immigration Law (1776–1875), 93 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1833, 1833–34 (1993). For background on the federalization of immigration lawmaking, 
see generally ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN: IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE 
FASHIONING OF AMERICA (2006); Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization 
of Immigration Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 641 (2005). 
 123. See Hidetaka Hirota, The Moment of Transition: State Officials, the Federal 
Government, and the Formation of American Immigration Policy, 99 J. AM. HIST. 1092, 1094 
(2013); Matthew J. Lindsay, Preserving the Exceptional Republic: Political Economy, Race, and 
the Federalization of American Immigration Law, 17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 181, 191–202 (2005) 
[hereinafter Lindsay, Preserving the Exceptional Republic]. 
 124. See Lindsay, Constitution of Foreignness, supra note 3, at 765–74. 
 125. See id. at 774–78. 
 126. On the pervasiveness of police regulations in the nineteenth-century United States, see 
generally WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA (1996). 
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of commerce, including slaves.127 
From the first decades of the nation’s history, regulating the status of 
foreigners present within the territory of a particular state was indistinct 
as a matter of legal authority from the task governing the domestic 
population. Because neither the Constitutional Convention nor the 
subsequent ratification debates addressed the authority to regulate 
immigration,128 the clearest glimpse of contemporaneous thought on the 
issue comes from debates in Congress over the Alien Friends Act of 
1798.129 The Act authorized the President to order the removal of any 
alien that he judged “dangerous to the peace and safety of the United 
States, or . . . ha[d] reasonable grounds to suspect” was engaged in treason 
or “secret machinations” against the U.S. government.130 It was a key 
component of the infamous Alien and Sedition Acts, and the most 
audacious legislative expression of the anti-alien frenzy stoked by 
Federalists in the 1790s.131  
Congressional Republicans condemned the Act as a grotesque assault 
on the Constitution—“[a] sacrifice of the first-born offspring of 
freedom . . . proposed by those who gave it birth”132—that, among other 
offenses, threatened to “swallow[] up” at Congress’s pleasure “all the 
reserved powers of the people or of the States.”133 State legislatures, they 
stressed, had long acted on the presumption that the individual states had 
“reserved to themselves the power of regulating what relates to 
emigrants.”134 That presumption, moreover, was rooted in the 
                                                                                                                     
 127. See infra note 175 and accompanying text. On the role of slavery in the unfolding 
constitutional debate over immigration regulation, see Mary Sarah Bilder, The Struggle over 
Immigration: Indentured Servants, Slaves, and Articles of Commerce, 61 MO. L. REV. 743, 793–
818 (1996). 
 128. See Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction? Historical Foundations and Modern 
Justifications for Federal Jurisdiction over Disputes Involving Noncitizens, 21 YALE J. INT’L L. 
1, 15–18 (1996). 
 129. Alien Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798). It was so designated to distinguish it from the 
Alien Enemies Act, which was part of the same package of legislation and applied only to the 
subjects of nations with which the United States was at war. Alien Enemies Act, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 
577 (1798) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 21 (2012)). 
 130. Ch. 58, 1 Stat. at 571. 
 131. In a series of bills preceding the Alien and Sedition Acts, Federalists had inflamed the 
nation’s nativist mood by admonishing Americans that alien enemies, and particularly French 
radicals, had infiltrated the American polity with the intention of devouring the tree of republican 
liberty root and branch. See ALEXANDER DECONDE, THE QUASI-WAR: THE POLITICS AND 
DIPLOMACY OF THE UNDECLARED WAR WITH FRANCE 1797–1801, at 126–30 (1966); Lindsay, 
Constitution of Foreignness, supra note 3, at 758–63.  
 132. E.g., 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2015 (1798) (statement of Rep. Robert Livingston).  
 133. 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2996 (1799) (statement of Rep. Albert Gallatin). Republican 
opponents of the Act charged that it violated the fundamental tenets of both separation of powers 
and federalism. See, e.g., id. 
 134. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2022 (statement of Rep. William Smith). 
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fundamentally local nature of immigration policy making, which was 
heavily informed by the specific demographic and economic 
circumstances within each state. Albert Gallatin, a Republican leader in 
the House of Representatives and President Thomas Jefferson’s future 
Treasury Secretary,135 explained that while “States whose population is 
full, and to which few migrations take place, are little concerned” with 
the bill’s potential to discourage immigration, it was of great 
“consequence . . . to those States whose population is thin, and whose 
policy it has always been to encourage emigration.”136 “Not only in some 
States have aliens been enabled to purchase, to hold, to inherit, and to 
leave by will, real estates,” Representative Gallatin recounted, “but many 
have actually been admitted . . . to all the rights of citizens of those 
States.”137 Perhaps most tellingly, even the Act’s Federalist advocates 
generally acknowledged that it granted to the President an extraordinary 
measure of authority, and that during more tranquil times the “power of 
admitting foreigners . . . remained with the States.”138 
In fact, the early states governed aliens in largely the same manner 
that they governed citizens. Historian Kunal Parker’s study of the legal 
construction of immigrants in antebellum Massachusetts reveals that well 
into the nineteenth century, individual towns, rather than the state or 
nation, operated as the “salient territorial unit” for the purpose of poor 
relief—one of the principal functions of municipal government.139 
Because “[o]utsiders were specifically understood as all individuals 
lacking a settlement in the town, rather than as individuals lacking 
citizenship,” town officials did not distinguish between “foreigners” who 
had been born and long resided in a neighboring town or state and 
“foreigners” who had immigrated to the United States from Ireland a 
month earlier.140 Only several decades after American independence did 
citizenship come to inform the administration of the state’s poor laws. 
My own earlier study of the New York State Commissioners of 
Emigration, the state agency that administered the landing of three-
                                                                                                                     
 135. Geoffrey D. Korff, Reviving the Forgotten American Dream, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 417, 
424 (2008). 
 136. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1982 (statement of Rep. Gallatin). 
 137. 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 3000 (statement of Rep. Gallatin). Another Republican declared 
that “[i]f aliens were to be sent off or banished,” it must therefore “be by the State Governments 
where they lived.” 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2003 (statement of Rep. Abraham Baldwin). 
 138. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1986 (statement of Rep. Harrison Otis). Federalist sponsors of the 
Alien Friends Act defended the Act on the basis of Congress’s duty of national self-defense and 
repeatedly denied that they were positing anything like a general federal immigration power. See 
Lindsay, Constitution of Foreignness, supra note 3 at 758–63. 
 139. Kunal M. Parker, State, Citizenship, and Territory: The Legal Construction of 
Immigrants in Antebellum Massachusetts, 19 LAW & HIST. REV. 583, 588–90 (2001). 
 140. Id. at 588, 597–98. 
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quarters of the nation’s immigrants between 1847 and 1891, confirms that 
until the 1870s, state immigration regulation was animated by the 
quintessentially local law and logic of poor relief and moral uplift.141  
Most importantly, the Supreme Court generated a body of 
constitutional immigration law premised on the idea that state laws 
governing the admission of foreigners to their jurisdictions were but one 
aspect of each state’s poor laws, and that immigrants’ noncitizenship was 
thus incidental, or at least secondary, to the nature of the regulatory 
authority to which they were subject. The early development of 
constitutional immigration law centered on two mid-nineteenth-century 
cases, Mayor of New York v. Miln142 and the Passenger Cases,143 
involving state laws regulating the landing of immigrants. All of the 
Justices who participated in those cases agreed that federal authority to 
regulate immigration, whatever its extent, derived from Congress’s 
commerce power. Disagreement centered on the nature and extent of 
authority reserved by the states. Notwithstanding the Justices’ divergent 
views over where the boundary between state and federal authority lay, 
however, the Court consistently drew the line of demarcation based on 
the purpose and effect of the regulation at issue, rather than the 
citizenship status of the persons upon whom it operated.144 
In Miln, the Court upheld against a federal preemption challenge a 
New York state law requiring the master of every vessel arriving in the 
port of New York from outside the state to report the name, birthplace, 
last legal settlement, age, and occupation of each passenger.145 The 
challenger, a shipmaster convicted of violating the Act, argued that 
Congress had claimed exclusive authority over all aspects of immigration 
when it adopted the Passenger Act of 1819, regulating steerage conditions 
on foreign vessels bound for the United States.146 Notably, the five-
Justice majority endorsed the state’s police rationale for a regulatory 
scheme that today would qualify unambiguously as an (exclusively 
federal) immigration law.147 It is particularly revealing in light of the 
                                                                                                                     
 141. See Lindsay, Preserving the Exceptional Republic, supra note 123, 195–96. 
Massachusetts may complicate this general characterization of state policy. Historian Hidetaka 
Hirota demonstrates how Massachusetts lawmakers, animated by intense anti-Irish nativism, 
aggressively excluded and deported alien paupers in the decades following the period covered by 
Parker’s study. See Hirota, supra note 123, at 1103–05. 
 142. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837). 
 143. Smith v. Turner & Norris v. City of Bos. (Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 
(1849). 
 144. I elaborate some of the arguments recited here in Lindsay, Constitution of Foreignness, 
supra note 3, at 774–86. 
 145. Miln, 36 U.S. at 102. 
 146. An Act Regulating Passenger Ships and Vessels, ch. 46, 3 Stat. 488 (1819). 
 147. Miln, 36 U.S. at 132. 
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modern presumption of federal exclusivity that New York acknowledged 
that the reporting requirement was intended to regulate immigration per 
se, and defended it on that basis. The necessity of regulating the “constant 
and steady migration” of Europeans to the United States had become 
“obvious” in recent decades, the State explained.148 Because New York 
had adopted the reporting requirement “to prevent the introduction of 
foreign paupers” into the state, the law was “a part of the system of poor 
laws,”149 and thus was a quintessential police regulation. As such, it could 
“operate on persons brought into a state, in the course of commercial 
operations”150 without making it “a commercial regulation” in the 
constitutional sense.151 In support of the proposition that states had 
engaged in precisely such regulation since the nation’s founding, New 
York cited more than one hundred statutes adopted by a host of different 
states.152 Notably, virtually none of these statutes appear to have had 
anything to do with immigration.153 Indeed, that was exactly the point: as 
far as New York was concerned, the challenged reporting requirement 
was merely one among many police regulations enacted to protect the 
health and welfare of the State’s citizenry.  
The Court concluded that by virtue of the Act’s purpose and object, it 
was “not a regulation of commerce, but of police; and [thus] . . . passed 
in the exercise of a power . . . rightfully belong[ing] to the states.”154 
Echoing the State’s brief to the Court, the majority acknowledged that the 
statute governed the conditions under which foreign migrants were 
landed in the port of New York, but maintained that this did not impeach 
its status as a valid police regulation.155 The Act was “obviously” 
intended to protect New Yorkers against the burden of supporting 
“multitudes of poor persons . . . from foreign countries.”156 As an 
affirmation of the State’s regulatory authority, the operative phrase here 
was not “foreign countries” but “poor persons.” Indeed, the Court 
stressed the profoundly local nature of the relevant legislative purposes: 
“New York from her particular situation, is, perhaps more than any other 
city in the Union, exposed to the evil of thousands of foreign emigrants 
arriving there.”157 Although the reporting requirement governed the 
introduction of foreigners into the United States, it remained 
                                                                                                                     
 148. Id. at 106. 
 149. Id. at 110. 
 150. Id. at 129. 
 151. Id. at 110. 
 152. Id. at 114–15. 
 153. See id. at 113–14. 
 154. Id. at 132. 
 155. See id. at 131–32, 141. 
 156. Id. at 141. 
 157. Id. 
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quintessentially a poor law, and as such belonged to “that immense mass 
of legislation which embraces everything within the territory of a state, 
not surrendered to the general government,” including inspection, 
quarantine, and health laws.158 There was thus “no mode in which the 
power to regulate internal police could be more appropriately 
exercised.”159  
The very ordinariness of a police regulation directed toward foreign 
migrants was underscored by the fact that, while the section of the law 
challenged in Miln applied to foreign migrants, the same statute regulated 
poor Americans in substantially the same manner, obliging shipmasters 
to remove to “the place of his last settlement” any United States citizen 
“deemed likely to become chargeable to the city.”160 In fact, New York 
had insisted that denying states the authority to control the entry of the 
foreign poor would necessarily deprive them of the ability to turn away 
domestic paupers as well.161 It was thus “apparent,” the Court agreed, that 
the legislature’s purpose was “to prevent New York from being burdened 
by an influx of persons brought thither in ships, either from foreign 
countries, or from any other . . . state[].”162 In short, neither the legislature 
that adopted the statute nor the Court that upheld it distinguished between 
the State’s authority to protect itself against poor Americans and its 
authority to protect itself against poor Europeans. To the extent that the 
majority “look[ed] at the person on whom [the law] operates,” it mattered 
only that “he [was] found within the same territory and jurisdiction.”163  
Moreover, the Court insisted that there was nothing constitutionally 
distinctive about a statute that regulated foreigners engaged in the process 
of immigration. The majority likened the regulation of foreign migrants 
under the challenged poor law to the prosecution under New York 
criminal law of recently landed “officers, seamen and passengers, who 
are within its jurisdiction.”164 Just as “[t]he right to punish, or to prevent 
crime, does in no degree depend upon the citizenship of the party who is 
obnoxious to the law,”165 the Court explained, “the same reasons, 
precisely, equally subject [a shipmaster] . . . to liability for failure to 
comply with” the reporting requirement.166 Each law depended upon the 
“same principle”—that New York, by virtue of its traditional police 
                                                                                                                     
 158. Id. at 133. 
 159. Id. at 141. 
 160. Id. at 154 (Story, J., dissenting). 
 161. Id. at 102 (majority opinion). 
 162. Id. at 133. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 141. 
 165. Id. at 140. 
 166. Id. at 141. 
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authority, could regulate “the persons and things within her territorial 
limits.”167 Neither an immigrant’s foreignness nor his migration from 
abroad entered into the analysis. 
Over the next half-century, even as the Supreme Court edged closer 
to federal exclusivity, the Justices continued to understand the regulation 
of foreign migration as a fairly unremarkable instance of the state police 
or federal commerce power. The Court’s next attempt to demarcate the 
states’ and Congress’s respective spheres of authority came twelve years 
after Miln in the Passenger Cases. A five-Justice majority168 struck down 
similar New York and Massachusetts laws requiring the master of every 
vessel arriving from a foreign port to pay a small tax for each passenger—
levied to fund a marine hospital and to support “foreign paupers,” 
respectively—on the ground that the laws unconstitutionally encroached 
upon the exclusively federal domain of “commerce with foreign 
nations.”169 As the majority refigured immigrants as articles of commerce 
with foreign nations,170 however, it staked congressional authority to the 
commercial nature of immigration rather than immigrants’ 
noncitizenship or the fact of their migration from abroad. Several of the 
Justices in the majority insisted that so long as the commercial goods at 
issue were transported across state lines, the Commerce Clause was 
indifferent to the national origin of either the goods themselves or the 
persons engaged in their transportation.171 States were prohibited equally 
from taxing merchandise “from one State to another State or [from] 
foreign countries,” irrespective of whether the importers “are citizens or 
foreigners.”172 Accordingly, the majority presumed that a holding with 
respect to foreign commerce would apply symmetrically to domestic 
interstate commerce.173 If New York could lay a tax on passengers 
arriving from Europe, Justice John McLean warned, “every State [could] 
tax all persons who shall pass through its territory on railroad-cars, canal-
boats, stages, or in any other manner.”174 The consequence would be to 
                                                                                                                     
 167. Id. 
 168. The majority was highly fractured, with each of the five Justices writing separately. The 
four Justices in the minority issued three separate dissents, for a total of eight opinions consisting 
of nearly 300 pages. 
 169. Smith v. Turner & Norris v. City of Bos. (Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 286, 
400 (1849). 
 170. The Court had laid the foundation for that construction twenty-five years earlier in 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). There, Chief Justice John Marshall famously 
concluded that “commerce” encompassed not only “buying and selling, or the interchange of 
commodities,” but also “commercial intercourse” more broadly. That included “navigation,” 
regardless of whether things transported were goods or passengers. Id. at 189–90. 
 171. See, e.g., Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 417 (Wayne, J., concurring). 
 172. Id. 
 173. See id. at 407 (majority opinion). 
 174. Id.  
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“enable a State to establish and enforce a non-intercourse with every 
other State.”175 
Even after the Passenger Cases, however, the states retained 
significant authority to regulate immigration under their police powers so 
long as the state laws did not “collide” with the policy of Congress. It was 
only in the 1870s and 1880s that the regulation of immigration became 
fully and exclusively federal. Beginning in 1875, Congress adopted a 
series of statutes transferring immigration policy making and 
administrative control from the states to the federal government.176 The 
Supreme Court, in turn, struck down several existing state regulations and 
upheld the new federal legislation.177 In Henderson v. Mayor of New 
York, a unanimous Court acknowledged that European immigration to the 
United States “has become part of our commerce with foreign nations, of 
vast interest to this country, as well as to the immigrants who come 
                                                                                                                     
 175. Id. The dissenters shared the majority’s presumption that the Commerce Clause applied 
symmetrically to commerce with foreign nations and commerce among the several states. See id. 
at 473 (Taney, C.J., dissenting). Indeed, the dissenters resisted the view that immigrants could be 
the subjects of commerce at least in part because it implied that Congress could regulate the 
movement of other human articles of commerce that increasingly dominated the nation’s political 
consciousness—namely, slaves and free blacks. Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, who eight years 
later wrote the majority opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), warned 
that if the federal government could oblige states to receive immigrants, then “emancipated slaves 
of the West Indies have at this hour the absolute right to reside, hire houses, and traffic and trade 
throughout the Southern States, in spite of any State law to the contrary; inevitably producing the 
most serious discontent, and ultimately leading to the most painful consequences.” Passenger 
Cases, 48 U.S. at 474. On the role of sectional conflict over slavery in the development of 
constitutional immigration law, see generally Mary Sarah Bilder, The Struggle over Immigration: 
Indentured Servants, Slaves, and Articles of Commerce, 61 MO. L. REV. 743 (1996). 
 176. See Page Act of 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (repealed 1974) (prohibiting the 
immigration of prostitutes, contract laborers, and convicts from “China, Japan, or any Oriental 
country”); Immigration Act of 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1551–1574 (2012)) (transferring authority over the landing of immigrants from individual 
states to the U.S. Treasury Department); Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 
(repealed 1943) (prohibiting the entry of Chinese laborers into the United States for a period of 
ten years); Contract Labor Act of 1885, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332 (repealed 1952) (prohibiting the 
immigration of any foreigner who had entered into an employment contract with an American 
employer prior to departing his country of origin); Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, § 7, 26 Stat. 
1084 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1551–1574) (transferring sole authority to administer 
immigration regulations to the federal government and creating the Office of the Commissioner 
of Immigration and Naturalization under the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury). 
 177. See Edye v. Robertson & Cunard Steamship Co. v. Same & Same v. Same, (Head 
Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 599–600 (1884) (upholding the head tax provision of the federal 
Immigration Act of 1882); Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 274 (1875) (striking 
down state head taxes); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 276 (1875) (striking down a California 
statute empowering a state immigration commissioner to require a bond for immigrant women 
determined to be “lewd and debauched”).  
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among us to find a welcome and a home.”178 Recast as “the business of 
bringing foreigners to [the United States],”179 as the Court later 
characterized it, immigration qua immigration became a branch of 
commerce with foreign nations and thus the exclusive province of 
Congress.  
The Henderson Court also suggested, for the first time, that governing 
foreign migration was conceptually distinct from domestic commercial 
regulation. Because a law that impedes immigration “concern[s] the 
exterior relation of this whole nation with other nations and 
governments,” the Court declared, it “may properly be called 
international.”180 Federal exclusivity would thus enable the United States 
to act as a single, unified sovereign in relation to foreign governments.181 
Yet another decade and a half passed before the Court announced in 
the Chinese Exclusion Case182 that federal exclusivity rested on a plenary, 
constitutionally exceptional power. Justice Stephen Field’s opinion for a 
unanimous Court not only upheld the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882; it 
also remade Congress’s authority to regulate immigration from an 
unremarkable instance of the commerce power to an extra-constitutional 
cousin of the war power that was inherent in the nation’s sovereignty, 
essential to its self-preservation, and therefore “conclusive upon the 
judiciary.”183 Although this re-grounding of federal authority marked a 
                                                                                                                     
 178. Henderson, 92 U.S. at 270. 
 179. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 595. 
 180. Henderson, 92 U.S. at 273.  
 181. Even after Congress assumed ultimate responsibility for the regulation of immigration 
in the Immigration Act of 1882, state officials continued to administer the actual landing of 
noncitizens in the United States for another decade under a provision of the 1882 Act that 
empowered the Secretary of the Treasury—the Executive department charged with the 
administration of the Act—to enter into contractual agreements with state immigration 
commissions “to examine into the condition of passengers arriving at the ports.” Immigration Act 
of 1882, § 2, 22 Stat. at 214; see also Lindsay, Preserving the Exceptional Republic, supra note 
123, at 217 (describing the Immigration Act of 1882). During this period, Massachusetts officials 
continued to deport noncitizens deemed foreign paupers pursuant to state policy. See Hirota, supra 
note 123, at 1104–05. 
 182. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
 183. Id. at 606. The Court wrote: “To preserve its independence, and give security against 
foreign aggression and encroachment, is the highest duty of every nation, and to attain these ends 
nearly all other considerations are to be subordinated.” Id. The Court’s construction of national 
sovereignty and security were heavily inflected with the theme of racial degradation:  
If, therefore, the government of the United States . . . consider[ed] the presence 
of foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, 
to be dangerous to its peace and security, their exclusion is not to be stayed 
because at the time there are no actual hostilities with the nation of which the 
foreigners are subjects. The existence of war would render the necessity . . . only 
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radical break with historical practice,184 the Court strove to characterize 
its innovation as a natural concomitant of sovereign nationhood that was 
rooted in timeless principles of international law. In Nishimura Ekiu v. 
United States,185 decided less than three years later, the Court confirmed 
that its novel, extra-constitutional federal immigration power extended 
beyond the exigencies of Chinese exclusion to the nation’s general 
immigration laws. In holding that the decision of a federal immigration 
inspector denying admission to a noncitizen was not reviewable in federal 
court,186 the Court set out the formulation of the plenary power doctrine 
that would become a key rhetorical touchstone for subsequent 
immigration cases:  
It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every 
sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, 
and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of 
foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in 
such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to 
prescribe. In the United States this power is vested in the 
national government, to which the Constitution has 
committed the entire control of international relations, in 
peace as well as in war.187 
The Court reasoned that, as a question of national sovereignty, the 
decision to deny admission to would-be immigrants had been consigned 
exclusively to the “political department” of the federal government.188 It 
therefore lay beyond “the province of the judiciary” to declare that 
foreigners who had never resided in the United States “shall be permitted 
to enter, in opposition to the constitutional and lawful measures of the 
                                                                                                                     
more obvious and pressing. The same necessity . . . may arise when war does not 
exist . . . .  
Id. at 606. For a discussion on the role that fears of a racial degradation of American labor and 
citizenship played in the origin of the plenary power doctrine, see generally Lindsay, Immigration 
as Invasion, supra note 3. 
 184. See infra Part III. 
 185. 142 U.S. 651 (1892). 
 186. Federal immigration officials had denied entry to Nishimura Ekiu, a Japanese woman, 
under a provision of the Immigration Act of 1891 that excluded “persons likely to become a public 
charge” from the United States. Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, § 1, 16 Stat. 1084; Nishimura, 
142 U.S. at 653. The 1891 Act had further assigned exclusive authority to administer the 
immigration laws, including the inspection of immigrants, to a national Superintendent of 
immigration lodged within the U.S. Treasury Department, and made final the decisions of federal 
inspection officers “touching the right of any alien to land,” subject to review only by the 
Superintendent and Treasury Secretary. Immigration Act of 1891, §§ 7–8, 16 Stat. at 1085. 
 187. Nishimura, 142 U.S. at 659 (citations omitted). 
 188. Id. 
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legislative and executive branches.”189 At least with respect to 
nonresident foreigners, the Court concluded that “the decisions of 
executive or administrative officers, acting within powers expressly 
conferred by Congress, are due process of law.”190  
One year after Nishimura Ekiu, in Fong Yue Ting v. United States,191 
the Court extended this principle to the expulsion of resident aliens. At 
issue was a provision of the Geary Act of 1892 that authorized the arrest 
and deportation of any Chinese laborer legally present within the United 
States who failed either to obtain a special “certificate of residence” or 
produce a “credible white witness” to attest that the laborer had resided 
in the United States prior to the adoption of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 
1882.192 A six-Justice majority upheld the certificate requirement. “The 
right to exclude or expel all aliens, or any class of aliens, absolutely or 
upon certain conditions, in war or in peace, [was] an inherent and 
inalienable right of every sovereign and independent nation, essential to 
its safety, its independence and its welfare,”193 the Court declared. 
Accordingly, constitutional criminal rights such as due process, “the right 
of trial by jury, and prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, and 
cruel and unusual punishments, have no application.”194 Fong Yue Ting 
remains good law, and the Supreme Court continues to cite the case in 
support of Congress’s plenary power to regulate immigration.195 
In sum, the notion that foreign immigration per se comprised a legally 
discrete, constitutionally exceptional subject of federal lawmaking did 
                                                                                                                     
 189. Id. at 660. 
 190. Id. A decade later, the Court did create a narrow opening for procedural review when it 
indicated that administrative officers could not “disregard the fundamental principles that inhere 
in ‘due process of law.’” Yamataya v. Fisher (Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86, 100 
(1903). Although noncitizens’ procedural challenges virtually always failed, the Japanese 
Immigrant Case did establish a formal doctrinal foothold for procedural due process claims that 
subsequently afforded meaningful, if still highly deferential, judicial review. See Motomura, 
Curious Evolution, supra note 22, at 1652 (describing a due process revolution in immigration 
law that culminated with the Court’s 1982 decision in Landon v. Plasencia, holding that a 
returning alien was entitled to due process in her exclusion hearing). 
 191. 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
 192. Id. at 727. The “credible white witness” alternative to the certificate of residence was 
introduced in a rule issued by the Treasury Secretary, who was charged with enforcing the 
certificate requirement. See id. at 727–28. 
 193. Id. at 711. 
 194. Id. at 730. The Court has continued to insist on the essentially “civil” nature of 
deportation proceedings. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) 
(“Consistent with the civil nature of the proceeding, various protections that apply in the context 
of a criminal trial do not apply in a deportation hearing.”); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 
580, 594 (1952) (“Deportation, however severe its consequences, has been consistently classified 
as a civil rather than a criminal procedure.”).  
 195. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2514 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 705).  
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not preexist the adoption of the plenary power doctrine in the late 
nineteenth century. The legal category “immigration law” was an 
historical effect of, or adjunct to, the Supreme Court’s re-grounding of 
immigration regulation in the nation’s inherent sovereignty. When 
contemplating a transition away from a unitary, categorical, extra-
constitutional immigration power and toward a disaggregated, more 
context-sensitive model of regulatory authority,196 it is helpful to recall 
that the inherent sovereignty model is not inherent to the regulation of 
immigration. Rather, a century of pre-aggregated immigration law 
provides abundant legal and historical precedent.  
B.  Judicial Dissent from the “Inherent Sovereignty” Model  
Virtually from the moment of its adoption at the end of the nineteenth 
century, the plenary power doctrine has been the object of dissent, 
criticism, and regret on the part of not only scholars and activists but also 
many Supreme Court Justices. This Section surveys this counter-history 
of judicial protest against, and ultimately resignation toward, a federal 
immigration power that is untethered from the Constitution. It 
demonstrates how, at the plenary power doctrine’s two key constitutive 
moments—its formative period of the 1890s and its solidification in the 
early 1950s—the doctrine remained intensely controversial. Throughout 
this period, several of the Justices argued strenuously in dissents that the 
consignment of immigration regulation exclusively to the political 
departments, buffered against judicially enforceable constitutional 
constraints, was fundamentally inconsistent with constitutional liberty 
and the rule of law. These dissents have served as a kind of jurisprudential 
refuge for the rights of noncitizens, where full constitutional personhood 
could be articulated.197 
As Part II noted, in the 1889 Chinese Exclusion Case and subsequent 
decisions the Supreme Court reconstructed Congress’s authority to 
regulate immigration from an unremarkable instance of the commerce 
power to an extra-constitutional analogue to the war power that was 
inherent in the nation’s sovereignty, essential to its self-preservation, and 
therefore “conclusive upon the judiciary.” The Court characterized its 
innovation as a natural concomitant of sovereign nationhood grounded in 
timeless principles of international law. Yet the patina of logical necessity 
in Justice Field’s unanimous decision dissolved four years later, in Fong 
Yue Ting. The extension of the plenary power doctrine from the exclusion 
                                                                                                                     
 196. See infra Part III. 
 197. In his important study of due process dissents between the Reconstruction Era and the 
early twentieth century, jurisprudence scholar Colin Starger demonstrates how “dissents can keep 
particular traditions of constitutional interpretation alive [after they are] forced into exile by 
shifting majorities of the Court.” Colin Starger, Exile on Main Street: Competing Traditions of 
Due Process Dissent, 95 MARQUETTE L.R. 1253, 1257 (2012). 
37
Lindsay: Disaggregating "Immigration Law"
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
216 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
 
of noncitizens to the expulsion of resident aliens produced three 
unusually vigorous dissents. Justice David Brewer condemned the very 
notion that legal residents of the United States could be subject to an 
extra-constitutional federal authority grounded in the ill-defined concept 
of national sovereignty; Justice Field, the author of the Chinese Exclusion 
Case, denounced at length the extension of the inherent-sovereignty 
model of federal authority from exclusion to deportation; and Chief 
Justice Melvin Fuller reiterated more briefly the essence of Justice Field’s 
position. Justices Field’s and Brewer’s opinions are worth considering at 
length for what they reveal about the novelty and extraordinary 
constitutional exceptionalism of the emerging federal immigration 
power. 
When contemplating the aura of naturalness and inevitability that 
surrounds the plenary power doctrine today, it is instructive that its 
primary architect “utterly dissent[ed]”198 from the doctrine’s application 
to noncitizens who were present within the U.S., and condemned “the 
decision as a blow against constitutional liberty” that “fill[ed] [him] with 
apprehensions.”199 There was “a wide and essential difference,” Justice 
Field insisted, between the power to exclude foreigners from the country 
and the “power to deport . . . persons lawfully domiciled therein.”200 “The 
moment any human being from a country at peace with us comes within 
the jurisdiction of the United States,” Justice Field explained, she 
“becomes subject to all their laws, is amenable to their punishment and 
entitled to their protection.”201 Because the relevant constitutional 
protections described in the Bill of Rights applied to “persons” and those 
“accused” of crimes, he reasoned, aliens were entitled to the same 
protection against “[a]rbitrary and despotic power” as “native-born 
citizens.”202 
Justice Field’s reliance on the Court’s then-recent decision in Yick Wo 
v. Hopkins is revealing.203 In Yick Wo, the Court unanimously struck 
down a San Francisco ordinance endowing city inspectors with 
unrestrained discretion to grant or deny business permits to certain 
commercial laundries—discretion that the City had used systematically 
to close down Chinese-owned laundries.204 Observing that the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment were 
“universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial 
                                                                                                                     
 198. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 755 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting). 
 199. Id. at 760. 
 200. Id. at 746. 
 201. Id. at 754. 
 202. Id.  
 203. Id. at 755 (discussing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)). 
 204. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 359, 374. 
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jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of 
nationality,” the Court invalidated the ordinance.205 “[S]trangers and 
aliens” enjoyed precisely the same rights under the “universal” provisions 
of the Fourteenth Amendment as “every citizen of the United States.”206 
For Justice Field, the same constitutional principles that prevented a state 
from discriminating against Chinese laundry owners in Yick Wo also 
constrained the federal government in its removal of resident Chinese.207 
He declared: “The fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness as individual possessions are secured by those maxims of 
constitutional law which are the monuments, showing the victorious 
progress of the race in securing to man the blessings of civilization under 
the reign of just and equal laws.”208 Accordingly, aliens enjoyed the very 
same protection against “[a]rbitrary and despotic power” as citizens.209 
To hold otherwise “would be to establish a pure, simple, undisguised 
despotism and tyranny with respect to foreigners resident in the country 
by its consent.”210 The majority decision carried the impossible 
implication that “Congress can, at its pleasure, in disregard of the 
guarantees of the Constitution, expel at any time the Irish, German, 
French, and English who . . . have taken up their residence here on the 
invitation of the government.”211 
Justice Field emphatically rejected the majority’s conclusion that 
deportation was a mere civil remedy rather than criminal punishment, and 
that noncitizens threatened with deportation therefore did not enjoy 
constitutional criminal rights guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
Amendments.212 He quoted at length from James Madison’s protest 
against the Alien Act of 1798: 
If the banishment of an alien from a country into which he 
has been invited as the asylum most auspicious to his 
happiness—a country where he may have formed the most 
tender connections, where he may have invested his entire 
property . . . , where he enjoys, under the laws, a greater share 
of the blessings of personal security and personal liberty than 
he can elsewhere hope for, if a banishment of this sort be not 
a punishment, and among the severest of punishments, it 
                                                                                                                     
 205. Id. at 369.  
 206. Id.; see also Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 233–34, 238 (1896) (striking 
down on Fifth and Sixth Amendment grounds a federal statute imposing imprisonment at hard 
labor on aliens determined in a summary administrative proceeding to be in the country illegally.)  
 207. See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 755 (Field, J., dissenting). 
 208. Id. (quoting Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 169). 
 209. Id. at 754. 
 210. Id. at 755. 
 211. Id. at 750. 
 212. See id. at 748–49.  
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would be difficult to imagine a doom to which the name can 
be applied.213 
The “punishment” inflicted under the Geary Act, moreover, was “beyond 
all reason in its severity” and “out of all proportion to the alleged 
offence.”214 “As to its cruelty,” Justice Field admonished, “nothing can 
exceed a forcible deportation from a country of one’s residence, and the 
breaking up of all the relations of friendship, family and business there 
contracted.”215 Notwithstanding Justice Field’s protest, however, the 
conceit that deportation is not “punishment” remains a key premise of 
constitutional immigration law. 
Justice Brewer, who was appointed to the Court after the Chinese 
Exclusion Case was decided and who dissented without opinion in 
Nishimura Ekiu, echoed Justice Field’s insistence that deportation was 
punishment216 and that noncitizens living within the United States were 
entitled to the protection of the Constitution.217 But Justice Brewer also 
added a withering condemnation of the very notion of unrestrained, extra-
constitutional authority: 
This doctrine of powers inherent in sovereignty is one both 
indefinite and dangerous. Where are the limits to such 
powers to be found, and by whom are they to be 
pronounced? Is it within the legislative capacity to declare 
the limits? If so, then the mere assertion of an inherent power 
creates it, and despotism exists. May the courts establish the 
boundaries? Whence do they obtain the authority for 
this? . . . The expulsion of a race may be within the inherent 
powers of a despotism. . . . [The Framers] gave to this 
government no general power to banish.218  
Justice Brewer’s words should disabuse modern readers of any notion 
that the plenary power doctrine is a natural or inevitable expression of 
                                                                                                                     
 213. Id. at 749 (quoting 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 555 (2d ed. 1836)). 
 214. Id. at 759.  
 215. Id. (“The laborer may be seized at a distance from his home, his family and his business, 
and taken before the judge for his condemnation, without permission to visit his home, see his 
family, or complete any unfinished business.”). 
 216. Id. at 740 (Brewer, J., dissenting) (“Every one [sic] knows that to be forcibly taken away 
from home, and family, and friends, and business, and property, and sent across the ocean to a 
distant land, is punishment, and that oftentimes most severe and cruel.”). 
 217. Id. at 738. Assuming that the Constitution implies “the power to remove resident 
aliens,” Brewer maintained, that power “still . . . can be exercised only in subordination to the 
limitations and restrictions imposed by the Constitution.” Id. The Geary Act’s deportation 
provision therefore deprives resident aliens of “‘life, liberty, and property without due process of 
law.’ . . . It places the liberty of one individual subject to the unrestrained control of another.” Id. 
at 739–40 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV). 
 218. Id. at 737. 
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sovereign nationhood or exclusive citizenship. Rather, even during a 
period of intense anti-Chinese sentiment and in the context of a federal 
registration law meant to control the “obnoxious Chinese”219 already 
present in U.S. territory, the assertion of an unrestrained authority 
inherent in federal sovereignty posed a conspicuous constitutional 
anomaly. “[The] arrest and forcible deportation from the country” of 
100,000 people was not “beyond the reach of the protecting power of the 
Constitution.”220 
Even as the constitutional exceptionalism of the federal immigration 
power became ever more firmly entrenched over the first half of the 
twentieth century,221 the Fong Yue Ting dissents continued to resonate. 
In a series of “national security” cases decided at the height of the Cold 
War in the late 1940s and early 1950s, several Justices voiced varying 
degrees of discomfort with a federal authority that was virtually 
unrestrained by fundamental constitutional guarantees of procedural 
fairness and individual rights. 
Justices William Douglas and Hugo Black, in particular, maintained 
in defiance of the plenary power doctrine that a resident alien threatened 
with deportation had a right to challenge the substantive basis of his 
deportation order.222 In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, for example, the 
Court upheld the deportation of a noncitizen—a legal U.S. resident for 
nearly four decades—on the ground that he had been a member of the 
Communist Party years earlier, before such membership was grounds for 
deportation.223 The majority conceded that the perpetual vulnerability of 
long-term resident noncitizens to “expulsion” from the United States 
“bristle[d] with severities” and that the statute under which Harisiades 
had been ordered deported—the Alien Registration Act of 1940—
“[stood] out as an extreme application of the expulsion power.”224 
Nevertheless, the power to expel a noncitizen remained “a weapon of 
defense and reprisal . . . inherent in every sovereign state,”225 that was “so 
                                                                                                                     
 219. Id. at 743. 
 220. Id. at 744. 
 221. See, e.g., Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521, 543 (1950); Oceanic Steam Navigation 
Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 343 (1909).  
 222. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 598–99 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).  
 223. Id. at 581–82, 595–96 (majority opinion). The U.S. Attorney General ordered that the 
petitioner, Harisiades, be deported based on a provision of the Alien Registration Act of 1940 
authorizing the deportation of a legally resident alien because of membership in the Communist 
Party. Id.; see Alien Registration Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-670, 54 Stat. 670 (1940) (codified 
at 18 U.S.C. §2385 (2012)). 
 224. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 587–88.  
 225. Id. The warrant for such extraordinary federal authority, the majority continued, lay in 
the fact that “any policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous 
policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a 
republican form of government.” Id. at 588–89. 
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exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be 
largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.”226 
Justices Douglas and Black dissented, insisting that the citizenship-
neutral language of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and other 
provisions in the Bill of Rights entitled noncitizens to both procedural 
and substantive constitutional protection.227 Because a noncitizen “who 
is assimilated in our society” is a “person” within the meaning of the Due 
Process Clause, Justice Douglas explained, he must be “treated as a 
citizen so far as his property and liberty are concerned.”228 Justice 
Douglas then quoted at length Justice Brewer’s dissent in Fong Yue Ting 
condemning the “powers inherent in sovereignty” theory of immigration 
regulation—a critique, he wrote, which “grows in power with the passing 
years.”229 The majority’s invocation of national security as a warrant for 
judicial diffidence was misplaced when the challenged federal action 
interfered with a fundamental constitutional liberty interest.230 “The right 
to be immune from arbitrary decrees of banishment certainly may be 
more important to ‘liberty’ than the civil rights which all aliens enjoy 
when they reside here,” Justice Douglas wrote.231 “Banishment is 
punishment in the practical sense,” he explained, and “may deprive a man 
and his family of all that makes life worth while.”232 As a result, unless 
noncitizens “are free from arbitrary banishment, the ‘liberty’ they enjoy 
while they live here is indeed illusory.”233 In stark contrast to the 
majority’s position, the fact that the Act governed the noncitizen 
petitioner’s right to be present in the United States did not exempt it from 
judicial review; to the contrary, the enormous stakes of a deportation 
proceeding enhanced the importance of judicially enforceable 
constitutional constraints.234  
Other Justices appear to have acquiesced only reluctantly in the 
principle of plenary federal power. Justice Frankfurter’s majority opinion 
                                                                                                                     
 226. Id. at 589. 
 227. See id. at 598 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  
 228. Id. at 598–99. 
 229. Id. at 599–600.  
 230. See id.  
 231. Id. at 600. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. Although the “drastic step” of banishment “may at times be necessary in order to 
protect the national interest,” Justice Douglas continued, unless the Government can show that 
“the continued presence of an alien . . . would be hostile to the safety or welfare of the Nation . . . , I 
would stay the hand of the Government and let those to whom we have extended our hospitality 
and who have become members of our communities remain here and enjoy the life and liberty 
which the Constitution guarantees.” Id. at 601. 
 234. See id. at 598; see also Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 533 (1954) (Black, J. dissenting); 
id. at 533–34 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  
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in Galvan v. Press,235 for example, reveals his serious misgivings about 
the constitutional anomalousness of unrestrained federal authority. Juan 
Galvan, a thirty-year resident of the United States who had an American 
wife and four native-born children, had been ordered deported because of 
his brief membership in the Communist Party in the 1940s.236 The 
Internal Security Act of 1950 had established as a matter of law that the 
Communist Party advocated the violent overthrow of the U.S. 
government, thus relieving the Government of the burden of proving as 
much.237 Further, under the Government’s construction of the Act, 
Congress had also dispensed with any need to prove that a particular 
noncitizen Party member was committed to, or even aware of, the Party’s 
presumed violent purpose.238 Although the “power of Congress over the 
admission of aliens and their right to remain [was] necessarily very 
broad,” Justice Frankfurter mused, “touching as it does basic aspects 
of . . . foreign relations and the national security,” the application of that 
principle in a case lacking any evidence of the noncitizen’s violent or 
otherwise illegal purpose gave him pause.239 “[C]onsidering what it 
means to deport an alien who legally became part of the American 
community, and the extent to which, since he is a ‘person,’ an alien has 
the same protection for his life, liberty and property under the Due 
Process Clause as is afforded to a citizen,” the deportation of Galvan 
“without permitting [him] to prove that he was unaware of the 
Communist Party’s advocacy of violence strikes one with a sense of harsh 
incongruity.”240 Because “the essence of due process” is “fair play,” 
Justice Frankfurter reasoned, “much could be said for the view, were we 
writing on a clean slate, that the Due Process Clause qualifies the scope 
of [Congress’s] political discretion”241 to regulate the admission and 
removal of aliens. Further, “since the intrinsic consequences of 
deportation are so close to punishment for crime, it might fairly be said 
also that the ex post facto Clause . . . should be applied to deportation.”242 
But alas, “the slate [was] not clean.”243 With respect to Congress’s 
plenary authority over immigration, Justice Frankfurter wrote, 
                                                                                                                     
 235. 347 U.S. at 523–24, 531–32 (majority opinion) (upholding the deportation of a long-
term resident alien under a section of the Internal Security Act of 1950 providing for the 
deportation of any alien who was a member of the Communist Party at any time after entering the 
country).  
 236. Id. at 532 (Black, J., dissenting).  
 237. Id. at 525–26 (majority opinion).  
 238. Id. at 526. 
 239. Id. at 530.  
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at 530–31. 
 242. Id. at 531. 
 243. Id.  
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There is not merely “a page of history,” . . . but a whole 
volume. . . . [T]hat the formulation of these policies is 
entrusted exclusively to Congress has become about as 
firmly imbedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of our 
body politic as any aspect of our government.244 
Despite such evident discomfort with the severity of the result, the 
Justices in the majority were “not prepared to deem [themselves] wiser 
or more sensitive to human rights than [their] predecessors,” and thus 
upheld Galvan’s deportation.245  
Further, even some Justices who reluctantly acquiesced in the 
consignment of immigration regulation to the political branches reserved 
a role for the courts in ensuring that noncitizens were afforded due 
process of law. This was true in exclusion as well as deportation cases. In 
Knauff v. Shaughnessy,246 for example, the Court famously declared that 
“[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as 
far as an alien denied entry is concerned.”247 Yet that principle, as well as 
the Court’s decision upholding the exclusion of a noncitizen based on 
undisclosed information,248 garnered a bare majority of only four 
Justices, with three Justices—Frankfurter, Black, and Robert Jackson—
dissenting.249 The dissenters argued that to exclude Ellen Knauff, the 
German wife of an American citizen, without even a hearing was 
inconsistent with constitutional liberty.250 “Security is like liberty in that 
many are the crimes committed in its name,” Justice Jackson scolded.251 
“The menace to the security of this country . . . from this girl’s admission 
is as nothing compared to the menace to free institutions inherent in 
procedures of this pattern.”252  
 
                                                                                                                     
 244. Id. (citations omitted). 
 245. Id. at 531–32. 
 246. 338 U.S. 521 (1950).  
 247. Id. at 544. 
 248. See id. at 547.  
 249. See id. at 550 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Two Justices did not participate in the decision. 
Id. at 547 (Douglas & Clark, JJ., abstaining).  
 250. Id. at 550–51 (Jackson, J., dissenting).  
 251. Id. at 551.  
 252. Id. Id. at 537. Following her exclusion, members of Congress sought to gain Ellen 
Knauff’s admission to the U.S. through a private bill. Though the bill stalled in the Senate, 
congressional involvement prodded the Attorney General to grant Knauff a full exclusion hearing 
before a Board of Special Inquiry. That Board upheld her exclusion, but its decision was later 
reversed by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The government’s conclusion that Knauff 
represented a national security risk rested on nothing more than “unsubstantiated hearsay,” the 
BIA concluded, before ordering Knauff admitted to the U.S. as a permanent resident. See 
Weisselberg, supra note 49, at 958–64. 
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A few years later, Justices Jackson, Frankfurter, Black, and Douglas 
again dissented when a five-Justice majority upheld the exclusion and 
indefinite detention of a noncitizen on Ellis Island without a hearing.253 
Although courts owed Congress’s and the Executive’s substantive policy 
judgments regarding security “[c]lose to the maximum of respect,” 
Justice Jackson wrote, “procedural fairness and regularity are of the 
indispensable essence of liberty” and would not be surrendered to 
legislative discretion.254 Justice Jackson emphatically rejected the 
Government’s (imputed) position that the noncitizen apprehended at the 
border “has no rights.”255 With respect to procedural due process, at least, 
noncitizens stood on equal constitutional footing with citizens. “If the 
procedures used to judge this alien are fair and just,” Justice Jackson 
explained, “no good reason can be given why they should not be extended 
to simplify the condemnation of citizens. If they would be unfair to 
citizens, we cannot defend the fairness of them when applied to the more 
helpless and handicapped alien.”256  
For the four Mezei dissenters, moreover, the denial of a hearing defied 
not only constitutional due process but also the essence of individual 
freedom and the rule of law.257 Notably, both Justices Jackson and Black 
drew explicit parallels between Mezei’s indefinite detention and the 
practices of Europe’s most infamous authoritarians. “[T]he 
Government’s theory of custody for ‘safekeeping,’” Justice Jackson 
observed, had “unmistakable overtones” of the Nazi system of 
“protective custody,” under which “the concentration camps were 
populated with victims of summary executive detention for secret 
reasons.”258 Justice Black similarly objected to “the Court’s holding that 
Mezei’s liberty is completely at the mercy of the unreviewable discretion 
of the Attorney General.”259 The Soviet People’s Commissariat and Adolf 
Hitler’s secret police claimed authority to imprison or banish both 
                                                                                                                     
 253. Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215–18 (1953). At the time the Supreme Court 
issued its decision, Ignatz Mezei had spent three years detained on Ellis Island based on “national 
security” reasons that the government refused to divulge. As in the case of Ellen Knauff, Mezei 
managed to gain an exclusion hearing before a Board of Special Inquiry. The Board upheld 
Mezei’s exclusion, but this time (due to substantial evidence of Mezei’s past communist activities) 
the BIA affirmed. Based on the finding that Mezei’s role in the Communist Party had been only 
minor, however, the BIA recommended to the Attorney General that Mezei be paroled into the 
U.S., and the Attorney General acceded. See Weisselberg, supra note 49, at 979–84. 
 254. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 222, 224 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 255. Id. at 226–27. 
 256. Id. at 225. 
 257. See id. at 217–18 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 218–21, 228 (Jackson, J., dissenting).  
 258. Id. at 225–26 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 259. Id. at 217 (Black, J., dissenting).  
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citizens and foreigners based on undisclosed information,260 he scolded. 
The American Bill of Rights, however, served as an essential bulwark 
against such practices and reflected the Founders’ abhorrence of 
“arbitrary one-man imprisonments. Their belief was—our constitutional 
principles are—that no person of any faith, rich or poor, high or low, 
native or foreigner, white or colored, can have his life, liberty or property 
taken ‘without due process of law.’”261 Taken to its logical conclusion, 
the consignment of immigration regulation exclusively to the political 
departments, free from judicially enforceable constitutional constraints, 
was fundamentally inconsistent with that principle. As Justice Jackson 
observed, “differences in the process of administration make all the 
difference between a reign of terror and one of law.”262  
* * * 
The national security cases of the early 1950s are notable today for 
their failure to command anything approaching judicial consensus about 
the metes and bounds of the federal immigration power. Although the 
holdings in those cases continue to carry significant precedential value, 
the opinions themselves go a long way toward unsettling the doctrinal 
foundation on which the modern plenary power doctrine rests. Even at 
the height of the Cold War, sixty years after the inherent sovereignty 
principle had presumably become settled law, and when claims of 
national security commanded extraordinary judicial deference, Justices 
Black and Douglas continued to reject the rule of Fong Yue Ting.263 
Others, such as Justices Frankfurter and Jackson, acquiesced reluctantly 
to six decades of precedent but continued to chafe at the patent unfairness 
that the doctrine sometimes produced, and to insist on meaningful 
procedural safeguards.264 This remarkable lack of consensus defies the 
aura of naturalness and inevitability that surrounds the plenary power 
doctrine today.  
III.  TOWARD AN UNEXCEPTIONAL IMMIGRATION POWER 
This Part argues that the Supreme Court should disaggregate 
immigration law for the purpose of constitutional review, and proposes 
that recent developments in constitutional immigration law have begun 
to chart a course toward that end. Disaggregating immigration law would 
mean recasting federal immigration regulation not as a distinct, 
constitutionally privileged subset of foreign affairs and national security, 
                                                                                                                     
 260. Id. at 217–18.  
 261. Id. at 218. 
 262. Id. at 226 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 263. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 598–600 (1952) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting).  
 264. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530–32 (1954).  
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but rather as ordinary lawmaking akin to Congress’s plenary power to 
regulate commerce or to tax and spend for the general welfare. Federal 
authority over noncitizens, including noncitizens’ right to enter or remain 
within the United States, would thus be constrained by the same 
substantive, judicially enforceable constitutional norms that apply to 
most other federal lawmaking and enforcement. Section III.A explains 
how mainstream constitutional norms have infiltrated the Court’s 
immigration opinions in recent decades, and proposes that this infiltration 
has begun to erode some of the plenary power doctrine’s key premises. 
Section III.B considers how a constitutionally disaggregated immigration 
law would operate in three select doctrinal contexts: eligibility for public 
benefits, removal, and detention. Finally, Section III.C begins to theorize 
a jurisprudential path that the disaggregation of immigration law could 
plausibly follow. 
A.  The Encroachment of Mainstream Constitutional Norms  
During the decades following the Cold War cases discussed in Part 
II.B, several Justices continued to protest the Court’s insulation of federal 
immigration regulation from constitutional review; however, they 
generally refrained from the sort of direct challenges that Justices 
Douglas and Black expressed in Harisiades.265 Yet in a number of cases, 
the Justices have suffused their opinions with the very substantive 
constitutional norms that the plenary power doctrine has, in theory, exiled 
from constitutional immigration law. Although this Section focuses on 
relatively recent developments, the encroachment of mainstream 
constitutional norms into the Court’s immigration decisions has been 
evident for decades. In two cases from the 1970s involving U.S. citizen 
                                                                                                                     
 265. Consider Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972). There, the Court rejected a First 
Amendment challenge to the government’s exclusion of Ernest Mandel, a Belgian Marxist 
journalist and scholar. Id. at 756, 770. Although the exclusion of Mandel implicated the First 
Amendment right of the petitioners (American scholars who had invited Mandel to an academic 
conference) to hear Mandel speak, the government’s plenary power to exclude noncitizens 
trumped that right. Id. at 765–66. Justices Douglas, Marshall, and Brennan dissented. See id. at 
770 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 774 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall observed in 
passing that the Chinese Exclusion Case, Fong Yue Ting, and the Cold War cases were “not the 
strongest precedents in the United States Reports,” but stressed that because “[t]here were no 
rights of Americans involved in any of the old alien exclusion cases, . . . their broad counsel about 
deference to the political branches is inapplicable.” Id. at 781, 783. The jurisprudential pillars of 
the plenary federal power to exclude noncitizens were easily distinguishable and thus need not be 
“overruled to strike down Dr. Mandel’s exclusion.” Id. at 782. 
It is unsurprising that judicial critics of plenary federal power stopped invoking Justice Field 
and Brewer’s Fong Yue Ting dissents, as “citing to dissents risks undermining the authority of the 
argument.” Starger, supra note 197, at 1264. Although “[t]he incentive not to cite dissents is 
strong,” however, dissents can nevertheless “influence doctrine far more than its number of 
citations would indicate. Id. 
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petitioners, for example, the Court subjected federal admission 
provisions—the inner core of federal “immigration law” and the subset 
that bears most directly on national “sovereignty”—to meaningful, if still 
highly deferential, constitutional review, even as it affirmed Congress’s 
plenary power to exclude noncitizens.266  
This Section analyzes two cases decided in the past fifteen years: 
Zadvydas v. Davis267 and Padilla v. Kentucky.268 The purpose of the 
analysis is twofold. First, it demonstrates the persistent dissatisfaction 
among some Justices with both the underlying logic and the practical 
consequences of the plenary power doctrine. Second, it proposes that the 
continued encroachment of mainstream constitutional norms into the 
Court’s immigration decisions has begun to wear a path of doctrinal 
development toward the end of plenary federal power and the 
disaggregation of immigration law.  
1.  Zadvydas v. Davis: Constitutional Norms in the Shadow of 
Plenary Power 
The Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in Zadvydas v. Davis provides an 
especially striking example of how substantive constitutional norms long 
banished under the plenary power doctrine nevertheless inform judicial 
decision-making in immigration cases. In Zadvydas, the Court held that 
the government lacked statutory authority to detain indefinitely Kestutis 
                                                                                                                     
266. In upholding Ernest Mandel’s exclusion on ideological grounds, the Court affirmed that 
“the legislative power of Congress [was] more complete over the ‘admission of aliens’ than any 
other ‘conceivable subject.’” Indeed, the majority quoted directly from the Chinese Exclusion 
Case and its early progeny, and expressly declined to reconsider the long and robust line of 
decisions upholding Congress’s plenary power “to exclude aliens altogether form the United 
States, or to prescribe the terms and conditions upon which they may come to this country, . . . and 
to have its declared policy enforced exclusively through executive officers, without judicial 
intervention.” Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 766 (quoting Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 
538, 547 (1895). Notwithstanding such language, however, the Court also appeared to condition 
the exercise of that power on the presence of a “facially neutral bona fide reason.” Id. at 766, 770 
(quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909).  A few years later, the 
Court similarly acknowledged Congress’s “exceptionally broad power to determine which classes 
of aliens may lawfully enter the country,” even as it subjected the challenged law—a provision 
extending preferential immigration status to the “illegitimate” children of U.S. citizens mothers 
but not U.S. citizen fathers—to something approximating rational basis review. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 
U.S. 787, 794 (1976). In so doing, the majority expressly rejected the government’s position that 
“substantive policy regulating the admission of aliens into the United States is not an appropriate 
subject for judicial review,” instead observing that “[o]ur cases reflect acceptance of a limited 
judicial responsibility under the Constitution even with respect to . . . the admission and exclusion 
of aliens . . . .” Id. at 793 n.5. 
 267. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).  
 268. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
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Zadvydas, a resident noncitizen subject to a final order of removal,269 and 
ordered Zadvydas released from federal custody and paroled into the 
United States.270 To understand how the Court arrived at that conclusion 
is to understand how constitutional norms can infuse ostensibly non-
constitutional review of immigration law. 
The federal statute at issue in Zadvydas governed the detention of 
removable noncitizens; it provided for a ninety-day statutory “removal 
period” following a final order, during which the alien typically would be 
held in custody.271 Ordinarily, the Government would remove the 
noncitizen within that ninety-day period.272 Because the Government had 
been unable to locate a country that would accept Zadvydas,273 however, 
he remained in custody after the expiration of the ninety-day removal 
period, with no realistic prospect of release.274 The Government claimed 
the authority to extend Zadvydas’s confinement indefinitely based on a 
statutory provision stating that when the Government fails to remove an 
alien during the ninety-day removal period and the Attorney General has 
determined the alien to be a “risk to the community or unlikely to comply 
with the order of removal,” the alien “may be detained beyond the 
removal period and, if released, shall be subject to [certain] terms of 
supervision.”275 At issue in Zadvydas’s challenge was whether the quoted 
language authorized the Government to detain a noncitizen indefinitely 
or, as Zadvydas maintained, only for a “period reasonably necessary” to 
accomplish removal.276 A five-Justice majority “construe[d] the statute to 
contain an implicit ‘reasonable time’ limitation, the application of which 
                                                                                                                     
 269. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684–85, 702. Specifically, Zadvydas had been convicted of 
possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute, a deportable offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) 
(1988 & Supp. V 1989–1994). Id. at 684. 
 270. See id. at 702. Although parole allows an excludable or removable alien to be released 
into the United States with or without monitoring and travel restrictions, it is not regarded legally 
as admission to the country. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (2000). Rather, a parolee has the same (limited) 
statutory and constitutional rights as an excludable alien at the border. See id.; Martin, supra note 
68, at 57, 71; Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. 
 271. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682.  
 272. Id.  
 273. Id. at 684. Germany, where Zadvydas was born, declined to accept him because he was 
not a German citizen; Lithuania, of which his parents had been citizens, declined to accept him 
because he was neither a Lithuanian citizen nor permanent resident; the Dominican Republic, of 
which Zadvydas’s wife was a citizen, likewise refused. Id. 
 274. Id. at 684–85.  
 275. Id. at 688–89 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (1994 & Supp. V 1995–2000)) (emphasis 
added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 276. Id. at 682. 
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is subject to federal-court review.”277  
Given that Zadvydas was, at bottom, a case about statutory 
construction, one might have expected the Court’s analysis to center on 
the text and perhaps the legislative history of the relevant provision. But 
it did not. After setting out the background of the case and establishing 
jurisdiction, Justice Stephen Breyer devoted eight pages of his twenty-
one-page majority opinion to the “obvious” constitutional difficulty 
“arising out of a statute that . . . permits an indefinite, perhaps permanent, 
deprivation of human liberty without any [judicial] protection.”278 
Although the majority acknowledged that Zadvydas’s constitutional 
liberty interest could not serve as the basis for a direct constitutional 
challenge to his confinement, it also maintained that the venerable canon 
of “constitutional avoidance” required the Court to attend to the 
constitutional issue.279 Zadvydas’s Fifth Amendment liberty interest thus 
entered into the Court’s analysis somewhat elliptically, through the 
“‘cardinal principle’ of statutory interpretation . . . that when an Act of 
Congress raises ‘a serious doubt’ as to its constitutionality, ‘this Court 
will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible 
by which the question may be avoided.’”280  
Even as the majority acknowledged that Zadvydas lacked a legal right 
to live at large in the United States and affirmed Congress’s plenary 
power over the removal of noncitizens, it nevertheless insisted that such 
power was “subject to important constitutional limitations.”281 “Freedom 
from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other 
forms of physical restraint,” Justice Breyer explained, “lies at the heart of 
the liberty that [the Fifth Amendment Due Process] Clause protects.”282 
When detention results from a criminal proceeding, the Constitution 
provides for “adequate procedural protections” against the unwarranted 
deprivation of individual liberty.283 Because the “indefinite civil 
detention” at issue in Zadvydas did not trigger comparable safeguards, 
however, it was incumbent on the Government to establish “strong 
special justification[s],” such as “preventing flight” or “protecting the 
                                                                                                                     
 277. Id. Four years later, the Court held that detention of noncitizens deemed inadmissible 
was likewise subject to a reasonable time limitation. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 386–87 
(2005). 
 278. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 692. As Professor David Martin has remarked, Justice Breyer’s 
attention to Zadvydas’s liberty interests reflected the majority’s “resolute insistence on viewing 
the situation from the perspective of the alien, not the government.” Martin, supra note 68, at 82. 
 279. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696, 699.  
 280. Id. at 689 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)). 
 281. Id. at 695. 
 282. Id. at 690. 
 283. Id.  
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community.”284 In this case, the Government failed to make such a 
showing.  
In describing the purported “limitations” on federal authority, Justice 
Breyer made a point to discount the relevance of the usual rationales for 
buffering federal immigration regulations against constitutional review. 
The case did not involve “terrorism or other special circumstances,” he 
reasoned, “where special arguments” grounded in national security might 
justify “preventive detention and . . . heightened deference to the 
judgments of the political branches.”285 Nor was the majority persuaded 
that the Government’s sole proffered “foreign policy consideration”—
that judicially ordered release from detention could compromise 
“sensitive repatriation negotiations” with Lithuania—was sufficiently 
weighty to justify indefinite confinement.286 Accordingly, the Court 
concluded that Zadvydas’s Fifth Amendment “liberty interest 
[was] . . . strong enough to raise a serious question” about the 
constitutionality of “indefinite and potentially permanent”287 detention. 
In a context other than immigration, that conclusion would warrant 
strict constitutional scrutiny, and thus a judicial inquiry into whether the 
challenged provision was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
government interest. By the Court’s own admission, however, the plenary 
power doctrine prevented Zadvydas from challenging the statute directly 
on Fifth Amendment grounds. “Despite this constitutional problem,” the 
majority conceded, if Congress had made clear its intent in the statute to 
authorize indefinite detention, “we must give effect to that intent.”288 In 
fact, setting aside for a moment the serious constitutional implications of 
indefinite, unreviewable detention, a candid reading of the relevant 
statutory text favors the Government’s position that Congress intended to 
bestow on the Attorney General broad discretion to detain noncitizens 
subject to a final order of removal. Yet the majority, reasoning in the long, 
perhaps obfuscating shadow of Zadvydas’s constitutional liberty interest, 
could not discern “any clear indication of congressional intent to grant 
the Attorney General the power to hold indefinitely in confinement an 
alien ordered removed.”289 The ambiguity lay in the provision that a 
removable noncitizen “may be detained beyond the removal period.”290 
                                                                                                                     
 284. Id. The majority was further troubled by Congress’s apparent delegation to the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), a mere “administrative body,” of an “unreviewable 
authority to make determinations implicating fundamental rights.” Id. at 692 (quoting 
Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 450 (1985)). 
 285. Id. at 696 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id.  
 288. Id.  
 289. Id. at 697. 
 290. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (1994 & Supp. V 1995–2000) (emphasis added). 
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Although the statute’s use of the word “‘may’ suggests discretion,” the 
majority reasoned, “it does not necessarily suggest unlimited discretion. 
In that respect the word ‘may’ is ambiguous.”291 Justice Breyer thus 
concluded that, “read in light of the Constitution’s demands,” the statute 
“does not permit indefinite detention,” but rather “limits an alien’s post-
removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about 
that alien’s removal from the United States.”292 Accordingly, the majority 
adopted six months as the presumptive period of reasonableness.293  
* * * 
Zadvydas illustrates at least two ways in which mainstream 
constitutional norms have encroached on constitutional immigration law. 
First and most evidently, in constructing the applicable statute the 
majority injected into its ostensibly sub-constitutional reasoning what 
Professor Hiroshi Motomura has called “phantom constitutional 
norms.”294 Second and more subtly, the majority refused to treat as 
dispositive one of the plenary power doctrine’s most foundational 
categorical presumptions: that courts owe the political branches broad 
deference based on the inextricable connection between the regulation of 
immigration and the conduct of foreign affairs and national security.  
a.  Statutory Construction and Phantom Constitutional Norms 
Although the plenary power doctrine obliges courts to refrain from 
direct constitutional review of substantive immigration law, 
constitutional considerations nevertheless frequently operate as 
“phantom constitutional norms,” shaping the meaning that courts ascribe 
to statutes and administrative regulations.295 By way of illustration, 
                                                                                                                     
 291. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 697. 
 292. Id. at 689. Justice Kennedy wrote scathingly in dissent that the “requirement the 
majority reads into the law simply bears no relation to the text; and in fact it defeats the statutory 
purpose and design.” Id. at 707 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 293. See id. at 701 (majority opinion). The majority based the period of six months on 
statements from a 1956 congressional debate suggesting that some members of Congress 
considered that detention longer than six months could be constitutionally problematic. Id. (citing 
United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194 (1957)). 
 294. Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom 
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 549 (1990) [hereinafter 
Motomura, Immigration Law].  
 295. See id. at 548–49. As Professor Motomura explains, the “phantom constitutional norms” 
that inform statutory interpretation in immigration law “conflict with the expressly articulated 
constitutional norm—unreviewable plenary power.” Id. at 564. Phantom norms are nevertheless 
“‘constitutional’” in that they have been “actually adopted as an expressly constitutional decision 
in other areas of law, [and] then carry over to immigration cases, where they are substantial 
52
Florida Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol68/iss1/4
2016] DISAGGREGATING “IMMIGRATION LAW” 231 
 
Professor Motomura analyzed a host of cases from the late 1970s and 
1980s in which courts very evidently, and often explicitly, adopted 
sometimes strained readings of immigration statutes and regulations in 
the service of phantom constitutional norms.296 In so doing, they 
prohibited the government from, for example, discriminating against 
noncitizens on the basis of race and national origin;297 detaining 
noncitizens indefinitely pending exclusion or removal;298 denying due 
process of law to first-time entrants seeking asylum;299 and excluding 
noncitizens on ideological grounds.300 In each of these contexts, courts 
recognized that the plenary power doctrine foreclosed a direct challenge 
centered on the constitutionally protected interest at stake, but 
nevertheless strove (sometimes successfully) to vindicate those interests 
through the sub-constitutional means of statutory construction. 
To characterize the constitutional liberty interest at work in Zadvydas 
as a “phantom” norm does not imply that it operated surreptitiously, or 
even subtly. Indeed, as the preceding overview of the majority’s analysis 
indicates, the “serious constitutional problem”301 of indefinite, 
unreviewable confinement looms over the entire opinion. At various 
points, Justice Breyer misleadingly implied that the alternative to 
constitutional avoidance was actually striking down the statute on 
constitutional grounds. On previous occasions, he counseled, “[w]e have 
read significant limitations into other immigration statutes in order to 
avoid their constitutional invalidation.”302 The implication is that “the 
                                                                                                                     
enough to serve the limited function of informing interpretation of immigration statutes and other 
subconstitutional texts.” Id. 
 296. See id. at 583–600.  
 297. See, e.g., Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 852, 857 (1985) (reading a prohibition against 
race or national origin discrimination into a general provision governing the parole of noncitizens 
into the United States); see also Motomura, Immigration Law, supra note 294, at 587–93. 
 298. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1387, 1389–90 (10th Cir. 
1981) (holding, after a trenchant and highly critical Fifth and Eighth Amendment analysis of the 
Government’s position that it could detain the noncitizen petitioner indefinitely pending removal, 
that the INS lacked statutory authority); see also Motomura, Immigration Law, supra note 294, at 
593–95. 
 299. See, e.g., Chun v. Sava, 708 F.2d 869, 877 (2d Cir. 1983) (reading into the asylum 
statutes and regulations a procedural due process right for stowaways to an exclusion hearing at 
which they could bring asylum claims, even though first-time entrants generally lacked such a 
right); see also Motomura, Immigration Law, supra note 294, at 595–97. 
 300. See, e.g., Allende v. Schultz, 605 F. Supp. 1220, 1226 (D. Mass. 1985) (reading a 
requirement that the Government provide a “‘facially legitimate and bona fide’” reason for 
denying a nonimmigrant visa to the widow of former Chilean President Salvador Allende into the 
statutory provision on which the petitioner’s exclusion was based); see also Motomura, 
Immigration Law, supra note 294, at 597–600. 
 301. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 638, 690 (2001).  
 302. Id. at 689. 
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Constitution’s demands” compelled the majority to read an “implicit 
limitation” into the post-removal-period detention statute.303 In fact, the 
obvious alternative to rewriting the statute to avoid the constitutional 
difficulty was to acknowledge that Congress, in its largely unrestrained 
authority to govern immigration, granted the Attorney General broad 
discretion to detain certain noncitizens subject to a final order of removal 
well beyond the statutory ninety-day removal period.304 In straining to 
avoid such a result, the majority opinion incorporated Zadvydas’s liberty 
interest as a phantom norm: it directly informed the disposition of the 
case—here, the construction of the statute not to sanction indefinite 
detention—even though it could not serve as its direct constitutional 
basis.  
To suggest that Justice Breyer squinted to see ambiguity in the 
challenged provision and then read into the statute a time limitation that 
Congress surely never contemplated may sound like a criticism. But it is 
not intended as one. Yes, the majority’s reading of the word “may” is 
strained and hardly stands as an example of textually rigorous statutory 
construction. Instead of viewing Justice Breyer’s analysis as an 
“unanchored interpretation” of the statute that improperly “nullifies the 
statutory purpose,”305 as Justice Kennedy charged in his dissent, the 
majority opinion should be understood as a particularly revealing artifact 
of the plenary power doctrine. Recall that in Mezei the Court held that a 
noncitizen with no right to be present in the United States could not 
challenge his indefinite, and perhaps permanent, confinement as an 
unconstitutional deprivation of liberty.306 Notwithstanding Justice 
Breyer’s generally unconvincing attempt to distinguish Mezei,307 it is 
difficult to see why, as a purely doctrinal matter, it should not control the 
                                                                                                                     
 303. Id.  
 304. Justice Antonin Scalia took this position in his dissent. Zadvydas’s “claim can be 
repackaged as freedom from ‘physical restraint’ or freedom from ‘indefinite detention,’” Scalia 
maintained. “[I]t is at bottom a claimed right of release into this country by an individual who 
concededly has no legal right to be here. There is no such constitutional right.” Id. at 702–03 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 305. Id. at 710 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 306. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.  
 307. Justice Breyer’s distinction turned on the fact that Mezei, although a long-term resident 
of the United States, had been detained at Ellis Island upon his return to the United States and 
thus stood in the same position for constitutional purposes as a noncitizen stopped at the border, 
whereas Zadvydas was a resident alien facing removal. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684, 693 
(majority opinion). As Justice Scalia pointed out in dissent, however, the territorial distinction on 
which Justice Breyer relied is informed by the fact that noncitizens present within the United 
States, and perhaps especially long-term residents, will generally have a stronger claim of right to 
be present in the United States than a noncitizen who has never been admitted. Id. at 703–04 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). But Zadvydas’s final order or removal had extinguished his right to remain 
in the United States. Id. at 703. 
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result in Zadvydas. To accept Mezei as controlling precedent, however, 
would have been to hold that the Attorney General had the authority, even 
absent any bona fide national security interest, to confine a man for years, 
and perhaps decades, with no realistic prospect of release; and to do so, 
moreover, outside the view of any constitutional court. That is an 
extraordinary assertion of sovereign power, which manifests the plenary 
power doctrine in its pure, undiluted form.308 Working under the 
assumption that Mezei would continue to define the scope of the 
Government’s detention authority, Zadvydas based his challenge not on 
constitutional grounds but on the Government’s interpretation of the post-
removal provision. It was, paradoxically, the sub-constitutional nature of 
the challenge—the fact that Zadvydas turned on the meaning of a 
statute—that created doctrinal space for the phantom constitutional norm. 
Faced with the alternative of sanctioning unrestrained governmental 
authority to deprive a person of basic human liberty—a proposition that 
a majority of the Court, like the Mezei dissenters, found fundamentally 
inconsistent with constitutional liberty and the rule of law—Justice 
Breyer chose to abandon strict fidelity to congressional intent.309 
b.  Challenging Immigration’s Presumptive Foreign Affairs–
National Security Nexus 
Invoking the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to rewrite the 
challenged statutory provision was essentially an evasive maneuver, 
through which the majority avoided the logical consequence of plenary 
federal power. Even as the Court left the plenary power doctrine itself 
intact, however, it also implicitly contravened the doctrine’s essential 
warrant for judicial deference: the presumption that immigration 
lawmaking and enforcement per se is part and parcel of the political 
branches’ authority over foreign affairs and national security. 
As this Article explained in Part I, the Court ordinarily presumes as a 
matter of course that immigration inherently implicates foreign affairs 
and national security—areas in which Congress and especially the 
Executive Branch operate largely beyond the purview of the federal 
courts. In 2003, for example, the Court upheld the mandatory six-month 
detention of a teenage petty criminal who, the Government conceded, 
                                                                                                                     
 308. Recall the Mezei dissents discussed above. See supra notes 253–62 and accompanying 
text. 
309. Justice Breyer’s analysis likewise reflects a rising judicial consciousness in the wake of 
the 1996 reforms (see supra notes 62–69 and accompanying text) that immigration law was 
becoming increasingly intertwined with criminal law in constitutionally relevant ways. In this 
respect, he anticipated the Court’s explicit engagement with the immigration/criminal law nexus 
a decade later, in Padilla v. Kentucky. See infra notes 318–43 and accompanying text. 
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posed neither a flight risk nor a threat to the community.310 As the 
majority explained, “‘any policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately 
interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of 
foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican 
form of government.’”311 “‘[R]easonable presumptions and generic 
rules,’ even when made by the INS rather than Congress,” the Court 
reasoned, “are not necessarily impermissible exercises of Congress’ 
traditional power to legislate with respect to aliens.”312 
Yet the Zadvydas majority declined to apply the same categorical 
presumption. Instead, it specifically considered and rejected the merits of 
the sovereignty, security, and foreign affairs rationales advanced by the 
Government. Because the specific circumstances of the case did not 
“require us to consider the political branches’ authority to control entry 
into the United States,” Justice Breyer wrote, ordering Zadvydas’s release 
would “leave no ‘unprotected spot in the Nation’s armor.’”313 “Neither 
do we consider terrorism or other special circumstances” that might 
justify “heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches 
with respect to matters of national security.”314  
Here, Justice Breyer subtly shifted two key pillars of plenary federal 
power. First, he implicitly shrank the sphere of immigration regulation 
that has been understood to implicate the nation’s inherent sovereignty. 
It is no longer immigration per se, understood as the right of noncitizens 
to enter and remain within the United States, but rather the “control of 
entry.” Second and more fundamentally, Justice Breyer implied that 
“heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches” will not 
be presumed, but instead requires an affirmative demonstration by the 
Government of “special” circumstances, such as terrorism. This is not the 
plenary power doctrine of Mezei, or even Demore v. Kim. The Zadvydas 
majority rejected the characterization of indefinite detention as merely an 
incident of the civil process of removal, and appeared to place the burden 
on the Government to provide a specific, constitutionally weighty 
justification. Although it was not quite the heightened scrutiny that the 
Government’s abridgement of a fundamental liberty typically triggers 
outside the immigration context, the majority nevertheless treated as 
extraordinary the assertion of authority to deprive Zadvydas indefinitely 
of his physical liberty, and insisted that such a deprivation must be 
justified by “special arguments” that were particular to Zadvydas’s case.  
                                                                                                                     
 310. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513–14 (2003).  
 311. Id. at 522 (quoting Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 n.17 (1976)).  
 312. Id. at 526 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 313 (1993)). 
 313. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695–96 (quoting Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 
602 (1953)). 
 314. Id. at 696 (emphasis added). 
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So, too, did the majority rebuff the Government’s asserted “foreign 
policy consideration”—specifically, the risk of interfering with 
“‘sensitive’ repatriation negotiations.”315 “[N]either the Government nor 
the dissents explain how a habeas court’s efforts to determine the 
likelihood of repatriation . . . could make a significant difference in this 
respect,”316 Justice Breyer observed. Indeed, even in the context of the 
“war on terror,” the Court has declined on several occasions to defer 
categorically to the Government’s invocation of national security to 
shield from judicial review the indefinite detention of noncitizens.317 In 
marked contrast to the Demore Court’s recitation of and reflexive 
capitulation to the traditional rationales for constitutional deference, the 
Zadvydas majority subjected each of those rationales to critical scrutiny, 
ultimately dismissing them as generic and devoid of substance.  
2.  Padilla v. Kentucky and the Erosion of the Civil–Criminal 
Distinction 
The Supreme Court destabilized another key pillar of the plenary 
power doctrine in the 2010 case of Padilla v. Kentucky: the notion that 
because removal from the United States is defined legally as a civil 
proceeding rather than criminal punishment, noncitizens subject to 
removal are not entitled to the suite of rights that protect criminal 
defendants against governmental abuses of power.318 As Part I observed, 
this means, among other things, that a noncitizen facing the prospect of 
                                                                                                                     
 315. Id. (quoting Brief for the Respondents at 21, Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (No. 99-
7791), 2001 WL 28667, at *21).  
 316. Id.  
 317. In Boumediene v. Bush, for example, the Court extended habeas corpus rights to 
noncitizen Guantanamo detainees who had been designated “enemy combatants,” 
notwithstanding the Government’s asserted interest in “apprehend[ing] and detain[ing] those who 
pose a real danger to our security.” 553 U.S. 723, 732, 797 (2008). “In considering both the 
procedural and substantive standards used to impose detention to prevent acts of terrorism,” the 
Court acknowledged that “proper deference must be accorded to the political branches.” Id. at 796 
(citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)). However, 
“[s]ecurity subsists, too, in fidelity to freedom’s first principles,” it reasoned. Id. at 797. “Chief 
among these are freedom from arbitrary and unlawful restraint and the personal liberty that is 
secured by adherence to the separation of powers. It is from these principles that the judicial 
authority to consider petitions for habeas corpus relief derives.” Id. Although Boumediene is not 
an immigration case and its implications for constitutional immigration law are far from clear, it 
does illustrate how, even in contexts that unambiguously implicate the nation’s security, the Court 
is prepared to rebuff the same rationale for judicial deference that undergirds the plenary power 
doctrine. For other recent examples of the Court’s refusal to abdicate its role in reviewing the 
federal government’s prosecution of the “war on terror,” see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 
507, 539 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430 (2004). 
 318. Compare supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text, with Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. 
Ct. 1473, 1481–82 (2010).  
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removal does not have a Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel, is 
not entitled to a Miranda warning, and cannot suppress evidence obtained 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment.319 It was precisely this withdrawal 
of deportation from the purview of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
Amendments that Justice Field condemned in his Fong Yue Ting 
dissent.320 Notwithstanding the protests of Justice Field and others, 
however, the conceit that deportation is not “punishment” remains a basic 
premise of constitutional immigration law.321 
Although Padilla did not directly repudiate the categorical distinction 
between civil deportation and criminal punishment, the five-Justice 
majority blurred the boundary between them in a way that necessarily 
diminishes its constitutional saliency. In brief, the Court held that a 
noncitizen criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel322 included receiving competent, accurate advice 
about the potential removal consequences of a criminal conviction.323 The 
petitioner, José Padilla, was a long-term permanent resident of the United 
States who was ordered removed after pleading guilty to transporting a 
large quantity of marijuana324—an offense for which federal law 
unambiguously mandated removal.325 Padilla then appealed his 
conviction on the ground that, prior to entering his plea, his attorney had 
falsely advised him that he “did not have to worry about immigration 
status since he had been in the country so long.”326 The Kentucky 
Supreme Court denied Padilla post-conviction relief on the ground that 
the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel did not 
entitle a criminal defendant to competent advice about removal.327 
Because removal was outside the sentencing authority of the trial court, 
                                                                                                                     
 319. See supra notes 57–61 and accompanying text. 
 320. See supra notes 198–215 and accompanying text. 
 321. See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (describing detention pending 
removal as a constitutionally permissible incident of the civil removal process).  
 322. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (holding that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel included the effective assistance of competent counsel determined 
by “reasonableness under prevailing professional norms”). 
 323. Defense counsel’s duty to inform her client about the possible removal consequences 
of conviction depends on the relative clarity of the statute, the majority explained. See Padilla, 
130 S. Ct. at 1483. Where the “deportation consequences of a particular plea are unclear or 
uncertain,” it reasoned, “[t]he duty of the private practitioner . . . is more limited.” Id. In such 
circumstances, she “need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges 
may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences.” Id. By contrast, “when the deportation 
consequence is truly clear . . . the duty to give correct advice is equally clear.” Id.  
 324. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477. 
 325. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012). 
 326. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478 (quoting Kentucky v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 
2008)). 
 327. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 485.  
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the Kentucky Supreme Court reasoned, it was merely a “collateral” rather 
than “direct” consequence of Padilla’s criminal conviction.328 That 
conclusion, which several federal appellate courts had also reached,329 
was firmly rooted in the Supreme Court’s long-standing position that 
deportation is a civil proceeding that is functionally and constitutionally 
distinct from the criminal proceeding from which it flows.330 
In Zadvydas, the fusion of immigration and criminal law remained in 
the background. In overturning the Kentucky Supreme Court, the Padilla 
majority placed that fusion at the center of its analysis.331 “Although 
                                                                                                                     
 328. Id. 
 329. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 n.9 (citing decisions by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for 
the First, Fourth, Fifth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits adopting the same position). 
 330. See supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text. See generally Gabriel J. Chin, Race, the 
War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE & 
JUST. 253, 253 (2002) (observing that collateral civil sanctions that deprive convicted felons of 
“the basic rights of membership in society,” though relatively “invisible,” often are the “most 
significant penalties resulting from a criminal conviction”). 
331. Over the last three decades immigration and criminal law have merged to a remarkable 
degree. As one of the leading chroniclers of this building “crimmigration crisis” explains, 
“immigration law became infused with the substance of criminal law” in three respects: 
First, there has been ‘unprecedented growth in the scope of criminal grounds for 
the exclusion and deportation of foreign-born non-U.S. citizens.’ Second, 
violations of immigration law are now criminal when they were previously civil, 
or carry greater criminal consequences than ever before. Third, recent changes 
in immigration law have focused on detaining and deporting those deemed likely 
to commit crimes that pose a threat to national security. 
Stumpf, supra note 61, at 382 (quoting Teresa Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration 
Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 613 (2003)); see also César 
Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Creating Crimmigration, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1457, 1468–74 
(2013); supra notes 62–69 and accompanying text (describing the dramatic expansion of statutory 
grounds for removal in 1996). Moreover, the physical experience of immigration detention is 
often scarcely distinguishable from prison. As the former Director of the Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement Office of Detention Policy and Planning explains, despite the legal 
distinction between “civilly detained and criminally incarcerated inmates,” they 
tend to be seen by the public as comparable, and both confined populations are 
managed in similar ways. Each group is ordinarily detained in secure facilities 
with hardened perimeters in remote locations that are considerable distances 
from counsel and their communities. With only a few exceptions, the facilities 
that the government uses to detain immigrant inmates were originally built, and 
currently operate, as jails and prisons to confine pre-trial and sentenced felons. 
Their design, construction, staffing plans, custody management strategies, and 
operating standards are based largely upon corrections principles of command 
and control. 
Dora Schriro, Improving Conditions of Confinement for Criminal Inmates and Immigrant 
Detainees, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1441, 1444–45 (2010) (footnote omitted). 
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removal proceedings are civil in nature” as a purely formal matter, Justice 
Stevens observed, “deportation is nevertheless intimately related to the 
criminal process.”332 Further, while American law has “enmeshed 
criminal convictions and the penalty of deportation for nearly a 
century,”333 in recent decades Congress both radically expanded the 
number of deportable offenses and stripped the courts and the Attorney 
General of their traditional and often-exercised authority to grant 
discretionary relief from deportation.334 Such enactments swelled the 
class of noncitizens eligible for deportation at the same time that they 
eliminated the traditional means of “ameliorat[ing] unjust results on a 
case-by-case basis.”335 The result was to render deportation “an integral 
part—indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that 
may be imposed on noncitizen defendants.”336 That development 
“dramatically raised the stakes of noncitizens’ criminal conviction”337 
and made it “‘most difficult’ to divorce the penalty from the conviction 
in the deportation context.”338 The majority was “quite confident,” Justice 
Stevens added, “that noncitizen defendants facing a risk of deportation 
for a particular offense find it even more difficult.”339  
One might feel cautious about ascribing to Padilla dramatic 
implications for constitutional immigration law. After all, Padilla is 
arguably not an immigration case at all, but a case about constitutional 
criminal rights—particularly, whether one of the many common 
“collateral” consequences of a criminal conviction340 is sufficiently 
serious or integral to the criminal process that defense counsel’s failure 
to address it competently would constitute “ineffective assistance” within 
the meaning of the Sixth Amendment. That is true as far as it goes; and 
in this respect, Padilla concerns the rights of criminal defendants who 
happen to be noncitizens rather than the rights of immigrants qua 
immigrants.  
But the real meaning of Padilla for constitutional immigration law 
may lie in what it tells us about how the five Justices in the majority 
                                                                                                                     
 332. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481. 
 333. Id. 
 334. See id. at 1478–79. 
 335. Id. at 1479. 
 336. Id. at 1480 (footnote omitted).  
 337. Id. 
 338. Id. at 1481 (quoting United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 38 (C.A.D.C. 1982), 
abrogated by Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473). 
 339. Id.  
 340. As Justice Samuel Alito observed in dissent, Padilla’s case happened to involve 
removal, but a criminal conviction can also lead to “civil commitment, civil forfeiture, the loss of 
the right to vote, disqualification from public benefits, ineligibility to possess firearms, 
dishonorable discharge from the Armed Forces, and loss of business or professional licenses.” 
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1488 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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understand removal. First, the majority emphasized and gave concrete 
legal effect to the often-extraordinary personal, familial, and economic 
stakes of removal. As this Article noted above, various Justices have at 
times acknowledged that deportation can carry momentous stakes, even 
characterizing it as a form of “banishment” or “exile.”341 Almost 
invariably, however, such recognition has come in dissents and 
concurrences; or, if in a majority opinion, as an expression of regret on 
the way to holding that the plenary power doctrine forecloses the relief 
sought. In Padilla, by contrast, the majority stressed the enormous stakes 
of removal as a reason to expand the constitutional rights of noncitizen 
criminal defendants.342  
Second, the majority suggested that the legislative reforms of the past 
two decades have changed the constitutional meaning of removal.343 
Removal is no longer an extraordinary sanction reserved for the worst 
offenders but rather a routine, yet no less weighty, element of both the 
criminal justice and immigration systems.344 In this new legal 
environment, the traditional civil–criminal distinction rang hollow. To 
defend the withholding of an important constitutional right from a 
criminal defendant facing banishment on the ground that removal is a 
civil rather than criminal proceeding, or a collateral rather than direct 
consequence of conviction, increasingly suggests an elevation of 
formalism over substance—a point Justice Stevens underscored when he 
contemplated the irrelevance of the collateral versus direct issue from the 
perspective of a noncitizen defendant.345 Inherited labels such as “civil” 
or “collateral” would not be dispositive of constitutional rights. 
B.  Disaggregating Immigration Law 
As this Article has discussed, denominating a statute or enforcement 
action directed at noncitizens an immigration law triggers a singular form 
                                                                                                                     
 341. See Bridges v. Wixon, 327 U.S. 125, 160–61, 163 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring); 
supra note 51 and accompanying text.  
 342. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480–82. One can be heartened by the Padilla Court’s 
recognition of the extent to which removal has become intertwined with criminal law, but also 
worry that importing criminal law norms such as effective assistance of counsel into the 
immigration context could have the unintended long-run effect of weakening established 
constitutional criminal protections. See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Strickland-Lite: 
Padilla’s Two-Tiered Duty for Noncitizens, 72 MARYLAND L. REV. 844, 854 (2013) (arguing that, 
by extending a watered-down version of the Strickland guarantee to noncitizen criminal 
defendants, Padilla risks eroding “the baseline Sixth guarantee of the right to effective assistance 
of counsel” outside the immigration context, as well). 
 343. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478–80.  
 344. See id. at 1478 (“The ‘drastic measure’ of deportation or removal is now virtually 
inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens convicted of crimes.” (quoting Fong Haw Tan v. 
Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948))).  
 345. See id. at 1481–82.  
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of exclusively federal, extra-constitutional authority. The constitutional 
exceptionalism is firmly rooted in the categorical presumption that “any 
policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with 
contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, 
the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of 
government.”346 This Section argues that the Supreme Court should retire 
that presumption, and with it the notion that the regulation of noncitizens 
comprises a discrete, constitutionally privileged domain of distinctly 
“political” subject matter. The effect would be to disaggregate 
immigration law for the purpose of constitutional review and approach 
the regulation of noncitizens for what it is—a variegated conglomeration 
of laws and enforcement actions concerning labor, crime, public health 
and welfare, and, sometimes, foreign affairs and national security.  
Stripped of its presumptive connection to foreign affairs or national 
security, the federal government’s authority to regulate immigration 
would remain “plenary” in the traditional sense. As Chief Justice John 
Marshall explained nearly two centuries ago, “[i]f . . . the sovereignty of 
Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those 
objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations, and among the 
several States, is vested in Congress . . . absolutely.”347 Indeed, when the 
Court adopted the plenary power doctrine in 1889,348 Congress had 
already exercised such “plenary” authority over immigration for at least 
fifteen (and arguably sixty) years pursuant to its commerce power.349 
Under a constitutionally unexceptional immigration power, the authority 
to govern the right of noncitizens to enter or remain within the United 
States would remain both broad and presumptively federal;350 however, 
                                                                                                                     
 346. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003) (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 
n.17 (1976)). 
 347. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 197 (1824). 
 348. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 606 
(1889) (stating that decisions by Congress to exclude aliens are “conclusive upon the judiciary”). 
 349. See supra Section II.A. (discussing City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102 (1837) and 
Smith v. Turner & Norris v. City of Bos. (Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. 283 (1849)).  
 350. Notwithstanding continued federal supremacy, the disaggregation of immigration law 
would implicate immigration federalism. Retiring the presumptive connection between 
immigration and foreign affairs entails reimagining much immigration-related lawmaking as 
ordinary, constitutionally unexceptional regulation of labor, crime, and public welfare—matters 
that historically were the province of the states, and which today the states and the federal 
government govern concurrently, subject to conventional preemption principles. Disaggregating 
immigration law would enable reviewing courts to acknowledge that a state law adopted pursuant 
to a declared policy of “attrition through enforcement” is for all intents and purposes a regulation 
of immigration, without rendering it automatically preempted. See supra notes 101–10 and 
accompanying text. On the one hand, it is doubtful that this acknowledgement would significantly 
expand the states’ domain of immigration-related lawmaking because such regulation would 
remain highly constrained by field and conflict preemption principles. See Huntington, supra note 
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that authority would be constrained by the same substantive, judicially 
enforceable constitutional norms that apply when Congress regulates 
commerce or taxes and spends for the general welfare.  
Critically, the disaggregation of immigration law would give full 
expression to noncitizens’ constitutional personhood. The individual 
right at issue, rather than the fact of noncitizenship or the categorical label 
immigration law, would frame the court’s review. A law or enforcement 
action that employed a suspect classification, infringed a noncitizen’s 
fundamental liberty interest, or had a chilling effect on free expression or 
association would be subject to strict scrutiny and upheld only if the 
government could demonstrate that it was necessary, or at least “narrowly 
tailored,” to serve a compelling government interest.351 Generic 
recitations of “foreign policy” or “national security” would lose their 
talismanic quality and cease to operate as trumps for meaningful 
constitutional review. Instead, reviewing courts would assimilate foreign 
policy and national security considerations into the strict scrutiny inquiry 
in the form of particularly compelling governmental interests. Foreign 
policy and national security would thus continue to serve as 
constitutionally viable warrants for laws burdening noncitizens, but the 
onus would lie with the government to demonstrate that such interests 
were meaningfully served by the constitutional denial at issue. 
Recognizing noncitizens’ full constitutional personhood would 
neither dissolve the legal distinction between citizens and aliens nor 
preclude the government from regulating immigrants as immigrants. As 
with constitutional challenges outside of the immigration context, the 
basic elements of strict scrutiny—the constitutional right at issue, the 
government’s interest in the challenged law, and the relative congruence 
between that interest and the regulatory means adopted352—would 
                                                                                                                     
101, at 850–52. However, it may enable reviewing courts to attend more candidly to the true 
purpose and effect of laws such as Arizona SB 1070—a candor that could be helpful in discerning 
whether a challenged provision conflicts with a policy of Congress. For an enlightening analysis 
of the federalism implications of an unexceptional immigration power, see Schuck, supra note 
101, at 66 (in light of the “federalist default” arrangement under which most federal programs are 
administered cooperatively with states and localities, “in principle immigration should not be 
different, though the precise mix of federal and state authority and responsibility is and must 
always be domain-specific”); Stumpf, supra note 101, at 1565 (“Reimagining immigration law as 
a domestic affair linked with employment, welfare, and crime is bound to expand judicial 
acceptance of state and local participation in immigration control.”). 
 351. The Court’s formulation of the strict scrutiny inquiry has not been entirely consistent. 
At times the Court has indicated that the challenged provision must be “necessary” to achieving 
a compelling governmental purpose. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 
(1995). At other times, however, the Court has indicated that the challenged provision need only 
be “narrowly tailored” toward that end. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003). 
 352. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (Brennan, 
White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
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remain highly context-sensitive. Even if the constitutional singularity of 
immigration law were dissolved, many of the categorical distinctions that 
currently inform both statutory and constitutional immigration law—for 
example, the distinction between would-be first-time entrants and long-
term permanent residents, or between undocumented and documented 
immigrants—would remain constitutionally salient.353 
The constitutional import of those distinctions, however, would be 
registered in the terms of conventional means–ends scrutiny—in the 
strength of the noncitizen’s constitutional interest; the compelling-ness 
of the government’s regulatory interest; and the requisite narrowness of 
tailoring. For example, in a substantive due process challenge to a 
noncitizen’s detention pending removal, a governmental interest in 
protecting public safety or preventing flight is much more compelling 
than an interest in administrative efficiency. So, too, is the removal of a 
noncitizen that knowingly funded an organization that sponsors terrorism 
vastly better calibrated to serve the government’s compelling interest in 
protecting national security than the removal of a noncitizen thrice 
convicted of minor drug offenses. Nor would the requirements of 
procedural due process consist in a “fixed content unrelated to time, place 
                                                                                                                     
 353. Consider Professor Martin’s proposal for formalizing a “clear and candid system of 
graduated [constitutional] protections”: 
Aliens, at least if present here, may be members of a relevant community they 
share with citizens, and are thus entitled to . . . certain rights and subject to certain 
reciprocal duties. But there are different levels of membership, or different 
circles of community, and additional reciprocal duties and rights, or at least more 
stringent protections of rights, will come into being for persons as they move to 
higher circles of membership. 
Martin, supra note 68, at 137, 89. Accordingly, Professor Martin offers a working “hierarchy of 
membership levels” in which U.S. citizens “occupy the highest rung of the community 
membership ladder,” followed by lawful permanent residents, admitted nonimmigrants, entrants 
without inspection, parolees, and, finally, applicants at the border. Id. at 92. 
Even in the context of admission decisions—the legal setting in which a noncitizen occupies 
the lowest rung of Martin’s membership hierarchy—the Supreme Court has on occasion 
undertaken meaningful, if still highly deferential, constitutional review. See Kleindienst v. 
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (denial of foreign scholar’s visa application must be based on a 
“facially neutral bona fide reason”); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1976) (statutory provision 
extending preferential immigration status to “illegitimate” noncitizen children of U.S. citizen 
mothers but not U.S. citizen fathers is subject to “limited judicial review” to ensure a rational 
basis); Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (slip op.) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (denial of visa 
application of noncitizen spouse of U.S. citizen must be based on a “facially legitimate bona fide 
reason”); see also supra note 265–66 and accompanying text (discussing Kleindienst and Fiallo). 
To be sure, such cases are exceptional and, not coincidentally, were all brought by U.S. citizens 
whose constitutional interests were directly impacted by the challenged governmental action. But 
they do suggest that a system of “graduated constitutional protections” is, as Martin proposes, 
already implicit in immigration law’s statutory and constitutional infrastructure.  
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and circumstances.”354 As the Court famously explained in Mathews v. 
Eldridge, “‘due process is flexible and calls for such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands.’”355 Indeed, it is precisely 
that flexibility that has allowed procedural due process to operate as a 
“surrogate” for substantive constitutional values that the plenary power 
doctrine ostensibly suppresses. Disaggregating immigration law would 
simply weigh those values against the relevant governmental interests in 
a formal, candid way. 
The remainder of this Section offers a brief illustration of how a 
disaggregated, constitutionally unexceptional immigration power would 
operate in practice, centering on three distinct regulatory contexts: 
eligibility for public benefits, removal, and detention.  
1.  Eligibility for Public Benefits 
As Part I noted, the Supreme Court has approached federal laws 
conditioning eligibility for federal benefits or employment on U.S. 
citizenship or length of residency as immigration laws. That classification 
decision spares what are, to all appearances, quintessential “alienage” 
regulations from meaningful constitutional review. As the Diaz Court 
explained, because “the relationship between the United States and our 
alien visitors . . . may implicate our relations with foreign powers,” the 
regulation of noncitizens had been “committed to the political branches 
of the Federal Government.”356 That commitment in turn “dictate[d] a 
narrow standard of review” in matters of immigration and 
naturalization.357 Consider the extraordinarily categorical nature of the 
Court’s presumption that such regulations implicate foreign affairs. It is 
enough that the relationship between the United States and its “alien 
                                                                                                                     
 354. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 
367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)). 
 355. Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). Eldridge set forth three 
factors for assessing the requirements of due process: the “private interest that will be affected by 
the official action; . . . the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; 
and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id. 
at 335. In the context of immigration regulation, this would mean, for example, that the 
constitutional liberty interest of a thirty-year lawful resident threatened with removal would be 
afforded much greater weight than that of an undocumented first-time entrant apprehended near 
the border. 
 356. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) (emphasis added).  
 357. Id. at 82. Relying on Diaz, federal courts later upheld provisions of the 1996 Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act, excluding lawful permanent residents from various 
means-tested federal welfare programs. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, 169 F.3d 1342, 1353 
(11th Cir. 1999); City of Chicago v. Shalala, 189 F.3d 598, 608 (7th Cir. 1999); Abreu v. Callahan, 
971 F. Supp. 799, 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
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visitors” may, in some undefined manner, bear on the nation’s 
relationship with some unspecified foreign power. The Court’s rationale 
for deference is a generic one, lacking any suggestion that this particular 
exercise of federal authority—a statutory denial of Medicaid benefits to 
which the petitioners would otherwise be entitled—has any plausible 
application to the “reasons that preclude judicial review of political 
questions.”358  
The constitutional stakes of classifying the challenged regulation as 
an immigration law become clear when Diaz is contrasted with the 
Court’s approach to analogous state laws. Even long before alienage was 
designated a “suspect classification” for equal protection purposes, the 
Court made clear that the plenary federal power to regulate immigration 
permitted Congress to employ race and alienage classifications in ways 
that the states could not. In its “broad constitutional powers in 
determining what aliens shall be admitted to the United States, the period 
they may remain, [and the] regulation of their conduct,” the Court 
explained in 1948, the federal government could govern noncitizens “in 
part on the basis of race and color classifications.”359 It did not follow, 
however, that “a state can adopt one or more of the same classifications 
to prevent lawfully admitted aliens within its borders from earning a 
living in the same way that other state inhabitants earn their living.”360  
                                                                                                                     
358. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 81–82. Notwithstanding the Court’s invocation of foreign affairs and 
the political question doctrine (see supra notes 10–16 and accompanying text; supra note 47), one 
can plausibly read Diaz more as a conventional equal protection case than an example of 
immigration exceptionalism. As Hiroshi Motomura observes, “Diaz took a constitutional 
challenge to an alienage law seriously, in contrast to immigration law decisions that rely on 
plenary power.” HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION 
AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 84 (2006). Although it is true that Justice Stevens’ 
unanimous opinion did indeed “carefully examine” the challenged Medicare eligibility’s 
requirement, conscientiously assessing its reasonableness rather than “rejecting out of hand the 
argument that the rule was unconstitutional,” (id.; see also supra note 14), it is nevertheless 
difficult to account for the Court’s highly deferential posture toward an admittedly suspect 
classification without acknowledging the great influence of the plenary power doctrine. Consider, 
again, the stark divergence between the Diaz Court’s declaredly “narrow” standard of review and 
the Graham Court’s heightened scrutiny of state alienage classifications, which, “like those based 
on race,” burdened a “discrete and insular minority” and were thus “inherently suspect.” See supra 
notes 7–8 and accompanying text.  
Characterizing Diaz as a plenary power decision is not intended to suggest that the Court 
abdicated any role in assessing the constitutionality of the provision. In fact, in reviewing the 
challenged provision for a rational basis, the Court employed a conventional form of 
constitutional analysis. Rather, Diaz is very much a plenary power case because the Court applied 
a different, and vastly more permissive, standard of scrutiny than it would have applied if the 
challenged classification had not been labeled an “immigration law.” 
 359. Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 418–19 (1948). 
 360. Id. at 418–20 (striking down a California law restricting eligibility for commercial 
fishing licenses to citizens); see Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 43 (1915); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 
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Then, in 1971, the Court added alienage to the constitutional roster of 
suspect classifications, alongside race and national origin. As this Article 
discussed above, in Graham v. Richardson the Court applied strict 
scrutiny to a state law conditioning eligibility for welfare benefits on a 
term of residency or U.S. citizenship.361 Traditionally states retained 
“broad discretion” under equal protection principles to engage in social 
and economic regulation, the Court explained, but “classifications based 
on alienage, like those based on nationality or race” were “inherently 
suspect.” Regardless of whether the challenged regulation impacted a 
fundamental right, noncitizens were “a prime example of a ‘discrete and 
insular’ minority for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is 
appropriate.”362 Two years after Graham, the Court reviewed a 
Connecticut law excluding aliens from the practice of law under 
heightened constitutional scrutiny.363 In striking down the law, the Court 
not only affirmed noncitizens’ full constitutional personhood, but also 
stressed that “[r]esident aliens, like citizens, pay taxes, support the 
economy, serve in the Armed Forces, and contribute in myriad other ways 
to our society.”364 Accordingly, it was “appropriate that a State bear a 
heavy burden when it deprives them of employment opportunities.”365 
Once alienage classifications became subject to strict scrutiny, the 
only thing standing between the regulation of noncitizens by Congress or 
the President and the “heavy burden” of justification imposed on the 
states was the categorical presumption that federal regulations were 
                                                                                                                     
118 U.S. 365, 374 (1886). Before 1971, states could discriminate against aliens so long as the 
discrimination served a special public interest—a standard that permitted a broad array of alienage 
classifications. See Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 220–21 (1923) (recognizing a special 
public interest in denying aliens the right to own land); Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 176, 189–90, 
194 (1915) (upholding New York law prohibiting the employment of aliens on public works 
projects); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 145–46 (1914) (recognizing a special public 
interest in prohibiting aliens from hunting wild game). 
 361. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).  
 362. Id. at 371–72 (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Carolene 
Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)). 
 363. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721–22 (1973); see also Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 
U.S. 634, 643 (1973) (striking down the provision of New York Civil Service Law restricting 
eligibility for certain positions within the state civil service to citizens). 
 364. Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 722.  
 365. Id. at 722. Notwithstanding heightened constitutional scrutiny, the Court has upheld 
citizenship requirements for state positions involving a “political function.” See, e.g., Cabell v. 
Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 447 (1982) (upholding state requirement of U.S. citizenship for 
peace officers).  State alienage classifications bearing on democratic self-government are likewise 
subject to only rational basis scrutiny. See Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 647–48 (upholding the denial 
to noncitizens of the right to vote or hold public office); Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134, 138 
(D. Md. 1974) (upholding the exclusion of noncitizens from jury service), aff’d, 426 U.S. 913 
(1976). 
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immigration laws that implicated distinctly national interests. In fact, in 
its sole decision striking down a federal alienage classification, Hampton 
v. Mow Sun Wong,366 the Court starkly illustrated both the remarkable 
power of that presumption and what it might mean to abandon it. On the 
same day that it decided Diaz, the Court in Hampton invalided a federal 
citizenship requirement for employment in the competitive civil service 
on the ground that the federal agency that promulgated the regulation—
the Civil Service Commission (CSC)—failed to demonstrate that 
Congress had delegated its plenary power to govern immigration to the 
agency.367  
As it did in state alienage cases such as Graham and Griffiths, the 
Court recognized that the noncitizen plaintiffs held important 
constitutional interests that the citizenship requirement infringed. The 
Court worried that the CSC rule disfavored “an identifiable class of 
persons” who were “already subject to disadvantages not shared by the 
remainder of the community.”368 Although the Court formally declined 
the noncitizen respondents’ request to review the rule under heightened 
constitutional scrutiny, it nevertheless emphasized that the citizenship 
requirement “deprive[d] a discrete class of persons of an interest in liberty 
on a wholesale basis.”369  
Even without invoking the “suspect classification” framework, the 
Court undertook an unusually searching examination of the CSC’s 
justification. It was true that the CSC’s argument “drew support from 
both the federal and the political character of the power over immigration 
and naturalization,” the Court acknowledged, and that an “overriding 
national interest[]” might thereby justify “a citizenship requirement in the 
federal service even though an identical requirement may not be enforced 
by a State.”370 Yet the federal immigration power was not “so plenary 
that any agent of the National Government” could “arbitrarily” single out 
noncitizens for unfavorable treatment,371 the Court insisted. Rather, 
“[w]hen the Federal Government asserts an overriding national interest 
as justification for a discriminatory rule which would violate the Equal 
Protection Clause if adopted by a State, due process requires that there be 
a legitimate basis for presuming that the rule was actually intended to 
serve that interest.”372 The CSC had cited various familiar “national 
interest[s]” as a warrant for judicial deference, including aiding the 
                                                                                                                     
 366. 426 U.S. 88 (1976). 
 367.  See id. at 116.  
 368. Id. at 102.  
 369. Id. at 102–03.  
 370. Id. at 101. 
 371. Id. 
 372. Id. at 103. 
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President in his dealings with “foreign powers,” providing an incentive 
for “aliens to qualify for naturalization,” and ensuring “undivided loyalty 
in certain sensitive positions.”373 Yet the Court rejected these rationales. 
Because the CSC lacked “direct responsibility for fostering or protecting” 
such interests, the Court would not assume that those interests had 
influenced the promulgation of the citizenship requirement.374 
To be sure, because the Hampton Court declined to apply the kind of 
heightened constitutional scrutiny that would normally be triggered when 
the government employs a suspect classification,375 it stopped short of 
subjecting federal regulation of noncitizens to mainstream constitutional 
norms. Moreover, as a matter of constitutional doctrine, Hampton merely 
stands for the proposition that if Congress wants to delegate its plenary 
authority to discriminate against noncitizens in ways that, if enacted by a 
state, would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, it must do so explicitly. Indeed, immediately following its 
rejection of the various “national interest[s]” advanced by the CSC, the 
Court suggested that “if the rule were expressly mandated by the 
Congress or the President, we might presume that any interest which 
might rationally be served by the rule did in fact give rise to its 
adoption.”376 In other words, the Court would have employed the same 
rational basis scrutiny that it did in Diaz, if necessary by searching the 
speculative universe for legitimate national interests that the 
discrimination might plausibly serve. In fact, following the Court’s 
decision in Hampton, President Gerald Ford issued an executive order 
reinstituting the citizenship requirement,377 and the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit upheld the order on the basis of Hampton—a 
                                                                                                                     
 373. Id. at 103–04. 
 374. See id. at 103–05. The CSC “has no responsibility for foreign affairs, for treaty 
negotiations, for establishing immigration quotas or conditions of entry, or for naturalization 
policies.” Id. at 114. 
 375. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (subjecting federal 
race-based affirmative action program to strict scrutiny); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 
(1979) (subjecting discrimination between mothers and fathers in the federal Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children program to intermediate scrutiny).  
 376. Hampton, 426 U.S. at 103. The majority apparently withheld judgment on whether 
Congress or the President could enact the challenged requirement in order to gain the votes of 
Justices Brennan and Marshall, who joined the opinion on the condition that the Court had 
“reserved the equal protection questions that would be raised by congressional or Presidential 
enactment of a bar on employment of aliens by the Federal Government.” Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., 
concurring). 
 377. Exec. Order No. 11,935, 41 C.F.R. § 37301 (1976). The Order provided, inter alia, that 
“[n]o person shall be given any appointment in the competitive service unless such person is a 
citizen or national of the United States.” Id. 
69
Lindsay: Disaggregating "Immigration Law"
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
248 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
 
result the Supreme Court declined to review.378  
More important than Hampton’s limitations as a constitutional 
holding, however, is the manner in which it models scrutiny of the federal 
government’s usual justifications for judicial deference. In the absence of 
a virtually automatic presumption that any federal regulation of 
noncitizens serves uniquely federal interests, the government would need 
to persuade a reviewing court both that compelling national interests were 
genuinely at issue and that the citizenship requirement was specifically 
tailored to serve those interests—not as a categorical matter on the basis 
of an asserted generic connection to foreign affairs or naturalization, but 
with respect to the particular job categories to which it applied. In 
Hampton, the Court objected in particular to the conspicuous mismatch 
between the challenged requirement and the national interests that it was 
purported to serve. Mow Sun Wong, the lead plaintiff, for example, had 
been an electrical engineer in China but under the CSC regulation “was 
ineligible for employment as a janitor for the General Services 
Administration.”379 After the President reissued the citizenship 
requirement, however, reviewing courts continued to operate under the 
presumption that a regulation excluding an otherwise qualified noncitizen 
from employment as a janitor was an immigration law that implicated 
ineluctably federal interests and thus warranted a high degree of 
constitutional deference.  
Under a disaggregated immigration law, a reviewing court would 
approach the President’s executive order as the “inherently suspect” 
alienage classification that it is, and uphold the discrimination only if the 
government could prove that it was narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling government interest. Considerations of foreign policy or 
national security would remain available to the government as 
constitutionally viable warrants for a citizenship requirement, but would 
be assimilated into the reviewing court’s strict scrutiny inquiry as 
government interests. The government would therefore bear the burden 
of demonstrating that the requirement was narrowly tailored to serve such 
interests—a burden that it would be unlikely to satisfy with respect to 
many civil service positions.  
2.  Removal 
The Supreme Court has long regarded laws governing the right of 
resident noncitizens to remain within the United States to occupy the 
inner core of federal immigration policy.380 Consider Galvan v. Press,381 
                                                                                                                     
 378. Vergara v. Hampton, 581 F.2d 1281, 1287 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 905 
(1979). 
 379. Hampton, 426 U.S. at 91.   
 380. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 731 (1893). 
 381. 347 U.S. 522 (1954).  
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a poster child for the virtual immunity of the deportation process from 
substantive constitutional review. As Section II.B explained, Juan Galvan 
was a thirty-year resident of the United States who had been ordered 
deported on the ground that he was briefly a member of the Communist 
Party, years before the Internal Security Act of 1950 made such 
membership automatic grounds for deportation.382 Justice Frankfurter’s 
majority opinion upholding Galvan’s deportation serves as a virtual 
catalogue of constitutional derelictions: of the “harsh incongruity” of 
deporting a constitutional “person” who had long been “part of the 
American community” and was innocent of any wrongdoing;383 of 
Galvan’s Fifth Amendment substantive due process right to individual 
liberty, which should, as a matter of principle, apply to deportation; and 
of the inapplicability of the Ex Post Facto Clause to retroactive grounds 
for deportation. If only the Court were “writing on a clean slate,” Justice 
Frankfurter lamented, much could be said for “qualif[ying] the scope of 
[Congress’s] political discretion” in immigration matters.384 
Unfortunately, however, the “slate [was] not clean.”385 Because 
“[p]olicies pertaining to the entry of aliens and their right to remain here” 
touched “basic aspects of national sovereignty, more particularly our 
foreign relations and the national security,” the formulation of those 
policies had been “entrusted exclusively to Congress.”386 A half-century 
later, a majority of the Court continued to accept this essential 
framework, reaffirming the “civil” nature of deportation proceedings and 
holding that a noncitizen ordered deported could not bring a selective 
prosecution challenge alleging that he was singled out for deportation due 
to membership in a politically unpopular group.387 
As with the administration of federal benefits and employment, this 
virtual immunity from judicially enforceable constitutional constraints 
rests on the presumption that immigration laws are, as a categorical 
matter, part and parcel of the conduct of foreign affairs and national 
security. Unlike eligibility for welfare benefits or employment in the 
federal civil service, however, laws that define the conditions of inclusion 
within both U.S. territory and the American polity do seem to involve the 
nation’s sovereignty in a direct and palpable way. To acknowledge that 
the presence of noncitizens in the United States implicates national 
                                                                                                                     
 382. Id. at 523.  
 383. Id. at 530.  
 384. Id. at 530–31.  
 385. Id. at 531.  
 386. Id. at 530–31. 
 387. In Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., the Court rejected First and Fifth 
Amendment challenges brought by noncitizens claiming that the Government had targeted them 
for deportation due to their affiliation with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. See 
525 U.S. 471, 473–74, 491–92 (1999). “An alien unlawfully in this country has no constitutional 
right to assert selective enforcement as a defense against his deportation.” Id. at 488. 
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sovereignty, however, in no way requires that the authority to govern 
their presence operates outside the scope of robust constitutional review.  
Disaggregating immigration law would retire the reflexive conflation 
of removal with foreign affairs and national security, and thereby give 
full expression to the constitutional norms that the Court suppressed in 
Galvan. In practice, this would mean that a noncitizen could challenge 
the substantive grounds of a removal order. The statute at issue in Galvan, 
for example, would be vulnerable on multiple counts. First and most 
evidently, a provision requiring a noncitizen’s physical apprehension and 
permanent expulsion from his long-time place of residence would be 
understood to deprive him of his Fifth Amendment substantive due 
process right to liberty.388 In fact, the Court has long recognized that 
deportation implicates a noncitizen’s Fifth Amendment liberty interest 
and that he is thus entitled to due process of law before he can be expelled 
from the country.389 If the Court were to decouple removal from foreign 
affairs and national security, thus bringing it out of the shadow of plenary 
federal power, the deprivation of liberty that the removal process 
necessarily entails would trigger strict constitutional scrutiny. The 
Government would therefore bear the heavy burden of demonstrating that 
the challenged removal provision was narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling government interest.390 
                                                                                                                     
 388. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945) (Deportation places “the liberty of an 
individual . . . at stake. . . . Though deportation is not technically a criminal proceeding, it visits a 
great hardship on the individual and deprives him of the right to stay and live and work in this 
land of freedom.”). 
 389. See Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 597 (1953) (holding that a noncitizen is entitled to 
“notice of the nature of the charge and a hearing . . . before an executive or administrative tribunal” 
before he can be “expelled and deported”). As the Court has explained in another context, the 
“liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause “denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint 
but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of 
life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship 
God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long 
recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” Bd. of Regents v. 
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 299 (1923)). Such a 
capacious understanding of constitutional liberty surely includes, as in Juan Galvan’s case, the 
right to remain in the country where one has lived for three decades and of which one’s spouse 
and children are citizens.  
390. A noncitizen in Galvan’s position likewise could challenge the statutory grounds for 
removal as an “unconstitutional condition” on his First Amendment right to free speech and 
association.  Even when a person lacks a “right” to a governmental benefit or privilege, the 
government “may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally 
protected interests—especially, his interest in freedom of speech.” Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 
593, 597 (1972). To permit the government to “penalize[] and inhibit[]” the exercise of 
constitutional freedoms would allow it to “produce a result which it could not command directly.” 
Id. (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958). By making Galvan’s fleeting 
membership in the Communist Party grounds for deportation, even absent any evidence that 
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Further, under a disaggregated immigration law the classification of 
removal as a civil proceeding would no longer limit the applicability of 
constitutional guarantees intended to protect criminal defendants against 
governmental overreaching.391 For example, the Supreme Court has long 
held that the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause392 applies only to 
criminal punishment. Accordingly, the retroactive imposition of civil 
burdens generally cannot be challenged as ex post facto laws.393 As 
                                                                                                                     
Galvan actually subscribed to the Party’s declared support for the violent overthrow of the U.S. 
government, the Internal Security Act imposed an unconstitutional condition on his First 
Amendment right of association. On unconstitutional conditions doctrine, see Kathleen M. 
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARVARD L. REV. 1413 (1989). Although the 
government’s interest in preserving the nation’s security surely qualifies as compelling, the 
extraordinary breadth of the class of persons that Congress made deportable—any noncitizen who 
knowingly joined the Communist Party, without regard to the timing or duration of membership, 
the noncitizen’s motives in joining the Party, his personal history of obedience to the law or 
loyalty to the country, or whether he actually shared the Party’s objectionable political 
commitments—strongly suggests that the provision was insufficiently narrowly tailored. 
 391. Numerous scholars have challenged the civil classification of removal and argued that 
the removal process should be subject to various constitutional constraints. See, e.g., Beth 
Caldwell, Banished for Life: Mandatory Detention of Juveniles as Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2261, 2277, 2280 (2013) (arguing that because deportation is 
often “imposed to punish,” it should be subject to the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishments); Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: 
Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1889, 1894–95 
(2000) (“Although the Court has repeatedly distinguished deporation from punishment and has 
characterized deporation as civil, this does not mean that every deporation law is immune from 
constitutional scrutiny.”); Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated 
Approach to Understanding the Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.–
C.L. L. REV. 289, 290–91 (2010) (arguing that “the determination whether to expel a noncitizen 
whom the government has previously invited into the national community as a lawful permanent 
resident is [better understood as] a criminal proceeding, in which the defendant is entitled to the 
full panoply of criminal procedural protections guaranteed by the Constitution”); Michael J. 
Wishnie, Immigration Law and the Proportionality Requirement, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 415, 417–
18 (2012) (arguing that removal is “sufficiently punitive to trigger proportionality review” under 
the Due Process Clause and the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause). 
 392. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. 
 393. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 391 (1798); see also Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 
460–61 (2001) (defining ex post facto laws exclusively as those that retroactively impose criminal 
punishment). Although a law imposing retroactive civil consequences currently can be challenged 
under the Due Process Clause, it will not be subject to heightened scrutiny. In Usery v. Turner 
Elkhorn Mining Co., for example, the Court rejected a due process challenge to a provision of the 
Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972 requiring mine operators to provide compensation for former 
employees’ death or disability due to illness caused by employment in mines, even if such 
employment ended prior to the adoption of the Act. See 428 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1976). The Court 
reasoned that because the provision was a “rational measure” for spreading the cost of injury and 
not a “wholly unreasonable” means of “providing benefits to those who were most likely to have 
shared the miner’s suffering,” it satisfied the requirements of due process. Id. at 18, 25–26. Under 
a constitutionally unexceptional immigration power, however, the threat of removal would 
implicate a noncitizen’s Fifth Amendment liberty interest, thus triggering heightened scrutiny.  
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Padilla v. Kentucky suggests, however, the Court increasingly may be 
willing to look past the formal criminal–civil distinction to the actual 
function and meaning of removal. As the Padilla majority explained, the 
statutory reforms of the preceding two decades have made deportation 
“an integral part—indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the 
penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants.”394 In fact, the 
Court has acknowledged outside the removal context that when a 
statutory scheme challenged under the Ex Post Facto Clause is clearly 
“punitive either in purpose or effect,” a “civil label is not always 
dispositive.”395 If the Court were to reject the constitutional 
exceptionalism of the removal process, laws that “prescribe[d] exile for 
prior innocent conduct” (as Justice Douglas described the provision at 
issue in Galvan) would look much more like impermissible ex post facto 
laws.396 The Court would likewise need to revisit its long-standing 
position that the exclusionary rule does not apply in the context of civil 
removal proceedings.397 The U.S. government’s “obligation to obey the 
Fourth Amendment . . . [would] not [be] lifted simply because the law 
enforcement officers were agents of the [INS], nor because the evidence 
obtained by those officers was to be used in civil deportation 
                                                                                                                     
The Court has repeatedly stated that the Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to deportation. 
See, e.g., Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 314 (1955) (stating that retroactive application of new 
grounds for deportation is not an impermissible ex post facto law); Harisiades, 342 U.S. 580, 594–
95 (1952) (determining that constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws does not apply 
to deportation). 
 394. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010) (footnote omitted). 
 395. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997). Relatedly, the Supreme Court has 
resisted the retroactive application of removal provisions when it would conflict with “‘familiar 
considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectation.’” INS v. St. Cyr, 533 
U.S. 289, 321 (2001) (quoting Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 358 (1999)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (construing statutory provision eliminating discretionary waivers of removal for 
noncitizens convicted of an aggravated felony not to apply to noncitizen criminal defendants who 
pleaded guilty prior to the effective date of the statute). The Court reasoned that this would create 
the “potential for unfairness” to the noncitizen criminal defendant. Id. at 323. “As our cases make 
clear,” Justice Stevens (also the author of Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473) instructed, “the presumption 
against retroactivity applies far beyond the confines of criminal law.” Id. at 324. 
 396. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 533 (1954) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“For joining a 
lawful political group years ago—an act which he had no possible reason to believe would subject 
him to the slightest penalty—petitioner now loses his job, his friends, his home, and maybe even 
his children, who must choose between their father and their native country.”).  
 397. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984). Lopez-Mendoza applied the 
framework set out in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) for determining to which 
noncriminal proceedings the exclusionary rule should apply. This involved weighing the “likely 
social benefits of excluding unlawfully seized evidence” against the costs to both law enforcement 
and the administrative efficiency. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1041.  
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proceedings.”398 
Finally, by dissolving the reflexive presumption that removal is part 
and parcel of foreign affairs, the disaggregation of immigration law 
would mean finally overturning the Chinese Exclusion Case and Fong 
Yue Ting—grim monuments to the legalized racism of the pre-civil rights 
era399—and subjecting discrimination based on race or nationality to 
strict constitutional scrutiny. In Fong Yue Ting, the Court had warned that 
anything short of an absolute power to control the presence of foreigners 
within U.S. territory could subject the nation to “the control of another 
power.”400 “The right to exclude or to expel all aliens, or any class of 
aliens, absolutely or upon certain conditions, in war or in peace,” the 
Court declared, was “an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign 
and independent nation.”401 Many readers might find it incredible that 
120 years later the presumptive nexus between immigration and foreign 
affairs continues to insulate even blatant racial discrimination from robust 
constitutional review.  
Critically, the constitutional mainstreaming of immigration law would 
not prevent courts from taking full account of circumstances in which the 
removal of a noncitizen is meaningfully connected to the conduct of 
foreign affairs or the preservation of national security, or where it is vital 
that the nation “speak with one voice.”  By dissolving the presumptive 
conflation of immigration with foreign affairs, disaggregation would shift 
the burden to the government to demonstrate that the challenged removal 
order was narrowly tailored to serve such an interest. Noncitizens faced 
with the prospect of removal would not cease to be constitutional 
“persons” within the meaning of the First and Fifth Amendments merely 
because they are the objects of the immigration power.  
In short, disaggregating immigration law would ensure constitutional 
protections commensurate with the human stakes of banishment. In this 
                                                                                                                     
 398. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1052 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Austin T. 
Fragomen, The “Uncivil” Nature of Deportation: Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights and the 
Exclusionary Rule, 45 BROOK. L. REV. 29, 31–32 (1978) 
 399. This is more than a hypothetical or symbolic issue. “Although the [INA] generally 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of [race and other factors], the [IIRIRA] created a substantial 
exception, authorizing the State Department to use race (as well as religion, sex, and other factors) 
in establishing visa application procedures and locations.” Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last 
Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 
1, 9 (1998) (footnotes omitted). Professor Jack Chin further observes that a majority of federal 
circuit courts have affirmed in recent decades that, under the plenary power doctrine, not only 
may “aliens . . . be excluded or deported on the basis of race without strict scrutiny, but also that 
such racial classifications are lawful per se.” Id. at 3–4 (footnote omitted). 
 400. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893) (quoting Chae Chan Ping v. 
United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889)). 
 401. Id. at 711. 
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respect, it would merely reinstate what the author of the Chinese 
Exclusion Case considered the essential constitutional bulwarks of 
individual liberty against “[a]rbitrary and despotic power.”402 After 
refocusing the constitutional analysis on the liberty of the person, the fact 
that removal proceedings involve the right of a noncitizen to remain in 
the United States enhances rather than diminishes the importance of 
judicially enforceable constitutional constraints. As Justice Douglas put 
it six decades ago, “[t]he right to be immune from arbitrary decrees of 
banishment certainly may be more important to ‘liberty’ than the civil 
rights which all aliens enjoy when they reside here.”403 
3.  Detention 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas v. Davis,404 
some courts and commentators surmised that the Justices were poised to 
recognize noncitizens’ Fifth Amendment right to challenge the 
lawfulness of their confinement.405 That expectation was dashed just two 
years later in Demore v. Kim,406 however, when the Court upheld a 
provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) requiring the 
detention of certain removable noncitizens for the duration of their 
removal proceedings.407 The Court affirmed that federal immigration 
regulations were due considerable constitutional latitude because “‘any 
policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with 
contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, 
the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of 
government.’”408 Here, again, the categorical presumption of a vital 
nexus between any regulation of a noncitizen’s right to be present in the 
United States, on one hand, and foreign affairs or national security, on 
                                                                                                                     
 402. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 754 (Field, J., dissenting). 
 403. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 600 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).  
 404. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 269–93 and 
accompanying text. 
 405. See, e.g., Welch v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 213, 224–25 (4th Cir. 2002), abrogated by 
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2002); Hoang v. Comfort, 282 F.3d 1247, 1255–56 (10th Cir. 
2002), abrogated by Demore, 538 U.S. 510; Patel v. Zemski, 275 F.3d 299, 308–10 (3rd Cir. 
2001), abrogated by Demore, 538 U.S. 510; Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 
16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339, 339 (2002). 
 406. 538 U.S. 510. 
 407. See id. at 531 (upholding the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012)). As Professor David Cole 
has observed, Demore is the “only non-wartime Supreme Court decision to uphold preventive 
detention without the procedural safeguards” that generally apply in “preventive detention” 
contexts, including the detention of foreign nationals suspected of terrorism. David Cole, Out of 
the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 716 
(2009). 
 408. Demore, 538 U.S. at 522 (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 n.17 (1976)). 
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the other, serves as a warrant for blanket deference to Congress or the 
President. Disaggregating immigration law would dissolve that 
presumption, thus extending to detained noncitizens the same 
constitutional guarantees of individual liberty that apply virtually any 
other time that the government incarcerates someone. 
The particular circumstances surrounding Hyung Joon Kim’s 
detention reveal the speciousness of that presumption. Kim was a long-
term permanent resident who had lived in the United States since age 
six.409 He had become subject to removal after he was twice caught 
shoplifting and later convicted of burglary for breaking into a tool shed 
with some high school friends—all within a ten-month period when he 
was eighteen and nineteen years old.410 Because a provision of the INA 
subjected “aggravated felon[s]” (which Kim was by virtue of his three 
criminal convictions) to mandatory detention pending removal, and 
notwithstanding the Government’s express determination that he posed 
neither a flight risk nor a threat to the community, Kim had been detained 
without bail for more than six months.411 The Court never explained 
exactly how Kim’s detention bore on foreign relations, war, or republican 
government.  
Kim’s challenge centered on the mandatory nature of the detention 
statute. Kim argued that, as a lawful permanent resident, his Fifth 
Amendment substantive due process right to individual liberty entitled 
him to an individualized bond hearing before the Government could 
confine him at length.412 Because the Attorney General had essentially 
conceded that there was no individualized justification,413 the 
Government staked its defense of Kim’s detention on Congress’s plenary 
authority to govern immigration.414 The majority acknowledged that the 
Fifth Amendment entitled aliens to due process of law in deportation 
proceedings,415 but denied that due process required the Government to 
                                                                                                                     
 409. Id. at 513. 
 410. Margaret H. Taylor, Demore v. Kim: Judicial Deference to Congressional Folly, in 
IMMIGRATION STORIES 343 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005). 
 411. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 513 & n.1, 531. The INS had declared sua sponte during the 
district court proceeding “that Kim ‘would not be considered a threat’ and that any risk of flight 
could be met by a bond of $5,000.” Id. at 541 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). For background on the Demore case, see Taylor, supra note 410, at 343–76. 
 412. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 540; see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) 
(“Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due 
Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action.”). 
 413. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 541 (“The INS has never argued that detaining Kim is 
necessary to guarantee his appearance for removal proceedings or to protect anyone from danger 
in the meantime.” (footnote omitted)).  
 414. See id. at 528 (majority opinion).  
 415. Id. at 523. 
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consider the particular circumstances of Kim’s case.416 Rather, 
“reasonable presumptions and generic rules” were “not necessarily 
impermissible exercises of Congress traditional power to legislate with 
respect to aliens.”417 
A “generic rule” denying individual bail hearings was thus 
permissible so long as Congress had evidence that some aliens released 
on bail would skip their removal hearings and “remain[] at large in the 
United States unlawfully.”418 In the context of immigration, that truism 
was a sufficient answer to the fact that this particular permanent resident 
did not pose a flight risk. Kim’s substantive due process right to freedom 
from confinement was subordinated to the “generic rule” of mandatory 
detention,419 even though (by the Government’s own concession) the 
rationale for that rule did not apply to his case. “[W]hen the Government 
deals with deportable aliens,” the Court declared, “the Due Process 
Clause does not require it to employ the least burdensome means to 
accomplish its goal.”420  
Disaggregating immigration law would give the lie to the implication 
that Kim’s detention—and most detentions pending removal are—
“‘vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in 
regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the 
maintenance of a republican form of government.’”421 Courts could thus 
                                                                                                                     
 416. See id. at 523–26 (discussing Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) and Reno v. 
Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993)).  
 417. Id. at 526 (quoting Reno, 507 U.S. at 313). A half-century earlier, before immigration 
became entangled with criminal law to the extent that it has today, the Court suggested otherwise. 
Detention was “necessarily a part of [the] deportation” process because some “aliens arrested for 
deportation would have opportunities to hurt the United States during the pendency of deportation 
proceedings.” Carlson, 342 U.S. at 538. But “[o]f course purpose to injure could not be imputed 
generally to all aliens subject to deportation.” The federal immigration statutes at issue thus had 
vested the federal courts with “discretion” to judge that the circumstances required the detention 
of a particular alien without bail. Id. 
 418. Demore, 538 U.S. at 528. The meaning of that evidence was hotly disputed. See id. at 
562–68 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 419. Id. at 526, 528 (majority opinion) (quoting Reno, 507 U.S. at 313).  
 420. Id. at 528. 
 421. Id. at 522 (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 n.17 (1976)). Scholars have issued 
persuasive challenges to the Court’s continued insistence that the detention of noncitizens pending 
removal is properly classified as “civil.” Professor César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández argues, 
for example, that even prior to the 1996 reforms, in the 1980s and early 1990s, Congress 
understood immigration detention “as a central tool in the nation’s burgeoning war on drugs.” 
César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 UCLA L. REV. 
1346, 1349 (2014). By “drastically expand[ing] the executive branch’s power—and at times 
obligation—to confine people pending immigration proceedings,” Congress created a “legal 
architecture that, in contrast with the prevailing legal characterization, is formally punitive.” Id.; 
see also Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42, 43 
(2010) (arguing that “excessive immigration detention” ushered in by the increasing 
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approach the detention of noncitizens for what it often is: The extended 
incarceration by the U.S. government of persons entitled to the protection 
of the Fifth Amendment.422 Justice David Souter’s dissenting opinion 
modeled what it would mean to take Kim’s constitutional liberty interest 
seriously; and, by extension, what an unexceptional immigration power 
would look like. “The Court’s holding that the Constitution permits the 
Government to lock up a lawful permanent resident of this country when 
there is concededly no reason to do so forgets over a century of precedent 
acknowledging the rights of permanent residents, including the basic 
liberty . . . lying at the heart of due process,”423 Justice Souter declared. 
The analytical starting point is the right itself: All persons within U.S. 
jurisdiction are entitled to the protection of the Due Process Clause. The 
Constitution’s protection of liberty and property is particularly 
compelling with regard to long-term permanent residents (LPRs), Justice 
Souter reasoned, because LPRs are encouraged by the immigration laws 
                                                                                                                     
“convergence” of immigration and criminal law have “evolved into a quasi-punitive system of 
immcarceration”). The implication, and perhaps premise, of such accounts is that the “civil” label 
is doing the legal and analytical work of exempting the confinement of noncitizens from 
constitutional safeguards. In some respects, of course, it is; but the problem runs deeper than 
mislabeling. As Justice Souter’s dissent in Demore v. Kim makes clear, in various nonimmigration 
contexts, due process entitles persons threatened with involuntarily civil commitment to 
individualized consideration of their potential dangerousness before they are “locked away.” 
Demore, 538 U.S. at 551–52 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Considered in 
this light, the question becomes why noncitizens detained for extended periods pending removal 
are not entitled to the same individualized consideration as other civilly detained persons. The 
answer, this Article argues, lies in the inherent sovereignty rationale for plenary federal power, 
and particularly the presumptive connection between immigration regulation and foreign affairs 
and national security. 
 422. That deprivation of liberty, moreover, often has serious “cascading” effects on a 
noncitizen’s ability to bring a substantive challenge to his removal order. As legal scholar Mark 
Noferi explains, an LPR subject to mandatory detention  
may never have a chance to meaningfully challenge [his removal] determination 
with counsel. He may be detained in substandard conditions for months or 
years—often far more time than he served for the crime—due to massive 
immigration court backlogs and the absence of speedy trial protections. Worse, 
his detention without counsel will deny him a fair chance to challenge his 
deportation from family, work, and property in the United States . . . . 
Mark Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to Appointed Counsel for 
Mandatorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal Proceedings, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 63, 66 
(2012) (footnote omitted). Indeed, “[t]hose who are represented and not detained at the time of 
[their] merits hearing are twenty-five times more likely to obtain a successful outcome as those 
who [are] unrepresented and detained.” Id. at 75. 
 423. Demore, 538 U.S. at 541 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As the 
Court has stated in a related context, “‘[i]n our society liberty is the norm,’ and detention without 
trial ‘is the carefully limited exception.’” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (quoting 
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987)). 
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to “establish a life permanently in this country by developing economic, 
familial, and social ties indistinguishable from those of a citizen.”424 The 
“attachments fostered” through a host of legal mechanisms are “all the 
more intense for LPRs brought to the United States as children,” who, 
like Kim, may lack meaningful familial or linguistic connections to their 
country of citizenship and who often grow up “considering the United 
States as home just as much as a native-born, younger brother or sister 
entitled to United States citizenship.”425 In short, Kim’s constitutional 
liberty interest was scarcely distinguishable from that of a U.S. citizen.  
In light of Kim’s clear constitutional right and because freedom from 
physical restraint lies at the core of the liberty protected by the Due 
Process Clause, Justice Souter continued, “the Fifth Amendment permits 
detention only where ‘heightened, substantive due process scrutiny’ finds 
a ‘sufficiently compelling’ governmental need.”426 The fact that Kim’s 
physical confinement took place in the context of a removal proceeding 
did not make it any less a deprivation of constitutional liberty. To 
determine what process is due before “someone is locked away,”427 
Justice Souter thus looked outside the immigration context to pretrial 
detention of criminal defendants and to involuntary civil commitment.428 
Based on that frame of reference, he concluded that “due process requires 
a ‘special justification’ for physical detention that ‘outweighs the 
individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical 
restraint’ as well as ‘adequate procedural protections.’”429  
When liberty is the rule and confinement the exception, there must be 
a “sufficiently compelling’ governmental interest to justify” detention, 
and the “class of persons subject to confinement must be commensurately 
narrow and the duration of confinement limited.”430 “By these standards,” 
Justice Souter concluded, “Kim’s case is an easy one.”431 The statute’s 
fatal flaw was its denial to Kim, and to other noncitizens in removal 
proceedings, of individualized consideration. Instead, the statute 
“select[ed] a class of people for confinement on a categorical basis and 
den[ied] members of that class any chance to dispute the necessity of 
putting them away.”432 Constitutional liberty “would mean nothing if 
citizens and comparable residents could be shorn of due process by this 
                                                                                                                     
 424. Demore, 538 U.S. at 543–44. 
 425. Id. at 544–45. As Justice Souter noted, Kim’s mother was a citizen and his father and 
brother were LPRs. Id. at 545. 
 426. Id. at 549 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 316 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
 427. Id. at 551. 
 428. See id. at 550–51.  
 429. Id. at 557 (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690–91 (2001)). 
 430. Id. 
 431. Id. at 558. 
 432. Id. at 551–52.  
80
Florida Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol68/iss1/4
2016] DISAGGREGATING “IMMIGRATION LAW” 259 
 
sort of categorical sleight of hand.”433 This is the heightened scrutiny 
absent from the majority opinion and from the plenary power doctrine 
generally. 
C.  Toward an Unexceptional Immigration Power 
The transition to a constitutionally unexceptional immigration power 
is unlikely to be accomplished all at once in a dramatic act of judicial 
overturning. Rather, the developments documented in this Part suggest 
what constitutional theorist David Strauss has termed a “common law” 
model of constitutional change.434  As Strauss explains, the formal 
overturning of anachronistic or otherwise undesirable constitutional rules 
typically occurs less as a radical break with precedent than as a 
ratification of doctrinal changes that have already taken place.435 Strauss 
describes a process of doctrinal evolution in which a problematic rule 
becomes hollowed out over time. In order to avoid objectionable 
outcomes in particular cases, Strauss explains, courts adopt various 
exceptions to the rule or subtly modify the terms of its application, all the 
while affirming their continued fidelity to the existing rule.436  
By way of illustration, Strauss describes the decline of the so-called 
“separate but equal” doctrine. In the four decades before the Court 
decided Brown v. Board of Education, he explains, it issued a string of 
decisions declaring that the racially segregated facility challenged in each 
case was not in fact equal.437 As a consequence, by the time Brown was 
before the Court, “the trend was unequivocal: it had been decades since 
the Court had actually found a system of segregation that it believed 
satisfied the principle of separate but equal.”438 Even as Plessy v. 
Ferguson’s precedential authority remained undiminished in theory, the 
“separate but equal” principle for which it stood was “in a shambles.”439 
In short, though the Court’s decision in Brown is often viewed as a 
dramatic triumph of constitutional principle, the “rule” of Brown—that 
separate educational facilities are inherently unequal—was announced 
only after decades of decisions had rendered “separate but equal” a 
hollow shell.440  
The legal developments analyzed in Section III.A suggest that the 
decline of the inherent sovereignty model may be following a similar 
course. Zadvydas and Padilla unsettled key premises of the contemporary 
                                                                                                                     
 433. Id. at 552. 
 434. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 36–37 (2010). 
 435. See id. at 35, 79, 85.  
 436. See id. at 85–92. 
 437. See id.  
 438. Id. at 90. 
 439. Id. at 85. 
 440. Id. at 90.  
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plenary power doctrine: The presumptive nexus between immigration 
and foreign policy, and the classification of removal as a mere “civil” 
process, respectively.441 In Zadvydas, in particular, the Court showed 
great solicitude toward a noncitizen’s constitutional liberty interest, thus 
implanting a bedrock constitutional value into a doctrinal setting—
immigration law—where such norms typically find little purchase.442 
Moreover, while those two decisions have received disproportionate 
attention from scholars and advocates, they are hardly outliers in the 
Supreme Court’s recent immigration jurisprudence.443 As Dean Kevin 
Johnson observes, for the past five Terms the Court has adopted a 
remarkably unexceptional posture when reviewing immigration-related 
lawmaking and enforcement, typically applying ordinary, “generally 
applicable principles of statutory interpretation, rules of deference to 
administrative agencies, and . . .[a strong presumption against] retroactive 
application of changes in the law and [conventional] federal preemption,” 
while virtually never invoking the plenary power doctrine.444 
                                                                                                                     
 441. See supra Subsection III.A.1. 
 442. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.  
 443. For example, in rejecting a 2001 equal protection challenge to a citizenship statute 
favoring non-marital children born abroad to U.S. citizen mothers over non-marital children born 
abroad to U.S. citizen fathers, the Court conspicuously did not avert to plenary power, and instead 
reviewed the provision under the “intermediate scrutiny” framework that it customarily applies to 
governmental discrimination on the basis of sex. Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 
533 U.S. 53, 56–57, 60 (2001). 
444. Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, 2009–13: A New Era of 
Immigration Unexceptionalism, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 57, 111–12 (2015). For example, the Court has 
on multiple occasions rejected BIA interpretations of statutory removal provisions that improperly 
expanded the meaning of “aggravated felony.” See, e.g., Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 
1686–87 (2013) (holding that under the proper interpretation of a federal removal statute, a 
noncitizen convicted in state court of marijuana possession with intent to distribute was not 
convicted of an “aggravated felony”); Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 379 (2011) (rejecting 
as “arbitrary and capricious” the BIA’s “policy for deciding when resident aliens may apply to 
the Attorney General for relief from deportation”); Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 
2580, 2581–82 (2010) (holding, contrary to the BIA’s position, that for second or subsequent 
simple drug possession offenses to qualify as “aggravated felonies,” the prosecutor must have 
charged the “existence of the prior simple possession conviction before trial, or before a guilty 
plea”). Even when the Court has sided with the government and against the noncitizen, Dean 
Johnson explains, it has done so by way of conventional statutory construction and administrative 
law principles, rather than the kind of broad, reflexive deference that historically has characterized 
judicial review of federal immigration-related lawmaking and enforcement. See Johnson, supra, 
at 127–29. Finally, as noted above, in federal preemption cases such as Arizona and Whiting, the 
Court applied conventional conflict preemption rules, essentially analyzing the challenged laws 
as ordinary regulations of labor, business, or crime rather than “immigration laws” per se. See 
supra notes 101–10 and accompanying text. Based on such decisions, Dean Johnson concludes 
that the Court has “silently moved away from anything that might be characterized as an 
immigration exceptionalism,” and imagines a plausible future in which the plenary power doctrine 
is relegated to history. Johnson, supra at 64. But see Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (2015) 
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If the Court continues this broad trend—of scrutinizing the 
government’s invocation of foreign affairs or national security; of reading 
statutes creatively to subject federal immigration law to “important 
constitutional constraints”; of eroding the constitutional salience of the 
civil–criminal distinction and giving legal weight to the often-enormous 
human consequences of removal; and of deciding most immigration cases 
on legally unexceptional grounds—it is not difficult to imagine a future 
in which the inherent sovereignty rationale has become a shell of its 
former self, occasionally recited ceremonially but rarely, if ever, 
determining the outcome of particular cases. When that day arrives and a 
majority of the Court is prepared to acknowledge that the plenary power 
doctrine has faded into irrelevance, the Chinese Exclusion Case and Fong 
Yue Ting will appear as decayed artifacts of a bygone era. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that the Supreme Court should abandon the 
long-standing presumption that the regulation of noncitizens comprises a 
discrete, constitutionally privileged domain of distinctly political subject 
matter that is inextricably linked to foreign affairs and national security. 
As Section I.A explains, that presumption functions as the logical 
lynchpin of the modern plenary power doctrine, under which the 
authority to regulate immigration is inherent in national sovereignty, 
untethered from the Constitution and buffered against judicial review.  
Notwithstanding its aura of naturalness and inevitability, the 
constitutional exceptionalism of the federal immigration power is a 
relatively recent invention and has always been an object of dissent and 
protest among the Justices. As Part II demonstrates, at the time of the 
nation’s founding and for nearly a century thereafter, American policy 
makers and judges did not conceive of immigration per se as a 
substantively or constitutionally discrete subject of lawmaking. The 
decidedly unexceptional manner in which both state and federal law 
regulated noncitizens migrating to and residing within the United States 
defies the constitutional singularity of a distinct class of exclusively 
federal immigration laws. The immigration cases decided at the height of 
the Cold War, in turn, reflect the continued absence of judicial consensus 
about the metes and bounds of the federal immigration power. Although 
those cases solidified the principle of plenary federal power, they are 
equally notable for their vigorous dissents insisting that the consignment 
                                                                                                                     
(grounding broad deference to the Executive regarding the issuance of immigrant visas in plenary 
federal power over immigration). See generally Michael Kagan, Plenary Power is Dead! Long 
Live Plenary Power!, 114 MICH L. REV. FIRST IMP. 2122–23 (observing that Kerry v. Din reflects 
a Court that is not yet prepared to “discard the plenary power doctrine entirely,” but also 
uncomfortable with the wholesale insulation of substantive immigration law from constitutional 
review, and suggesting that the Justices may be “confused and divided about how to bring the 
doctrine down for a gentle landing”). 
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of immigration exclusively to the political departments of the federal 
government, free from judicially enforceable constitutional constraints, 
is fundamentally inconsistent with constitutional liberty and the rule of 
law. 
Part III then demonstrated how mainstream constitutional norms have 
encroached in recent decades into constitutional immigration law. Cases 
such as Zadvydas and Padilla unsettled key premises of immigration 
exceptionalism. The Zadvydas majority not only declined to defer to the 
President in a removal matter, instead placing the burden on the 
Government to provide a specific, constitutionally weighty justification for 
Zadvydas’s indefinite detention; it also specifically considered and rejected 
the Government’s asserted foreign policy rationales for judicial deference. 
The Padilla majority, in turn, blurred the boundary between civil 
deportation and criminal punishment in a way that necessarily diminishes 
that boundary’s constitutional saliency. Zadvydas and Padilla thus bespeak 
the dissatisfaction on the Court with both the underlying logic and practical 
consequences of the plenary power doctrine; moreover, they signal a 
refusal among some Justices to be bound by the categorical presumptions 
that currently justify deference to the “political” judgment of Congress or 
the President. Disaggregating immigration law would dissolve those 
presumptions and subject immigration-related lawmaking and 
enforcement—including but not limited to the administration of federal 
benefits, removal, and detention—to the same constitutional guarantees of 
individual liberty and equality that apply when Congress regulates 
commerce among the several states or taxes and spends for the general 
welfare. 
Although the disaggregation of immigration law would fundamentally 
transform the constitutional landscape within which Congress and the 
President govern immigration, such a transformation is unlikely to be 
accomplished through some audacious act of judicial overturning. As Part 
III suggests, the impulse already exists in the important, if indirect, 
influence of mainstream constitutional norms on the Court’s immigration 
decisions; in the Justices’ skepticism toward the categorical presumption 
that immigration is part and parcel of foreign affairs and national security; 
and in the Justices’ willingness to press the government to justify the 
deference that it customarily receives as a matter of course. In the absence 
of a precipitous mass migration to the United States or another catastrophic 
episode of foreign terrorism, this trend is likely to continue.445 
At present, that impulse is visible at the margin of the Court’s immigration 
jurisprudence, expressed most directly in dissents but occasionally also 
seeping into its majority decisions in the context of criminal defense or 
through statutory construction. By disaggregating immigration law once and 
for all, the Court can give full expression and effect to that impulse, and thus 
end noncitizens’ century-long constitutional exile.  
                                                                                                                     
 445. Johnson, supra note 444, at 65–66. 
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